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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis is discussing the failing Kurdish nationalism between the year 1850 and 
1930. The researcher discusses various difficulties faced by the Kurdish 
nationalism, particularly due to the fact that Kurdistan was occupied by the Ottoman 
and Persian empires, followed by the arrivals of the British Empire, France and 
Russians (major allied powers) in the Middle East generally, and Kurdistan 
particularly. These powers took a great part of Kurdistan and attached them to 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran. These steps were made by the treaty of Lausanne of 1923, 
although in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, the right to establish an independent 
Kurdish state was recognized for the first time. However, due to the scattered nature 
of Kurdish nationalism in one hand, and the influence of the major allied powers in the 
region, the Kurds could not establish an independent nation-state for themselves. 
Interestingly, the Kurds proved their origin in the region with their distinctive culture, 
language and geography, but in terms of their nationalist identity, it is imperative 
to ask whether Kurdish nationalism was able to become a cohesive definition to 
introduce the Kurds within the frame of an independent state. If not, what went 
wrong to Kurdish nationalism?  
The main objective of the thesis is to show the reader that political goal of Kurdish 
nationalism is lost, and could not unite all the Kurds, but always depended on the 
foreign powers to make it live and stand, while these powers let them down. Thus, 
the Kurds need to rely on itself.   
The researcher argues that Kurdish nationalism could not become a united political 
philosophy that could attract the major allied powers towards the Kurds, and to 
make them honor their promises to the Kurdish independent state. In spite of the 
fact the Kurds had a deep-rooted culture in the region different from the Turks, 
Persians and Arabs, but in terms of awareness and education, the Kurds were to 
certain degree were illiterate in general. In other words, only few numbers of 
individuals were educated who could not have a broad influence on the Kurds.  
There are four chapters in this thesis, in which the t Chapter One is dedicated for 
the literature review defining the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ in order to serve 
identifying the Kurds as a nation. Chapter Two, discusses about the relevant 
international treaties to the Kurds and Kurdistan. Chapter Three addresses Kurdish 
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nation as a nation and how the elements of nationhood apply to the Kurds. Chapter 
Four is another important chapter of the thesis, which addresses Kurdish cause. It 
categorizes Kurdish nationalism into three stages, they are: firstly, Kurdish 
nationalism during the era of Kurdish dynasties. Secondly, during the era of 
Kurdish revolutions starting from the revolution of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri in 
1880 until 1908. The third one starts from 1908 until 1930s. The last chapter will 
be the concluding chapter.                         
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INTRODUCTION 
1. General Background  
This thesis begins with one part of a Kurdish poem by Ibrahim Ahmad, a famous Kurdish 
nationalist poet during the end of twentieth century, which says:  
“Before fire worshiping, before being Muslim, 
While captive and free, 
We were Kurds, and will remain Kurds 
I am neither Arab, nor Iranian, nor a mountainous Turk  
Not only me alone, but even the history confirms: [that] 
I am a Kurd and from Kurdistan, 
It is not shame nor pride 
Nations’ differences, 
It is a decision that the history had made 
We are Kurds, and will remain Kurds”1 
Kurdistan is a large geographical region in the Middle East and consists of mountains 
and high plains. Many primitive terms from ancient history have been used to name it, 
such as ‘Mabaina Nahrain’ i.e. Country between the Two Rivers”. The population of 
this region considers themselves native Kurds and most of the historic sources are of the 
view that Kurds and Kurdistan are two complementary terms in the region. The great 
Greek historian Herodotus referred to the Kurds as the descendants of the Medes, which 
has nowadays become the national march for the Kurds, as it was written by the Kurdish 
prominent poet Dildar who said: “We are the generations of Medes and Kay Khusraw, 
our religion and beliefs are homeland.”2 
Today the Kurds are considered the fourth largest nation in the Middle East in terms of 
numbers, with nearly fifty million people, and are members of multiple branches of 
Islam, including Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims including Alawites, Kakay, Yazidis, 
Shabak people. They still do not have an independent state for many reasons. Whatever 
the reasons may be, they can be categorized under two main categories of factors: 
internal and external facts. 
Kurds have a long history consisting of revolutions, political uprisings and armed 
conflicts against the regional and international forces. Besides that, they have their own 
famous political figures, and have sacrificed a large number of their people for the sake 
of freedom and independence for Kurdistan, though never achieved. Two centuries ago, 
                                                          
1 Umar Maaruf Barzinji., Ibrahim Ahmad: Koi Barhama Shirakani, (Kurdish), (Tra: 
Ibrahim Ahmad, All his Poems), 1st Edi, Sulaimani, 2007, 68. 
2 Dildar, Zhianu Barhami (Kurdish), (Tra: His Life and Workings), Sulaimani Publishing, 1969, p. 57.   
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in other words, which was considered as the golden ages of the Kurdish dynasties, 
Kurdistan was divided between the Ottoman and the Persian empires. These two empires 
acted like two major polar influencing dynasties and Kurds lived under their control and 
were persuaded to join the conflicts against the opposing empire. This situation 
weakened the Kurdish dynasties and caused disunity, which finally led to their 
disappearance. The last dynasties to collapse were Baban in 1851 and Botan in 1855. 
These two dynasties had strong and influential positions economically, culturally and 
politically in the region.3   
This thesis will mainly focus on a specific period related to Kurdish nationalism which 
starts from the early years of post Baban and Botan eras during the 1850s until 1930. In 
fact, Kurdish nationalism went through four significant stages during this period. This 
will be chronologically discussed as follows:  
The first stage can be named as “dark years”. This stage started immediately after the 
collapse of the two last dynasties. In this period, Kurdish society was left with no national 
ruler. In other words, there were no Kurdish authorities to control the society’s 
economic, military and political powers. The main governing powers were stemmed 
from the Ottoman and Persian empires, because the remnants of these dynasties were 
occupied and became no longer independent. This stage continued for two and half 
decades for the Kurds to re-gather their powers and reconnect different parts of Kurdistan 
in the early years of 1880s.  
The seconds stage can be named as “the birth of Kurdish armed revolution” which started 
in 1880. This revolution was led by Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri who was subsequently 
given the title of “Father of Kurdish Nationalism”. He established the Kurdish Union 
Organization which successfully gathered all the Kurdish tribes in the region. The main 
purpose was to establish a strong and widescale union among the Kurds in order to fight 
against the two empires’ existence in Kurdistan. This revolution continued for over 
another two and half decades until the establishment of the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) in 1908, which was the triggering point of the third stage, as follows;  
The third stage can be named as the “emergence of Kurdish civil organizations”. In this 
stage numerous Kurdish civil organizations published journals and newspapers in all 
                                                          
3 Zaki Beg, Muhammad Amin., Tarîkh Addua Al-Imarat Al Kurdiyah fi Ahdil Islami, (Arabic), (Tra: A 
History of states and Kurdish emirates in the Islamic Era), Al-Saadat Publishers, Egypt, 1945, pp. 22-25. 
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Kurdish, Arabic and Turkish languages. The aims of these publications were to enhance 
Kurdish public awareness about the geography Kurdistan and spread the philosophy of 
Kurdish nationalism, Kurdish identity, culture, history and Kurdish language to every 
individual as much as possible. This stage opened the door for Kurdish intellectuals and 
writers to continue in publications which never stopped until nowadays although it went 
through different circumstances throughout the twentieth century.4       
In around the same time, due to the interference of the Russian, British and French forces 
in the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs which was named at that time as ‘the sick man 
of Europe’, the internal control of the empire was shrinking day after another. Besides 
that, the ethnic minorities lived under the control of the empire were gradually more 
aware of their status, history, nationalism and identity. This was another factor that led 
to the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1920s.  
When the Word War One (hereinafter “WW1”) outbroke in 1914, the Russian, British 
Empire and French forces (hereinafter ‘the major allied forces’) arrived in the region. 
During the war, both British and French powers had secretly agreed on dividing the 
Ottoman’s lost-territories in which Kurdistan was immensely part of the agreement. The 
agreement called Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.5  
Soon after the agreement, the Kurds realized that they have the opportunity to establish 
their own independent nation-state like the other Arab states in the region. On that 
ground, they asked for their rights of independent Kurdish state to be recognized as any 
other nation-state in the early twentieth century. However, this right was not achieved 
due to the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and subsequent treaties 
of Sevres of 19206 and Lausanne 1923 by the allied forces.7 This situation led Kurdish 
nationalism to enter into the fourth stage.  
As to the fourth stage, Kurdish nationalism emerged in the form of civil and armed 
revolutions and against two frontiers. These frontiers were regional which was consisted 
of the Turks, Arabs and Persians, and international, which was consisted of Russian, 
                                                          
4 Abubaker, A. Othman, Kurdu Kurdistan la komala Wtareki Mezhuida [Tra; Kurds and Kurdistan in a 
number of historical speeches], 1st Edi, Ministry of Education Press, 2005, pp. 13-18 
5 Chomsky, N. ‘Sykes-Picot Is Failing’, Interview, July, 2013, No. 2029, Al-Akhbar English at 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16132, re-visited on 03 April 2014. 
6 ‘Tucker, Spencer and Roberts, Priscilla Mary., Vol. 4 WW1’, Encyclopedia, World War One. ABC-CLIO, 
2005, pp. 1079-1080. 
7 Page, Mevin E., Colonialism, An international Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, 
2003, p. 527. 
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British and French forces. The main aims of these revolutions were to establish an 
independent Kurdish nation in the region. The most popular revolutions were, firstly, the 
revolution led by Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji in Southern Kurdistan in 1921. Secondly, 
the revolution led by Sheikh Said Piran in Northern Kurdistan in early 1920s which 
finally ended upon executing him in 1925. Thirdly, the revolution led by Simko Shikak 
in Eastern Kurdistan throughout 1920s which ended in 1930.8                 
This thesis explores the abovementioned four stages in details. In other words, it will 
examine the Kurdish political cause and Kurdish nationalism that went through these 
four stages from the second half of the nineteenth century until 1930s in terms of both 
revolutionary and cultural perspectives.  
2. Thesis Main Question  
As previously mentioned, the current state of the Kurdish people has become one of the 
major ethnic issues known worldwide. This issue originally stems from the lack of 
owning any independent and sovereign state that defines its national, ethnic and 
geographical identity within a proper described boundary on the map. Although the right 
to establish an independent sovereign state was granted to the Kurds according to the 
Treaty of Sevres 1920, this status was subsequently withdrawn in the Treaty of Lausanne 
1923.  
Hence, the thesis’ main question is as follows:  
Why were the rights of an independent Kurdish state provided under Treaty of Sevres 
1920 were removed in its subsequent Treaty of Lausanne 1923, which became an official 
instrument that led to partitioning Kurdistan until now? What went wrong that hindered 
the establishment of Kurdistan?  
To answer the above question, it is imperative to address whether the flaws of Kurdish 
nationalism were factors for not achieving Kurdish independence. This can be done 
through examining Kurdish history from 1850 to1930, in which several Kurdish 
revolutions took place. In addition, other internal and external factors are important to 
consider. Once all these factors have been examined, then we can understand the nature 
of Kurdish nationalism.   
                                                          
8 Khwaja, Ahmad., Chim Di (Kurdi), (Tra: What I saw!), 1st Edi, Shafiq Publishing, Baghdad, 1968, 
p.130. 
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In line with Kurdish nationalism, the thesis will examine further whether there was a 
lack of a prominent and internationally known charismatic Kurdish political figure, the 
lack of an internationally supported Kurdish lobby, and whether the internal disunity and 
political discrepancies inside Kurdistan were in fact strenuous conditions that hampered 
the Kurds in imposing their rights to an independent state. The researcher will also 
examine whether regional political conditions were impeding factors for the Kurds, 
while at the same time being supportive factors for the Balfour Declaration 1917.   
3. Justification 
There are three justifications for the current thesis topic, as follows: 
Firstly, looking for sources and information available in British libraries, and those 
written by non-Kurdish writers on this current thesis topic was challenging, and Kurdish 
readers are not aware of such sources until recent years. Kurdish writers have covered 
various topics on Kurdish issues, but when they reached the issues covered in this thesis, 
they addressed them in a skeptical way with little reference to the non-Kurdish writers’ 
views and texts. In other words, they bypassed the issue without going into too much 
detail due to their lack of access to the materials here in the UK as the main references 
for writing. In addition to this, one of the barriers was the language barrier, therefore, 
they avoided dealing with this thesis question in order not to quote statements 
incorrectly. In fact, the language barrier caused problems and happened on a number of 
occasions. The researcher identified mistakes in texts translated from English into 
Kurdish. For example, occasionally, the years and the names were quoted incorrectly. 
Thus, in order to more past this skepticism, the researcher is confident that addressing 
the current thesis question is timely, valid and necessary, and directly addresses the 
controversial issue of Kurdish nationalism, and will further enrich Kurdish resources in 
the United Kingdom. It is nonetheless important to state that these foreign sources had 
impartial perspectives on the Kurdish nation; they did not favor one group over another, 
and they translated what they saw into the writings. Their writings, thus, get to the heart 
of Kurdish issues and in an objective way. Their impartialities can become a great source 
for academic writings.    
Secondly, neither the details nor any similarities to this thesis topic have been addressed 
previously by Kurdish historians and writers at the academic and higher education levels 
in any universities inside Kurdistan, despite covering the same period in history that the 
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current thesis (i.e. between 1850-1930). They have discussed the same treaties that this 
thesis examines, but they referred to them only if they were relevant to their research 
question. This means that they did not extend their analysis on these treaties, particularly 
when examining how these treaties were created by the major allied powers that were 
not in favor of an independent Kurdish nation.  
It is worth mentioning that some Kurdish writers took a narrative approach in explaining 
the incidents relevant to the current thesis topic. This is not the case for the researcher. 
The originality of the topic can be clearly seen from the nature of the thesis question 
itself which required the researcher to conduct a thorough, impartial and systematic 
analysis of all the factors relevant to the thesis question. This approach will produce a 
conclusion that contributes to the literature of Kurdish nationalism.   
4. Thesis objectives  
Upon addressing the thesis main question, the researcher aims to reveal significant 
historical issues related to the Kurds from two perspectives, they are namely, external 
and internal factors. The former one is related to the control of the external powers by 
the allied countries in general, and regional powers that surrounded the great Kurdistan 
area. These regional powers approached the major allied powers to protect their interests. 
The internal factors, on the other hand, are related to the Kurdish internal matters 
attached to Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds generally had gone through long-lasting 
internal divergence that weakened them to the degree of being unable to stand in front 
of both the major allied powers and regional powers. Such divergence could be as a 
result of geographical, cultural and religious factors that stopped the rise of a charismatic 
national symbol capable of uniting the Kurdish people.  
In the context of Kurdish nationalism, as a political principle, it is important to recognise 
the character of Kurdish nationalism against the background of its political role in 
response to all the international conflicts that took place in Kurdistan. Therefore, the 
researcher aims to find out whether the lack of awareness of a vivid Kurdish nationalism, 
which also comprises Kurdish identity, compelling external factors or all these 
circumstances together contributed to the weaknesses of Kurdish nationalism in nature. 
As previously mentioned, there are factors indicating that the Kurds live on a land that 
has considerably significant geopolitical and socioeconomic element, yet the researcher 
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examines whether or not these were exploited as reliable factors to achieve 
independence.  
5. Thesis Methodology 
In the current thesis, the researcher investigates what occurred in Kurdistan between 
the years 1850s and 1930 in order to find a convincing academic answer for why 
Kurdistan was not formed. In other words, this thesis focuses on the key historical 
facts and incidents that took place at that time. In this context, Burns suggested that 
“History is a manifold record, evaluation, systematic analysis and synthesis of 
evidence concerning human achievement. It is not a list of chronological events; it is 
rather an integrated account of the relationships between persons, events, times and 
places”.9 To apply Burns’s statement into the thesis, the researcher argues that modern 
Kurdish history does not entail a mere list of chronological events to mention, 
otherwise it would become a story text. It is far greater than this stage, as analysis is 
needed for each stage, time, period and persons, and why these persons acted in 
particular way. Once all these factors are understood, then the puzzle of Kurdish 
nationalism in the early twentieth century will be solved.    
Thus, for this type of research the researcher needs to employ a ‘qualitative approach’ 
within a ‘case study’ technique. Before explaining how the current thesis applies the 
qualitative approach, it will be more realistic to understand qualitative research 
through the following questions: What is qualitative research? What is the aim? What 
does the researcher need to do? And how does it serve the researcher to find answers 
for the current thesis? All are discussed below:  
As to the first question, Key in his book had defined qualitative research “...as a 
generic term for investigative methodologies which can bring emphasis on the enquiry 
at variables in the natural setting in which they are found”.10 Additionally, Sherman 
                                                          
9 Historical research enables the researchers to understand the past and the present in the light of the past. 
It is an act of reconstruction, undertaken in a spirit of critical inquiry and prevents us from reinventing the 
wheel. Thus, those involved in historical education research cannot create new data and must work with 
what already exists although some of it may be unknown at the start of the research and only comes to light 
through the investigation. Much historical research is conducted in detective-like fashion, wearable 
information is attracted to a source, those knowledgeable about the event or situation contracted and used 
as informants and documents located. In general, quality historical research depends on sufficient primary 
data rather than secondary data. Burns, Robert B., Introduction to research methods, Sage, London, 1990, 
pp. 481-486. 
10 Key, James P., Research Design in Occupational Education, Oklahoma State University, 1997, at 
http://www.okstate.edu/ag/agedcm4h/academic/aged5980a/5980/newpage21.htm, re-visited on 16 May 
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quoted Edson’s argument that “…‘qualitative research’ is an enquiry in a form of 
‘moral discourse’ which means an attempt to understand ourselves in relation to the 
larger world relevant to a particular matter”.11  
Mason provided a much simpler explanation by saying that:  
“…qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical position which is 
broadly `interpretivist' in the sense that it is concerned with how the social 
world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced based on two 
methods: the first one is methods of data generation which are flexible and 
sensitive to the social context in which data are produced. The second one 
is methods of analysis and explanation building which involve 
understandings of complexity, detail and context.” 12  
Since the current thesis takes a qualitative approach, the researcher aims to seek 
answers to the question, what went wrong in Kurdish nationalism in the early decades 
of twentieth century? The researcher depends on collecting primary sources in order 
to produce findings that were not determined in advance by anyone else, sources which 
are related to the nature of Kurdish nationalism in the early twentieth century.  
As to the third question; what does the researcher need to do? The researcher 
implements Mason’s approach of qualitative research. According to Mason, the 
following steps must be taken by the researcher in order to effectively contribute to 
the relevant literature of a particular topic: 
Firstly, conduct systematic and rigorous research. This means that the researcher has 
to use key principles of research design such as linking the research questions to the 
methodological approaches, considering issues of analysis and data collection as 
integrated and being clear about the purposes of the research.  
Secondly, the research should produce social explanations to intellectual puzzles, like 
the puzzle of Kurdish issues that have lasted for a century. Moreover, the researcher 
                                                          
2016. This approach is frequently criticized for not allowing generalizations to be made, and this argument 
has some validity. However, other observers argue that ‘generalisability’ need not be a problem in 
qualitative research’. Still, if we contrast case study research with larger quantitative comparative studies 
there is an apparent trade-off between their respective advantages. See also “Qualitative Research Methods: 
A Data Collector’s Field Guide”, Module 1, Qualitative Research Methods Overview, Family Health 
International, p. 1, at http://www.ccs.neu.edu/course/is4800sp12/resources/qualmethods.pdf, re-visited on 
20 May 2016. 
11 Sherman, Robert R. & Webb, Rodman B., Qualitative Research In Education, USA, Routledge, 
University of Florida, 1988, at p. 2. See also Trochim, William M.K., Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
2006, Web Center for Social Research Methods. Available at 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/order.php, re-visited on 15 May 2016. 
12 Mason, J., Qualitative Researching, London, Sage, 1996. p.4.  
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is explicit about the rationales that have produced these explanations through a 
selection of events for analysis, and what the main role of the researcher is in the 
findings.13  
Based on the above explanations, the researcher set the thesis’ methodology through 
employing the data classification discusses in the following section.  
The researcher can only depend on one type of sources; that is documents,14 which 
can be primary or secondary sources. For example, for a document to be a primary 
source, it should be either a copy of a legal document, or any work, letter or diary 
written by a witness to the events, but the secondary sources are second-hand versions 
and therefore less immediate. Nevertheless, secondary sources can be used as back-up 
data and when primary data is not available. Detailed below is how the researcher 
categorised the useful and dependable data.  
i. Primary sources 
Primary sources comprise the most important component of the thesis. Generally, as 
Burns suggested that “…for primary sources documents are the most common, which 
range from newspapers and committee reports to songs, tales and ballads, and to more 
personal diaries, letters and memories. Burns further suggested that some documents 
are intentional, produced for public consumption, while others are unpremeditated, 
written for personal use, the intended different purpose of the various types of 
document affect the validity of the information they contain.”15  
In line with the above, the researcher mainly referred to the documents discussing 
Kurdish nationalism, the political circumstances of the region including Arabs and 
Turkish nationalism, and the stands of the wining major allied powers of WW1 and 
                                                          
13 Ibid.  
14 Normally, there are four types of data sources to be used in historical research; documents, oral records, 
artefacts and quantitative records. The researcher states that firstly, the current thesis’ question seeking 
answers to issues related to Kurdish nationalism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
there is no oral record narrating the political environment in the region at that time. Secondly, any artefact 
existing in Kurdish museums can serve the aims of this thesis on a limited basis apart from indicating 
Kurdish identity. Although Kurdish identity comprises a great characteristic of Kurdish political issues, the 
available items at the museums are not displayed in such a way as to connect them to the Kurdish political 
issues, i.e. they are focused on archaeological perspectives and are related to ancient Kurdish societies. 
Thus, the researcher finally decided not to rely on these artefacts for the thesis. Finally, Kurdish issues 
particularly at that time were not an issue to be addressed by a survey distributed to the public, at least 
among those who were educated in the society. Based on this presumption, no quantitative records on 
Kurdish issues can contribute to the thesis question. 
15 Burns, supra, note 9, p. 485.  
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the regional political circumstances in the Middle East. Following this, all the 
international instruments of Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916, Balfour Declaration 1917, 
treaty of Sevres 1920, and Treaty of Lausanne 1923 are the primary sources directly 
related to this thesis. The researcher found relevant documents, statements, 
newspapers among other documents written at that time in the following locations:  
Firstly, Record Centres in the UK 
These centres are ‘British National Archives’ at Kew, and British Library in London. 
As to the former one, obtaining original historical documents from this archive was 
crucial for the thesis’ main question. The researcher found that writing on Kurdish 
issues in the early twentieth century will require significant reference to this archive, 
otherwise it will lead to a less significant contribution to the literature. The reason is 
that British Empire was one of the major and powerful states that controlled a vast 
area of Mesopotamia generally, and Kurdistan particularly. The researcher visited the 
archive three times and found the most relevant and contributory sources for the 
research. For example, the documents obtained included primary sources from the 
British foreign policy documents, maps and writings of the commissioners and other 
local rulers to the British commissioners, as will be elaborated in the thesis’s main 
body.  
The British Library in London is another significant centre that the researcher visited 
to consult its materials. Although it was indeed worth visiting this great library, the 
researcher found that most of the sources relevant to the thesis’s question were also 
available at the British National Archives. Nevertheless, there were important 
textbooks written at that time that had contributory inputs to the thesis literature. For 
example, the books written by James Baillie Fraser on his famous book titled “Travels 
in Koordistan [Kurdistan], Mesopotamia, Etc. Including an Account of Parts of Those 
Countries Hitherto Unvisited by Europeans: With Sketches of the Character and 
Manners of the Koordish [Kurdish] and Arab Tribes”, written in 1840. Similarly, 
Claudius James Rich’s book titled “Narrative of a residence in Koordistan, and on the 
site of ancient Nineveh; with journal of a voyage down the Tigris to Bagdad, and an 
account of a visit to Shiraz and Persepolis, by C.J. Rich, ed. by his widow”. Both 
writers focused on Kurdish culture and lifestyles before the year 1850. These can be 
relied on when discussing Kurdish identity in the subsequent chapters. As to the writes 
after that date, Basil Nikitin was a Russian connoisseur who lived during the late 
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Ottoman Empire, and witnessed the events after WW1. The Royal British Diplomat 
Cecil John Edmonds (1889-1979) was another benchmark in this context, and will be 
referred to in the thesis’s main text.  
In this context, Major Soane (1881-1923) was a prominent expert of the Kurds, a 
Kurdologist and wrote an interesting and controversial book about the Kurds, their 
language and culture. He worked at one time for the Imperial Bank of Iran and is 
probably best known for his book “To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise”. In 
this book he recounts a journey he made from Constantinople to Baghdad disguised 
as a Persian traveler. He spoke Persian, Arabic and was an acknowledged expert on 
the Kurdish language. There are some other writes who visited Kurdistan during the 
period of which the current thesis focuses on their writings are considered as a primary 
source for Kurdish nationalism during the early twentieth century, and will be 
mentioned in the main body of the thesis. 
The reason for depending on their writings is that they referred to and evaluated the 
political, social, language status, even psychological aspects, identity and nationalist 
senses of the Kurds during the period of which the thesis covers. In other words, they 
recorded all the facts about the Kurds for a future audience. Besides that, there were 
Kurdish writers who were contemporaneous to those foreign writers, yet the Kurdish 
writers’ thoughts were based on Kurdish backgrounds from inside, while the foreign 
writers had an outside perspective. Thus, no historical analysis to the Kurdish issues 
can be made in a proper way without significantly relying on these foreign writers.    
Secondly, Kurdish Library resources 
These include the research institutes that the researcher consulted in order to obtain 
original Kurdish texts on the subject. Although these centres are in early stages of 
development, there are plausible efforts to collect the manuscripts and all other 
documents on Kurdish history in South Kurdistan. 
a. The main Library of Sulaimani University. 
b. Zhin Centre – which is one of the centres that focuses on collecting the historical 
documents of Kurdistan at different periods in history. 
c. Institute of Strategic research studies – although this centre is sponsored by the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Party it gives particular attention to the history of 
the Kurds. 
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The researcher obtained the following the documents, which are considered primary 
sources: 
a. Books 
There are two books on the Kurds that are considered primary sources; Sharaf al-Din 
Bitlisi, a medieval Kurdish historian and poet (1543-1599), wrote Sharafnama in 1597 
in the Persian language. This is regarded as the main source on medieval Kurdish 
history. He advised the Kurds to be united and stay together against foreign powers 
and wrote of the weaknesses of the Kurdish elites when they met non-Kurdish powers. 
As for more recent history, Amin Zaki (1880–1948),16 was a Kurdish writer, historian, 
Iraqi statesman and politician who witnessed and reported many important events 
during those days, in his book on Kurds and Kurdistan, he discussed the issues 
surrounding Kurdish nationalism in the twentieth century on Kurds and Kurdistan in 
which he also discussed Kurdish nationalism issues in those days. He explained how 
Kurdistan was partitioned and the role that should be taken by the Kurdish 
revolutionists and nationalists. 
b. Diaries 
As to the diaries, Rafiq Hilmi (1898–1960) was a Kurdish historian, writer and 
politician and was the founder of the Kurdish party Hîwa in 1938 and the author of 
many books on the history of Kurdistan and the Kurdish language. He wrote his 
famous Yadasht (Diary) on the Kurdish revolutions and Malik Mahmood during the 
early 1920s. Therefore, his diary was published and is now considered a primary 
source. 
c. Newspapers 
The researcher found many interesting newspapers from the early twentieth century 
which dealt with Kurdish issues during those days, such as Zhin which was followed 
by Zhyanawa , and others that encouraged the Kurds to stand against the major allied 
powers, and Turkish and Persian plans in the region. These will be referred to 
throughout the thesis.  
  
                                                          
16 Zaki Beg, supra, note 3. 
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d. Ballads 
There were also several Kurdish poets who wrote about Kurdish nationalism, like 
Ahmadi Khani (1650-1707). In the early twentieth century, others wrote poems on 
Kurdish culture, issues and nationalism, like the prominent Kurdish poet, novelist and 
journalist Tawfeq Mahmoud Hamza known as Piramerd (1867-1950) and Haji Qadir 
Koyee (1817-1897) who carried on a nationalistic message from Ahmadi Khani. There 
are other poets whose writings are greatly relevant to the thesis’s main question. For 
example, when the thesis focuses on Kurdish identity, these poets tell us how 
important it was to speak in the Kurdish language in order to show that the Kurds were 
different from the Turks, Arabs and Persian. These poets also encouraged the Kurds 
to be proud of being ‘Kurd’ like any other nations in the region. They indeed had roles 
in reviving Kurdish nationalism in their times, as will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapters.       
ii. Secondary sources  
There are several text books about the Kurds and Kurdish issues, which are written by 
scholars on the topic, like David McDowall, who wrote his book on Modern History 
of the Kurds, which will be referred to as a secondary, but still significant’ source.  
For example, when McDowall talks about Kurdish society during the early twentieth 
century, he claimed that almost every tribe and tribal section also possesses a strong 
sense territorial identity alongside ideas of ancestor.17 This could be partially true and 
on line with the researcher’s hypothesis, i.e. ‘disunity among the Kurds’, but he did 
not distinguish the fact that the sense of nationalism was already existed in the minds 
of Kurdish individuals. That is why they could not accept the controls of Persians and 
Ottomans for centuries before. Besides that, Kurdish leaders were aware of that sense 
of nationalism, and all they needed to do was to bring them under one umbrella. Thus, 
talking about Kurdish revolutions in the period in issue will needs more explorations 
which the task of the current thesis is. Yet, his book is significant when it examines 
various Kurdish issues like society, politics, nationalism, religion and geography.  
There are other important Kurdish historians who covered significant parts of Kurdish 
nationalism. For example, Kamal Mazhar whose books are prominent ones and the 
                                                          
17 McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds, [3rd Edi Rev], I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, (1996), pp. 
13-17. 
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most relied ones in Kurdish library. The researcher argues that without reference to 
his books, the thesis will not meet the main thesis question. Yet, it is important to 
mention that his books are following narrative approach when he examined different 
facts and incidents took place during the early twentieth century. One can understand 
that he tries to convince the reader that religion had influence on the failure of most of 
Kurdish revolutions. For instance, when he talked about the battle of Shaibah near 
Basra of 1914 between the English troops and the Ottomans, he argued that religion 
was the main factor for Sheikh Mahmood as a Kurdish leader to join the Arabs and 
the Ottomans in the battle.18 However, the researcher does not necessarily agree with 
the author, as Sheikh Mahmood later on negotiated with the British Empire in order 
to be recognised as the king of Kurdistan notwithstanding that he was a religious man. 
He was trying to establish an independent Kurdish nation-state. He refused the 
Ottoman’s control in Kurdistan. If that was for religion, he would not stand against the 
Ottomans and subsequently negotiate with the British Empire during the early years 
of 1920s. So, his sense of nationalism and popularity in the region pushed him to fight 
against the English troops in Shaibah battle, and not religion.    
Next, Jamal Nabaz’s books and writings are important as well. He is one of the 
prominent Kurdish historians in the twentieth century whose works were on Kurdish 
nationalism and Kurdish revolutions. His thoughts are secular in general within the 
context Kurdish nationalism. In his writings, he mainly gives particular importance to 
Kurdish language, geography and culture. For him, as long as these elements exist, the 
Kurds will remain, principally language. He argued that a standard unified language 
will be certainly the main door for independence. Conversely, the researcher argues 
that standard unified language will not be the main factor for Kurdish unity. Kurdish 
language is rich in vocabulary and diversified across Kurdistan in which standardizing 
and unifying it will be an impossible task to do. So, Kurdish nationalism can succeed 
to achieve in establishing an independent Kurdish nation-state through national unity 
of the Kurds throughout Kurdistan similar to Jewish nationalism. 
As to Arab writers, Satih Al-Husri’s publications was an important source and contributory 
to the thesis. His book Ma Hiya Al Qaumiyah? Which means: What is Nationalism? indeed 
                                                          
18 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar., Chand Laparayak La Mezhui Gali Kurd (Kurdish), (Tra: Some Pages in 
the History of Kurdish Nation), (2nd Edi), Ministry of Education Publishing, Erbil, (2001), pp. 13-23.  
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helped the researcher to compare Kurdish nationalism with Arab nationalism. 
However, when dealing with Kurdish nationalism issues the researcher discusses the 
opinions of some Arab nationalists like Abdulrahman Kawakibi whose works, and 
speeches were quoted in Al-Husri’s book. Both Kawakibi and Al-Husri were 
recognised as the founders of Arab nationalism. That is why is it necessary to refer to 
their works as secondary sources. 
6. Thesis Structure  
This thesis is comprised of four main chapters apart from the introductory and conclusion 
chapters. The current chapter focused on the general background on the thesis topic, main 
research question, methodology, objectives and challenges. Chapter One focuses on the 
existing literature on nation and nationalism, which covers the topics of concepts of 
‘nation’ and nationalism Arab and non-Arab forms of nationalism, followed by territorial 
and pan-nationalism. Chapter Two will be mainly on the international and regional 
treaties and agreements in relations to Kurdistan, in which it will be examining the 
emergence of Otto-Persian treaties, treaties of Erzurum I of 1823, and II of 1847. Then it 
will be examining the treaties of Sevres of 1920, and Lausanne of 1923. Then the Chapter 
will turn to the topic on the Kurds: a critical appraisal. Chapter Three will be on the 
historical analysis of Kurdish national identity, which will examine Kurdish identity and 
Kurdistan, Kurdish language and culture, Sufism and Kurdish national identity. Chapter 
Four will be mainly on the emergence of Kurdish issues and nationalism by starting with 
Kurdish issues, Kurdish nationalism, and emergence of Kurdish national awareness. 
Under the later topic, the chapter will examine Kurdish organizations before 1930, 
Kurdish newspapers and magazines before 1930, Kurdish nationalist poetry and 
revolutions before 1930, Kurdish nationalist poetry and Kurdish revolutions between 
1850-1930. Finally, the chapter will turn into examining the last question: why Kurdish 
nationalism failed in the early twentieth century? After all these various interrelated topics 
being examined, the thesis will turn into the concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
EXISTING LITERATURE ON NATION AND NATIONALISM 
1.1 Introduction 
Like any other nation, Kurds have their own sense of nationalism which is rooted within 
the Kurdish communities both inside or outside of Kurdistan notwithstanding that its 
strength was varied from a time to another.  
Before starting the chapter, it is important to recall that the thesis will explore two 
important issues in detail; firstly, an examination of the internal factors among the 
Kurds. These factors were directly related to the existent movement known as 
‘Kurdish nationalism’. Secondly, the external factors that led to the weakening of the 
Kurds in the region in many aspects, which is why they were left helpless and left 
Kurdistan partitioned. 
Furthermore, the academic contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate whether 
Kurdish nationalism lacked an independent political philosophy, or whether it was 
heavily influenced by the imported nationalism of the Turks, Persians and Arabs. To 
do that, the thesis will first examine the relationships between civil and armed 
revolutions that served Kurdish nationalism. The civil revolution took place in the 
form of Kurdish journalism as a medium of communication, writers and poets which 
was backing and representing Kurdish armed revolutions at internal and external 
levels. In the meantime, they gave particular attentions to Kurdish culture, language 
and educate Kurdish individuals on that rhythm in order to break the influence of Arab, 
Turkish and Persian cultures on Kurdish society. So, it will examine whether they 
were only successful to protect Kurdish identity, culture and language or not? Also, it 
will examine whether the armed revolutions were able to become an umbrella to 
control and achieve the goal of independent Kurdistan or not? This contribution will 
be achieved through critical review of the incidents took place from 1880s to 1930 in 
Kurdistan that will require significant references to the archives and primary sources, 
otherwise it will lead to a less significant contribution to the literature.  
Next, the contribution of this chapter derives from the fact that it will be unrealistic to 
deal with the above matters without having a clear understanding of the concepts of 
‘Nation’ and Nationalism. Once, the two terms are clearly defined and explained, then 
it will be important to consider Arab and non-Arab Forms of Nationalism like Turkish 
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nationalism as the Arabs and Turks were the neighboring and closest nations to the 
Kurds. Later on, Territorial and Pan-Nationalism will be discussed.  
1.2 The concepts of ‘Nation’ and Nationalism 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘nation’ refers to ‘a large body of 
people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular 
state or territory’.19 The concept of ‘nation’ has connections to what is known as ‘ethnic 
community’, and is also sometimes referred to as a ‘civic identity’. Peter Alter suggested 
that the term ‘nation’ shares a common myth from the descendants transferred from one 
generation to another. There should be a common history, a distinctive culture, a 
common territorial association, and by a group of people who have a sense of 
solidarity.20  
It is important to mention here that there is no clear definition of ‘nation’, and explaining 
it remains long-standing dispute, which makes it difficult to analyze, as perceived by 
Anderson.21 However, in this chapter, the researcher attempts examine the term ‘nation’ 
to head for understanding the term nationalism subsequently.   
The term ‘nation’ is originally rooted from the natural identity of the individuals to see 
themselves as being different to others. However, the idea of being a nation or being part 
of a nation is sourced from the individuals’ minds and opinions which makes them 
exhibit some of their important characteristics as a nation. The first step to finding the 
identity leads the individuals to search for their identities through their feelings created 
collectively with the other individuals of the same nation. In this context, Bagehot said:  
“The problem of ‘nation-making’—that is, the explanation of the origin of nations 
such as we now see them, and such as in historical times they have always been — 
cannot, as it seems to me, be solved without separating it into two: one, the making 
of broadly-marked races, such as the negro, or the red man, or the European; and the 
second, that of making the minor distinctions, such as the distinction between 
Spartan and Athenian, or between Scotchman and Englishman. Nations, as we see 
them, are (if my arguments prove true) the produce of two great forces: one the race-
making force which, whatever it was, acted in antiquity, and has now wholly, or 
almost, given over acting; and the other the nation-making force, properly so called, 
                                                          
19 ‘Oxford Dictionaries’, (n.d.)., at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nation, re-visited  
on 07 May 2014. 
20 Alter, P. Nationalism, London, Edward Arnold, 1989, p. 7. 
21 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verso, 2006, p.3. 
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which is acting now as much as it ever acted, and creating as much as it ever 
created”.22 
To relate this statement to the Kurds as a nation, as a ‘broadly-marked race’, the Kurds 
are the descendants of the Aryan race from the Indo-European family and have been 
living in the Middle East from the time of antiquity, on a specified territory distinguished 
from the other races in the Middle East by virtue of their distinctive culture, language 
and common history. Thus, like Scotsmen who are not Englishmen, the Kurds are not 
Arabs, Turks nor Persians, although the latter two nations are also Indo-Europeans.     
In fact, this definition is broad and has a multi-dimensional aspect, however, apart from 
this opinion, there was a need for people to depend on the nation itself for their identity. 
For example, Renan suggested that nations are comprised of a general and continuous 
referendum.23 This statement establishes a sort of psychological self-confidence that 
became the gateway for another component of nation and nationhood, that is, the 
awareness of the nation that creates an association between the individuals of a common 
background. Hence, the question of national identity and independence is likely to 
emerge among the people. Renan was a French philosopher, historian and writer who 
dedicated his life and works to his native province of Brittany. He is best known for his 
influential historical works and political theories, especially concerning nationalism 
and national identity. One can argue that his sense of nationalism and focus on national 
identity was the compelling factor that made him believe that the existence of any nation 
should rely on a continuous referendum to be updated and continue to exist.  
In the Middle East, the concept of nationalism has a more formal shape, the new modern 
Turkish state was established upon the philosophy of ‘Turkism’ that considered the 
Kurds to be the mountainous Turks which further deprived them of their basic national 
rights. The Iraqi Baathist party re-established Iraq upon the philosophy of nationalist 
Baathist in the late 1960s. It initially recognized Kurdish identity, as mentioned by Aflaq 
in 1969, the founder of the Baath Party in Iraq, and it was only after a long-lasting 
Kurdish revolution, that the Baath party agreed to sign the Declaration of 11 March 1970, 
which recognized the Iraqi Kurds’ rights to their languages, culture and history. 
However, this right was limited to the boundary of one unitary state, Iraq. Thus, as an 
                                                          
22 Bagehot, Walter, Physics and Politics or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural 
Selection and Inheritance to Political Society, Batoche Books Kitchener, 2001, p.52.  
23 Renan, Ernest., What is a nation? Vol. 2, Tapir Press, 1996, pp. 23-25.   
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Arab nationalist movement, the Baath party recognized Kurdish identity, but did not 
allow Kurdish to spread beyond to political or national issues.24 That is why the 
Declaration of 1970 was not successful.  For Kurds, so as to preserve their identity in 
accordance with Renan’s opinion, they must update their identity continuously in order 
to survive the influences of other nations like the Turks, Arabs and Persians.  
Although national identity evidently predates the struggle for national recognition and 
dignity, one can argue that when a nation without a state is unrecognized by another 
nation, the unrecognized state struggles to establish a state, which further leads them to 
revolt until they are recognized as a nation with all its particulars and characteristics and 
is protected. For example, the Kurdish nation has fought for nearly a century and a half 
against the process of Turkification, and the subsequent Arabization and influence of 
Persian politics. 
In the late nineteenth century, the world seen three important phenomena: British 
industry, the American economy and the German capitalism, which inter-influenced 
each other in terms of nation and nationhood. Hobsbawm, quoted that “…we are forced 
to look after the world’s economy, and respect the general interests of all the states, 
although that does not mean we should not prioritize the economic status of our 
country.”25 
As for the term ‘nationalism, the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “an extreme 
form of patriotism marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries” and 
“Advocacy of political independence for a country”, such as Scottish nationalism.26 
‘Kurdish nationalism’ conforms to this definition. Many writers define the term 
‘nationalism’ from their own perspectives. For example, Rothi defines nationalism as a 
belief or political ideology that involves an individual identifying with or becoming 
attached to his or her nation, which further establishes a feeling of national identity. At 
this juncture, unlike the Oxford English Dictionary definition, Rothi differentiated 
between the sense of nationalism and what comprises patriotism. For Rothi, ‘patriotism’ 
entails the social continuity and personal behaviors that support their states’ decisions 
                                                          
24 Zaki Beg, Muhammad Amin., Tarîxî Kurd û Kurdistan, (Kurdish), (Tra: A Short History of the Kurds 
and Kurdistan), Dar al-Islami Publishers, Baghdad, 1931. See also Bengio, Ofra., Saddam's Word: The 
Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford University Press, 2002, at pp.5-7. 
25 Hobsbawm, Eric., Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, Hachette UK, 2010, Chapter 7. 
26 Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 19.  
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and actions,27 while the Oxford English Dictionary made a strong connection between 
both terms. According to Rothi’s definition, however, one can see that both nationalism 
and patriotism complement each other in such a way that one cannot be useful without 
the other. Thus, it is the sense of ‘nationalism’ that gives birth to patriotism, while 
‘patriotism’ provides technical support and maintenance to ‘nationalism’ through the 
individual’s positive behavior. Through patriotism, the individuals love their country, 
and prove this love through supporting their country’s institutions and, sometimes, their 
government. However, nationalism seems a more clearly-defined programme, which 
aims at national independence, territory, and the assertion of national rights.  
Next, Motyl has looked upon nationalism from a sociological perspective, and gives 
particular importance to the sequence or the lifetime of nationalism, in which the 
beginning of the nationalism process has influences on its later stages, even on 
contemporary nationalism. For Motyl, there are pre-modernist and modernist 
perspectives of nationalism. As to the former, nationalism comes from the reflection of 
an ancient time in a particular society, which took on an evolutionary pattern that humans 
needed in order to organize themselves into different groupings based on a close 
relationship by virtue of their color, race, language, or their affinity of birth. Motyl has 
described modern nationalism, on the other hand nationalism as a recent phenomenon 
that necessitates structured circumstances of modern society in order to exist.28 
Furthermore, Paul James argues that in order to achieve subjective modern nationalism, 
a reference to primordial statements is necessary.29Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, 
and in line with James statement, understanding Kurdish primordial claims is essential 
to developing an understanding of modern Kurdish nationalism before 1916, which will 
be discussed in Chapter Five.   
In Germany, the concept of nationalism did not alter from the traditional, essentially 
political, conception of nationhood to an ethno-cultural concept. For example, the 
question of Alsace-Lorraine led to the ideological emphasis of the French political, 
against the German ethno-cultural, understanding of nationhood. The German historian 
Mommsen said ‘…it is possible that Alsace is German by race and by language, but it is 
                                                          
27 Rothi, D., ‘National attachment and patriotism in a European nation: A British study’, Political 
Psychology, (2005), no. 26, 135-155.  
28 Motyl, A., Encyclopedia of Nationalism, San Diego Academic Press, 2001, p.251. 
29 James, P., Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In, Sage Publications, London, 
2006, pp.290-296. 
 
21 
 
French by nationality and by its sense of fatherland.”  This sense was similarly developed 
by Renan, as suggested by Brubaker. 30 Therefore, one can see that the Germans thought 
that the state would not construct the ‘nation’ rather, on the contrary, the nation would 
construct the state, which means that people have no legal rights to their fatherland, but 
that it is the common basis of ethnicity, language and culture that construct a state.  
Hence, Giddens chose to be silent about the special will of the nationalists in establishing 
their own nation-state, while Kohn focused on the psychological component of 
nationalism as a high egoistic feeling by the citizens to establish a nation-state. He quoted 
that “every nation contemplates itself through the medium of self-conceit, and draws 
conclusions to its own advantage, which individuals then adopt to themselves with 
complacency, because they confound and interweave their private and their national 
character.”31 Kohn’s view seems to be narrowing the meaning of nationalism because he 
linked ‘nationalism with nation-state’. For him, there is no nationalism without a nation-
state. If we analyze Kohn’s view, it can be argued that he automatically separated 
stateless nations from the definition of nationalism, (like the Kurdish nation) while he 
considers himself as one of the strongest figures on the theory of nationalism.  
Thus, the term ‘nationalism’ can generally be defined as a natural phenomenon because 
from humanity’s earliest stage, humans have wanted to establish contact with those who 
understand their language. Nationalism itself is a neutral concept; as Gellner suggested, 
nationalism does not have a specific political color, it will get its color from its 
surroundings. The history, geography, politics and culture of a state contribute to a 
specific form of nationalism.32 The nationalists might change their own nature in 
different historic ages; therefore, researching nationalism in any country needs to take 
into consideration the particular circumstances and goals of nationalism in that 
country. The concept of nationalism should not be considered separately. It is not a 
distinct part of theoretical history; rather, it should be discussed in relation to a specific 
experience in a particular time and place. It appears with its own specification and cannot 
be repeated in other places.  
                                                          
30 Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press, 2009, 
p.12. 
31 Kohn, Hans., The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins And Background, Transaction Publishers, 
1961, p. 371. 
32 Gellner, Ernest, Nation and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, New York, 1983, pp. 1-5. 
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Next, nationalism appears with two different goals: firstly, nationalism can stand for 
freedom, equality and justice, therefore it can be viewed as a struggle for freedom against 
oppression and invasion. Secondly, nationalism means chauvinism and racism. When 
the major allied powers came to the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, they opened the door for nationalism emerging in a more significant way. 
However, the newly established states exploited this concept of nationalism and mixed 
it with an ideology against the rights and existence of other nations. For example, forces 
used against the Kurdish nation throughout history include the Turkish Kamalist, the 
Baath regime and Persians, and in particular the Anfal-genocide campaign and the 
restraining of the Kurdish revolution and uprising of the main actors.     
Earnest Gellner and John Breuilly in their book titled: Nations and Nationalism stated 
that a sense of nationalism can define then create nations, not vice-versa. According to 
them, one must acknowledge that the culture historically inherited by these nations will 
be subject to change because of nationalism. Subsequently, nationalism revives dead 
languages and norms, but this does not indicate that nationalism is invented by newly 
created, manmade ideology,33 that it can be argued that nationalism is first instilled by 
intellectuals or elites. In this context, nationalism would not have arisen in Kurdistan if 
European intellectuals had not initiated the debate about nationalism at the heart of active 
political groups 34 Lastly, Smith states that nationalism appears through politicizing 
ethics. Nationalists are not able to take ownership of national legends or give meaning 
to any traditions. Nationalism centers on political independence and territorial unity.35  
1.3 Arab and non-Arab Forms of Nationalism  
In the Arab world, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi is regarded as the father of Arab 
nationalism. Nineteenth century writers in Sham also played a role in initiating Arabic 
cultural nationalism, like Haider Asshahabi, followed by Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Butrus al-
Bustani, and Adib Ishaq whom, like al-Kawakibi, emphasized the unity of Arabs on the 
basis of land, i.e. that of the ethnic nation and not on the basis of religion. They also 
considered political suppression as equal to religious suppression. Kawakibi’s finger was 
pointed to those nations of the western Saharan people because they were not considered 
                                                          
33 Gellner, Ernest & Breuilly, John, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp.53-54 
34 Ibid. 
35 Smith, Anthony D., Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History: Key Concepts, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, 
Chapter Four.   
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as part of the Arabic world throughout the nineteenth, and many years of the twentieth, 
centuries. Kawakibi’s belief could not reach beyond the theory of Khalafat. Khalafat is 
thought to be political right i.e. to be elected by the people, but for Kawakibi, Khalafat 
must be established on the basis of ethnicity. In this context, writes like Satih Al-Husri, 
depended on the constitutional principle that states: people are the source of power, and 
the Khalifa is elected by the people.” Additionally, for Kawakibi Khalafat is a spiritual 
post to be determined on the basis of time. In other words, Khalifah’s role is a religious 
role and not a political one. This separation was gradually becoming the back bone of 
modern Arab nationalism.36  
After WW1, the question of the ethnicity and religion of eastern Arab societies took on 
a new dimension acknowledged by Satih Al-Husri. He was initially attached to the 
Ottomans on the basis of religious unity, but later he diverted his thoughts towards 
Arabism as he was influenced by the classical thoughts of German and French 
nationalism, particularly Fichte’s writings.  
For Al-Husri, ‘nation is a separate issue from land, since nationalism is a natural element 
of humans. Common language and shared history is the forceful power of nationalism.’ 
He rejected the religious, economic and cultural relationships, and presented himself as 
a domestic nationalist who stood strongly against religious and cultural nationalism of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Al-Husri was a secular Arab nationalist who believed 
that pan-Islamism was no longer effective and would soon diminish.37   
In fact, the emergence of Arab nationalism, if compared with Kurdish nationalism, Zain 
Nooradin Zain stated in his research on the rise of Arab nationalism stated that ‘during 
the nineteenth century, Islam was a deeply rooted religion in the East Arab regions, in 
such a way the new thought of western nationalism could not only break thought it, but 
even Islam (as the religion of the majority of the region) was able to stand against all the 
efforts of the sense of nationalism including secularism in the region.’ Similarly, it is not 
possible to consider that this political nationalism was just born out of internal conflicts 
                                                          
36 Al-Husri, Satih., Ma Hiya Al Qaumiyah? (Arabic) (Tra: What is Nationalism? Arab United Studies 
Centre, Beirut, 1985, p.108. 
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and spiritual instabilities that the Arabs finally came to realise from their own civilization 
alone.38 However, Said, who was a contemporary of Zain, argued the opposite, 
that…when the WW1 out broke, the Ottoman empire collapsed, then national states 
appeared before the concept of nationalism. At that point, the Arab nation’s league 
emerged, which first called for re-establishing the nation-states which existed 
geopolitically in the region.39  
The concept of Arab nationalism seems to have some harsh elements against non-Arab 
nations. For example, in a multi-racial society where the majority of the population is 
Arabic, like Iraq, where the Kurds are a moderately crowded population in their own 
geographical area, one can see that the Arab nationalists who considered themselves as 
the representatives of the majority of people in Iraq, did not allow other minorities to 
speak out about their own nationalism. That is how they became a source of suppression 
to the Kurds in Iraq throughout the twentieth century. When the first generation of Arab 
nationalists were beginning to work on the administrative tasks in their newly formed 
countries, their personal interests were parallel to the western nations’ interests in the 
region, on account of their people’s welfare and regional well-being. That is why the 
British Empire and the French provided support for Arab nationalism at this stage, 
especially during the first decade of the twentieth century.  
In fact, Arab nationalism was suggested to be weak during the early twentieth century 
until after WW1. The reasons were that, as Nazimi argued, Arab nationalism was too 
weak or too fragmented to understand the happenings in the region, which is why they 
had to choose to either support the Ottomans or the British Empire, which supported the 
Husseins project for the region. In Iraq, nationalist activities increased between the years 
1914 to 1918.40That means, Arab nationalism was baseless and was literally created by 
outside support served to strengthen Arab nationalism against the Ottoman empire. This 
support did not last long as they also stood against the Arab nationalists in the following 
decades. In this context, Kawtharani stated that: “…through using oppressive forces 
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against the civic action by those communities who were directly living under the control 
of the major allied powers, they [the major allied powers] also worked to miscarry the 
projects of establishing new national states with all their structures and shapes set by 
these people.”41However, the Arab nation-states continued to be established until 1950. 
That means if the Arab nationalism was not baseless, then the major allied power could 
not interfere in the Arab world and its nationalism.   
To illustrate Kawtharani’s view, we can look at the history of the British Army’s 
repression of the Iraqi Arab revolutions that took place between 1914 and 1918, and the 
revolution of 1920 on one hand, and repressing the Kurdish Malik Mahmood revolution 
that took place between 1919 and 1922 on the other hand. Ubeydullah Arwi stated that 
“…the State [Iraq] remained as a foreign State, and its people became destitute” 
nevertheless, he mentioned the Iraqi nationalist movement as separate from its culture 
and religion, since the movement was different from the culture and norms of the people 
at that time.42 This shows the weaknesses of both Arabic and Kurdish nationalism during 
WW1, because they easily became emotionally supportive means for the Ottomans or 
the Britons. In fact, the Iraqi Arabs supported Sahrif Pasha’s project which was in line 
with British interests. This indicates that Arab nationalism was not independent and had 
weaknesses. Which time, here was no specific ‘Iraqi nationalism’ since it was only 
established in 1921. Therefore, one can argue that before that date, the people of the 
region were influenced by Arab nationalism which was supported by the Britons who 
worked towards establishing Iraq.       
Some Arab nationalists, such as Sati’ al-Husri and Michel Aflaq, tried to adapt a 
framework for nationalism and religion to set up a do you mean ‘idealism’ instead of 
‘idealistic’. They wanted to formulate the principles of Arab nationalism and the 
circumstances of uniting Arab ideas by returning to Islam emotionally, such as 
the spirit of Arab history, and using some of Fichte and Hegel’s study that considers 
language a method of spirituality and the basis of a nation. This takes into account the 
basis that everyone who speaks Arabic is Arab, and confusing sentence so consider 
reworking this and other places which the Arabic language is spoken. In this context, 
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Michel Aflaq said: “There is a nationalistic part in Islam that has an awesome position 
of building Arab history and Arab nationalism. The Baath party was the first movement 
which illustrated this relationship and gave a new form. This task answered this historic 
crisis”.43  
Said contributed to the term ‘nationalism’ in the Arab world by arguing that nationalism 
in the beginning of the twentieth century in the Arab states was synonymous to 
patriotism”. He mentioned further that even the Egyptian Al-Ahram newspaper at that 
time was referring to patriotic and national assumptions. However, he soon decided to 
assert that the term nationalism itself emerged among the Arabs in 1916, when Hussein 
Sharif called for revolution against the Ottomans. However, this term was not initially 
understood as separate from patriotism until the 1930s when it became more obvious in 
the writings of Satih Al-Husri.44   
Therefore, mixing western cultural ideas with the religion of Islam as a basis for 
spiritual unity, Arab history, common Arab feelings and a common land and history was 
not enough to confirm the principles of democracy and nationalism in Arab countries or 
parts of Arab countries. Hence, the nature of Turkish, Persian and Arab nationalisms are 
linked with political, cultural and social history of those nations on one hand, but, on the 
other hand, their versions of nationalism were the result of the reactions and fear of 
capitalizing on nationalism in neighboring countries. Although each of these nations 
were able to establish their own independent states in co-operation with the allied 
countries of WW1, it was mainly through this cooperation that confirmed and enforced 
the boundaries of their countries.  
If we study the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan with its specifications, 
which will be further discussed in Chapter Five, as a political reaction against the threats 
and attacks of Arab, Persian and Turkish nationalism. In other words, although Kurdish 
nationalism involves the struggle of freedom fighters in an invaded nation, Kurds do not 
have basic rights in any part of the land known as Kurdistan, the prominent 
German theoretician named Johann Gottlieb Fichte thought that the natural state border 
should be established on the basis of language. However, it is also fair to state that 
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sometimes a border can become the foundation for identifying a language; for example, 
the Kurdish language was born solely within the border of Kurdistan, and exists nowhere 
else. With the utilization of the famous Kant theory concerning humans’ decision, that 
man should depend on them, He brought the matter of human decision into existence. 
From Fichte’s survey, individual poverty is not stated but individuals will disappear 
from the nation. Fichte transmitted Herder’s theory concerning nationalism into two 
goals; firstly, he has given the content of idealism in German because he considered it 
more significant than the other languages. Secondly, for Herder, the institutions and the 
authority of the State were an important necessity for protecting German cultural 
areas (or German language areas). Thus, German nationalism has evolved to mean a 
nation of high standing and a political entity.45  
Before the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of cultural revolutions, using the 
example of the French Revolution had been spread by intellectuals in the Ottoman and 
Iranian Empires. And the economic, cultural and political authorities of these empires 
had strong links to European capitalism. Each state was also linked to the global 
capitalism. First, the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and European countries 
had developed. Intellectual Turks and other people from the Ottoman Empire stood 
against the Ottoman authority and for the sake of new constitutional life had been 
started. Some of the Turkish intellectuals had escaped from Ottoman authority to 
European countries. The cultural ideas of these countries had an influence on the Turkish 
intellectuals. Following this, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 1908, of 
which the Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals had been members, changed their reformist 
project to Pan-Turanism (Pan-Turkism) for the purpose of uniting the Turkish nations in 
one state with the Turks from Bulgaria, the Caucasus, central Asia and China. This can 
be regarded as Turkish nationalism reacting against the dangers of the Pan-
Slavism movement which the Russians claimed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century.     
This step by Turkish nationalism became one substantial factor for a wake-up call to 
the nations under the Ottoman Empire, among them the Kurdish and Arab intellectuals, 
until they demanded constitutional change, political reforms and other local 
administrative rights. Therefore, Kurdish and Arab nationalism were considered a 
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reaction to the local authorities of neighboring countries. However, aside from similar 
factors that led to its emergence, Persian nationalism had two distinct features worthy of 
mention. The first resulted from their irritation against the Russian and 
British authorities that existed in Iran. While the second was their feeling of self-
underestimation in comparison with Turkish Nationalism, which later led to the 
establishment of the State of Shi'ites sect in Iran which had caused trouble for the 
Ottoman Empire since the early sixteenth century.  
When Raza Khan established the state of Iranian nationalism with the cooperation of the 
Englishmen, he wanted to imitate the form and model of the state of Turkish nationalism 
and Kemal Atatürk in various ways. For example, they attempted to establish a military 
state and modernize the state and its institutions and impose the Persian language as the 
only official language. They attacked the cultures and languages of other nations in 
Iran. On the other hand, Iranian nationalism in this context was obliged to deal with 
religious cultures and religious authority that was a direct result of politics, culture and 
religion in Iran. This was an opposite step to Turkish nationalism which was 
fundamentally established on secularism from the time of Ataturk and afterwards, while 
before this, Turkish nationalism during the Ottoman Empire, and particularly before 
WW1, showed empathy towards the Islamic religion, mainly Sunni doctrine.  
Aside from this, the behavior of leadership groups or elites that involves efforts to 
advance their own interests when they are involved in the organization of an ethnicity, 
such as the Kurds, is crucial in the development of the culture of that ethnicity. So, it is 
fair to argue that the role of Kurdish leaders, like Sheikh Said Piran and Sheikh 
Ubeydullah of Nehri among others, and Kurdish intellectuals, like RafiqHilmi, Piramerd 
and other poets (as will be mentioned in the subsequent chapters), during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries was a significant factor in the struggle for Kurdish independence 
and, consequently, the state of Kurdistan today. 
Finally, there is a strong relationship between the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. It is 
suggested that these terms are a modern phenomenon. Gellner stressed that “…nations 
can be identified through the stages of nationalism”. He simplified the relationship by 
drawing on the fact that nationalism benefits from the development of the culture or 
cultures that became rich as a result the passing of time in which one can say that history 
inherited developments while nationalism deals with cultures by election i.e. it will 
initially change the elements of cultures. Thus, Gellner’s view tells us that nationalism 
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can be regarded as a modernizing phenomenon which is directly linked to the 
industrialization of a society.46 Anderson added that ‘nation or nationhood and 
nationalism’ are terms based on the history of the eighteenth century.”47 
1.4 Territorial and Pan-Nationalism 
Territorial nationalism adopts the idea that all inhabitants of a particular nation like 
Kurds, Jews, and Arabs among others owe loyalty and commitment to their country of 
birth or adoption.48 In the present day, citizenship is an ideal symbol of territorial 
nationalism, as evoked by nationalists.49 However, in the past, citizenship was not an 
important factor for the less developed societies like that of Kurdistan, so what was the 
alternative means of signifying nationalism for the Kurds? Anna Grigorieva suggested 
that the main principle of territorial nationalism is the establishment of mass, common 
values that create public culture, and traditional and cultural codes of the population in 
place. Language can be another important factor.50  
Pan-nationalism, on the other hand, refers to a large geographical area. This type of 
nationalism focuses more on the cultures of clusters of ethnic groups and shares the 
general nationalist ideology that a particular nation, like the Kurds and Jews, are 
fundamentally part of human society. This is similar to Arab nationalism. Although this 
definition can be applied perfectly to the Kurds of greater Kurdistan today, it does not 
apply to the Jews, since they were in diaspora and were dispersed around the world 
without having a central homeland to consider until the establishment of Zionism in the 
late nineteenth century, which was not the case for the Kurds.  
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter explored the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ with references to scholars’ 
and philosophers’ definitions and opinions who lived during the time when Kurdish 
nationalism was a critical question. Although there is no clear definition of the term 
‘nation’, yet ‘nationalism’ can be derived from the belief or political ideology that 
                                                          
46 Gellner, supra, note 33, pp. 56-58. 
47 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verso, 2006, p.3. 
48 Leoussi, A. S., Encyclopedia of Nationalism, New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2001, p. 62.  
49Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 29. 
50Grigorieva, A. A. ‘Pan-Slavism in central and southeast Europe’, Journal of Siberian Federal University. 
Humanities & Social Sciences, 2009, 1(3): 13-21: p.14. 
30 
 
involves an individual who consider themselves to be attached to his or her nation, which 
further establishes a feeling of national identity. 
It further concludes that in Turkey, Turkish nationalism was based on Turkism, in which 
the modern state of Turkey was successfully established as a strong nation-state in the 
region. In comparison, it can be argued that Arab nationalism was more rhetoric from its 
face, but was rather weak and baseless, because it could not lead to independence. 
Instead, Arab states were established by international treaties that gave them a strategic 
geopolitical location in the modern Middle East. 
When the matter comes to Kurdish nation unlike Turks and Arabs, the Kurds were 
fighting for their independent state against the Turks, Arabs and Persians at the regional 
level, and against the strategy of the major allied powers at the international level. That 
is why it would be sound to argue that Kurdish nationalism existed in various forms from 
armed revolutions to journalism and poetry. Thus, it is imperative to examine ‘Kurdish 
nationalism’ from all these various aspects in order to identify the relationships between 
civil and armed revolutions and how these two forms supported each other. It will be 
also important to examine whether Kurdish nationalism lacked an independent political 
philosophy, or whether it was heavily influenced by the imported nationalism of the 
Turks, Persians and Arabs. In addition to this, the researcher will examine whether 
Kurdish nationalism and partitioning Kurdistan are two indistinguishable factors related 
to each other or not. However, it is important to address the external impacts on Kurdish 
nationalism, which are; the international and regional treaties and agreements in relations 
to Kurdistan on.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS IN 
RELATIONS TO KURDISTAN 
2. Introduction  
In modern times, when we talk about regional and international agreements, the first 
thing that comes to mind is the role of international law. The term ‘international law’ 
has been defined as “the body of rules, which are legally binding on subjects of 
international law in their intercourse with each other.”51 If we look back to the early 
twentieth century, when the international community was preparing for the outbreak of 
WW1 in 1914, writers like Nagel argued that ‘international law’ is mainly guided by the 
principal nation-state entering the standard of conduct. Accordingly, every sovereign 
nation was willing at all times and under all circumstances to do what was best for them, 
which might today be called an anarchic international system. That is what Nagel 
believed to be the universal hypothesis of modern diplomatic discussion of that time; no 
nation would permit its own conformity to be questioned.52 This was the case when the 
legal features of international law were not well-established to be distinguished from 
political interests. Nagel explained this as one of the most serious hindrances to the 
development of a clear and authoritative international law which has intermingled with 
political and legal considerations. Sometimes there has been merely a lack of close 
reasoning, but frequently statesmen have attempted to strengthen a national policy by 
claiming it as having 'the character of international law.’53  
Before the WW1, the world was basically divided into two types or categories of nations; 
strong and weak nations. The strong nations aimed to occupy new territories and the 
weak nations, which either surrendered to occupation, or struggled for independence. 
The powerful states and their political leaders used the positions of the weak nations like 
Kurds and Jews to serve their national interests. That is why the rights of a particular 
weak nation were recognized in a treaty signed by the strong nations; these rights were 
repealed in subsequent treaties as long as the national interests of the strong nations were 
met, as will be clarified later on. Thus, it can be argued that changes in circumstances 
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had a direct influence on creating, amending, and abolishing treaties in the early 
twentieth century, even if a treaty had been enforced for less than a decade. As, Since 
the central problem of the thesis advocates why the Kurds did not emerge with a state of 
their own, this chapter will be dedicated to examining ‘the actions of the regional powers 
and the major allied powers as they were relevant to Kurdistan. This chapter will be 
dedicated to analyzing the Otto-Persian Treaties, the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, the Treaty 
of Lausanne of 1923, and an examination of how they were negotiated and concluded. 
In other words, it will address how the map of the Middle East changed in less than a 
decade, from 1916 to 1926.   
2.1 The Emergence of Otto-Persian Treaties 
This section will examine the factors and conclusion of three major treaties that were 
created before the twentieth century and will further examine how they related to the 
Kurds in the region. These include: Treaty of Zuhab 1639, the Treaty of Erzurum I of 
1823, and the Treaty of Erzurum II of 1847. 
However, at the outset, it is worth mentioning that the first partition of Kurdistan goes 
back as far as the Chaldiran War of 1514 between the Ottoman empire and the Safavid 
empire. In this war, the Ottomans secured a larger proportion of Kurdistan.  
2.1.1 Treaty of Erzurum I of 1823 
Although there were tensions between the Persian and Ottoman empires because the 
latter provided protection to the rebellious tribesmen fleeing Persian Azerbaijan, Russia 
instigated the war. Russia hoped to increase difficulties for the Ottoman Empire, which 
is then waging war with the Greeks, who are supported by Russia. The Russians induce 
Persian governor of Azerbaijan, Abbas Mirza, son of Fath Ali Shah, to invade Ottoman 
territory. His troops occupy Kurdistan and the districts adjacent to Azerbaijan. In 
retaliation, Ottoman forces under the pasha of Baghdad drive into Persia. They are 
defeated and forced to withdraw back to Baghdad, which comes under a Persian siege 
for a time. In the Battle of Erzurum in 1821, Abbas Mirza and some 30,000 Persians 
triumph over an Ottoman force of more than 50,000 men. 54 Ates states that the result 
of frontier raids carried out by Abbas Mirza and Dawlatshah, the war of 1821-22 was 
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inconclusive, despite Iran’s many victories. Then, the emergence of cholera, mutual 
concerns about Russia’s advance, the wars in Greece, and pressure from Iranian 
merchants trading with the Ottoman Empire all helped bring hostilities to an end.55 
Finally both sides agreed to peace in the Treaty of Erzurum I 1823. The treaty again 
restored the pre-war status quo while it guaranteed Persian access to the Muslim holy 
sites in Iraq and Arabia. In return, the Ottomans agreed to work to halt Kurdish raids on 
Persian territory56 in order to protect their own dynastical existences on one hand and 
also depended on the Ottoman’s promised to enhance Kurdish dynasties towards their 
autonomy. This step taken by the Ottomans left the Kurds in the middle of nowhere, and 
helpless, because due to this treaty, the Kurds had to seek another way to protect 
themselves. Fortunately for the Kurds, the Treaty of Erzurum 1823 opened the floor for 
the Russian and western powers to arrive in Mesopotamia through their delegates, who 
gradually approached the Kurds that subsequently emerged as a source of hope.        
On the contrary, Edmund stated that the Treaty of Erzurum of 1823 was partly the result 
of the Dawud Pasha’s (Ottoman Empire’s) attempts to gain control over the Kurdish 
tribes in Iraq who were supported by Persia. The treaty was finally concluded in 1823 
and reaffirmed the boundary arrangement established by the Treaties of Zuhab 1639 and 
Kerden 1746.57 Therefore, the Kurdish tribes were both directly and indirectly involved 
and the territories became battlefields for those conflicts, which as a result weakened 
their positions in the region. When the treaty of Erzurum I was finalized, the Kurds again 
were affected, as their lands and territories fell under the control of the two empires in 
accordance with the treaties of 1639 and 1746.  
Finally, Bahadori argued that although the treaty of Erzurum I did not delineate new 
borders, it strictly called for the non-intervention of both sides in the others’ affairs. As 
it states in Article I of the treaty: 
“From this period, on the side of Baghdad and Koordistan [Kurdistan] no 
interference is to take place, nor with any Districts of the Divisions of Koordistan 
within the boundaries, is the Persian government to intermeddle, or authorize any 
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acts of molestation, or to assume any authority over the present or former 
possessors of those countries.”58 
While the terms of the treaty were clear, both sides continued to intervene in each other’s 
Kurdish affairs to the extent that this endangered the interests of foreign powers in the 
region. This intervention reached a level that no empire could tolerate. 
Another agreement was reached in 1827 between the Ottomans and Persians, known as 
the Turkmanchay Treaty, which was the result of the first Erzurum agreement. This came 
after a four-member committee was formed, including Britain, Russia, the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran. Their task was to determine the border between the two empires 
(Ottoman and Iranian), especially in the regions where Kurdish tribes and clans lived. 
For different reasons, the Kurds were frequently relocated to the border of one of these 
empires despite living on their own land. After 1835, when tensions over the Kurdish 
unrest escalated along the Otto-Persian border the two empires nearly entered a new war, 
but the British intervened as a mediator to avoid war.59  
2.1.2 Treaty of Erzurum II of 1847 
As mentioned earlier, due to the Kurdish unrest in the region, both empires were about 
to enter into a new war. In 1840, the Ottomans moved against Muhammarra in the south, 
while the Persians followed suit by attacking Sulaymaniyya, a Kurdish territory, located 
in the northeast of modern Iraq, near the Iranian border. However, according to Ates, the 
Babans in Sulaymaniyyah had a level of is more formal autonomous ruling during 1840, 
and even the Ottomans wanted to eliminate the Babans due to the latter’s influence in 
the region and growing conflicts with Baghdad. They wanted to make the ruler of Baban 
a puppet in order to soothe irritations between the Kurds and the foreign forces i.e. the 
Ottomans. They wanted to make this new puppet model to be imposed against other 
Kurdish dynasties, such as Rawanduz, Khoshnav, Hakarri and others. in the region.60 As 
a result, the unrest on the Otto-Persian border led to the decline of the Babans’ 
dominance, while the Ottomans assured Persia, through the British Commissioner in 
Tehran, that Persia did not pose a threat.61 The Ottomans indeed wanted to go ahead with 
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the Second Treaty of Erzurum with the help of the with the help of the British and 
Russians, who took great steps to mediate between the two empires. The treaty was 
successfully concluded in 1847 by suppressing the Kurds’ or ‘culminating in the 
suppression of the Kurds.62     
Cusimano suggested that this treaty established more clearly the northern part of the 
Ottoman-Persian border. To do this, the treaty provided that a commission be appointed 
whose task it would be to demarcate the northern border. Once again, however, the two 
sides were soon in conflict. This time the dispute was not about arms; rather, it focused 
the interpretation of some of the treaty's key provisions.63  
In addition to this, Sabir and Kakeyi argued that in accordance to a British proposal, this 
second Erzurum Treaty of 1847 emphasized that the Persian government could not 
interfere in Kurdistan by supporting their struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Both 
empires had agreed to punish those individuals who engaged in violence and criminal 
activities along the border, which included Kurdish tribes located in the territory of each 
empire.64 Thus, the treaty not only outlined new terms for the empires, but also brought 
the first foreign intervention in Persian-Ottoman relations. While small, occasional 
border disputes did occur, the two empires did not engage in another large-scale war due 
to the presence of the foreign powers.65 
Kakeyi remarked that the chaotic relationship between the Persian and the Ottoman 
empires saw four centuries of interrupted warfare. While the Ottoman period amplified 
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the ongoing Kurdish conflict on one hand, the Persian and Ottoman governments further 
integrated the Kurds into a territorial struggle on the other hand. Due to the pre-existing 
hostilities, the conflict became an ongoing clash between two empires which equally 
benefited the British and Russian governments. It was suggested that it was an 
intentional joint policy of Britain and Russia to sustain the animosities between the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires. Kakeyi quoted the statement by Sir Palmerston, the 
British Ambassador in Petersburg, Russia, at the time, who said: “If Great Britain and 
Tsarist Russia are not desirably willing to end the Persian-Ottoman conflict, then it will 
never come to an end.”66  
Finally, one could argue that Great Britain had a strategic interest in Ottoman territories 
in Mesopotamia and did not want these territories to remain unsecure due to Otto-Persian 
wars; they wanted to see the Ottomans stronger than the Persians in the region. This was 
in order to expand their influences in Caucasia and central Asia, to hinder Russian 
expansion through Persian lands and to control these regions, particularly the strategic 
area surrounding the Black Sea. Hence, the Russian and British empires came into 
conflict, but this time proceeded with their conflicts by proxy, i.e. they exploited the 
Otto-Persian conflicts. The Britons backed the Ottomans, while the Russians backed the 
Persians. The central location of the conflict was on Mesopotamian land, specifically in 
Kurdistan. Nevertheless, in order to show their good intentions to the Ottomans, the 
British established a boundary commission composed of Iranian, Turkish, British and 
Russian diplomats to mediate the conflict. This was the beginning of the second treaty 
of Erzurum which was concluded in 1847. 
In short, the Erzurum Treaty II was signed in May 1847;67 which was an extension of 
the previous treaty. Kurdistan was officially divided between the Ottomans and Persians 
and was monitored by the British and the Russians. With their interference, the 
boundaries were determined for each state. The most important clause of the treaty 
centered on preventing Iranian interference in the internal affairs of the Sulaimani area. 
In return, the Ottomans gave up their privileges to Iranian land in Muhamra Port and the 
island of Alkhizir, among other key locations.  
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When we closely consider the clauses of Erzurum I and II, we can see that there was not 
any particular emphasis on the rights of the Kurdish people living on this land. Moreover, 
according to Erzurum II, the Emirs and local authorities lost the advantage of changing 
sides and were completely divided between the two empires. This imposed a limitation 
on the powers and authorities of the Kurdish dynasties, which subsequently led to their 
decline. Finally, the treaty was supervised by Russia and Britain.  
After the treaty of Erzurum II, British and Russian interests increased in the region; as 
Olson suggests, their influence in Persian and Ottoman affairs increased accordingly in 
order to get free access to the Persian Gulf, along with their economic exploitation 
objectives. As for the British-controlled lands, securing a commercial road between 
India and Europe through Kurdistan, weakened the Kurds, for the Russian-controlled 
lands, the unhappy Persian-Ottoman Kurds were a critical element in helping gain 
territorial advances and keeping its rivaling southern neighbors of Turkey and Iran 
preoccupied with internal affairs.68 When the Ottomans realized this intention, they  they 
against the Russians for a decade, from 1877 to 1878, that brought devastation, famine 
and general hardship accompanied by disease, banditry and violence, especially in north 
and south Kurdistan. 69 
Three decades later, when oil was discovered in south Kurdistan in 1908, the policies of 
the colonial powers of Britain, France, Germany and Russia changed, and they viewed 
the Middle Eastern region with greater economic interest than before.70 This happened 
as the Ottoman Empire entered into a period of declining power. The influence of the 
Young Turks had a direct effect on the Kurds and Kurdish issues since some of the 
founders of this organization were Kurds who worked for awakening the different 
nations living within the Ottoman Empire. However, in the later stages, this organization 
showed its real face which denied the rights of other nations in favor of the Turks.  
In this context, Kurdistan became a strategically important place in international politics 
prior to the onset of WW1. That is why the British promised the Kurds an independent 
Kurdish kingdom in return for their opposition to the Turkish-German alliance.71 Finally, 
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it is worth mentioning that these frequent negotiations were able to produce the Tehran 
Protocol in 1911. This emphasized the restoration of the Treaty of Erzurum II.72 The 
Teheran Protocol was agreed upon so that disputes relating to the demarcation practice 
would be submitted to an arbitration tribunal at The Hague.73 This was followed by the 
Constantinople Protocol in 1913, which was also related to the delineation of the Otto-
Persian boundary signed at Constantinople on November 4th 1913,74 and Kurdish issues 
became more prominent in the wider world. The Delineation Commission's agreement 
was signed in 1914,75 which provided the actual demarcation of the border between Iraq 
and Iran, and and further divided Kurdistan. Thus, one can argue that these three 
international instruments directly partitioned Kurdistan before the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916. Moreover, they directly weakened Kurdish nationalism as a result 
of separating the Kurds.   
2.2 The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 
After the Balfour Declaration 1917, the Armistice of Mudros ended WW1 hostilities 
with the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918, and the Treaty of Sevres took another 
twenty months to conclude. As with many other treaties that ended the war, the 
victorious countries presented the terms, which were not subject to negotiation, to the 
defeated nations.76 When the Ottoman Empire declared defeat, it is fair to believe that 
the Empire should have lost control of its provinces, particularly the regions outlying 
Anatolia, due to lack of military strength. This was outside of its western frontiers, 
known as European territory, which was expected to be divided between Greece and 
Bulgaria. Thus, it was ostensibly unlikely for the Ottoman Empire to survive in any 
recognizable form. This scenario was a grand opportunity for the Allied forces to 
colonize the new occupied regions, or at least to achieve what they concluded in Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916. Hence, under the guise of promoting peace, the Ottoman 
Empire came under pressure to sign the treaty to protect itself; the treaty was concluded 
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in Sevres, France on 10 August 1920. The treaty envisaged the virtual dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire and called for large-scale territorial changes and redistribution 
of imperial control in the Near East.  
According to the treaty, the Ottoman Empire was to recognize the independence of its 
former Arabian possessions of Hijaz77 and to cede Mesopotamia and Palestine as 
mandates of Britain, and Syria and Lebanon as mandates of France.78 In this context, 
Spencer believes that while Arabia was nominally free of foreign rule, it was in reality 
under British suzerainty. Similarly, the British and French mandates regarding Palestine, 
Mesopotamia, Syria and Lebanon were supposed to lead to eventual independence under 
the supervision of the League of Nations.79 That is why the United States declined to 
participate in the negotiation as American leaders thought there would be a furtherance 
of European major allied power in the region, and the US had never been at war with the 
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Ottoman Empire;80 the Ottoman Empire had a good economic and diplomatic 
relationship with America throughout the nineteenth century.81   
Furthermore, the Sevres Treaty called for an independent Republic of Armenia, which 
prior to the war was known as Turkish Armenia.82 In addition to this, the treaty 
established that the East Thrace, including Gallipoli and the Turkish Aegean islands, 
come under Greek control, whereas Smyrna and the adjacent area were to be 
administered by Greece for five years, after which a plebiscite was to be held.83 Finally, 
and most importantly, a plebiscite was also planned for Kurdistan,84 although it never 
took place, as it did not stand in parallel with the British interests for the whole 
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Kurdistan, thus was limited to the areas under the control of Sheikh Mahmud, which also 
never happened as will be discussed in Chapter Five.85  
The Ottoman Empire had to renounce all claim to ethnically non-Turkish territories. 
Thus, the Ottoman government confirmed the Italian possession of Dodecanese and 
Rhodes and the British control of Cyprus and Egypt. The Turkish Straits were to be 
demilitarized and internationalized, and the coastal regions around Antalya and Adana 
were to be occupied by Italy and France, respectively. Finally, the strength of the Turkish 
army was limited to 50,000 men and the country was placed under de facto entente’s 
protectorate. 
The terms of the Treaty were drafted at the first London Conference from February to 
April 1920 and finalized at the San Remo Conference at the end of April 1920.86 The 
terms were considered harsh and punitive, mainly attributable to the condition that 
imposed control on Turkey’s finances, budget and customs by an international financial 
commission. Moreover, Turkey had to pay its debts and the costs of the allied military 
occupation, and the new frame of the Turkish state would be confined to Anatolia, with 
the Sultan being allowed to remain in Constantinople. However, as Spencer suggested, 
the provisions of the Treaty made him a virtual prisoner to the interests of the victorious 
nations.87 A harsher condition was that the Allies, via the Tripartite Pact, would enjoy 
economic spheres of influence. For example, France would focus on Cilicia and Italy 
would focus on Adalia, and in these circumstances, Christian minorities would be 
protected.88  
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It was argued that when the allies imposed the Treaty of Sevres on the Sultan’s 
government, the Sultan knew it would not be enforced, which is why took a gamble by 
signing it in order to provide time for the Empire to reassert dominance in the region. 
The first justification for this was that he knew that the treaty’s fate rested in the Turkish 
nationalists and Mustafa Kemal, believing that it would be a good card to play.89 Mevin 
noted that the harsh conditions of the treaty engendered great resentment in Turkey, and 
the republican nationalist movement under Kemal Ataturk, which began in 1919, one 
year before the Treaty was created, refused to recognize the Treaty of Sevres. Kemal’s 
success at this time forced the Allies to negotiate a new treaty with Turkey in Lausanne 
in 1923,90 which will be discussed further in subsequent sections of tis thesis. 
The second justification for the Sultan signing the treaty was that even several allied 
politicians doubted the enforceability of the Treaty since its harsh conditions would not 
be accepted by any nation, even as a result of the war. Needless to say, the Turks would 
have refused to give up their empire just by ratifying a treaty. For the Sultan, the 
enforcement of the Treaty would greatly depend on whether the Greek army would be 
able to subdue the Turks in Anatolia.91  
The gamble that the Sultan played ended in his favor as the powerful Turkish national 
movement established a new regime under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 
Ankara, Western Anatolia. By astute negotiation and military success against the British 
and the Greeks, Ataturk forced a final resolution of the Eastern Question. On the basis 
of recognizing a fully national Turkey, ruling over territory principally populated by 
ethnic Turks, a revised settlement was imposed by Ataturk to overturn Sevres. 92 Most 
nationalists understood that reviving the Ottoman Empire and recapturing the lost Arab 
lands could not, and should not, be accomplished. They bristled, however, at any 
ethnically Turkish lands falling under foreign control. Kamal set out to regain all 
Anatolian and Armenian lands for Turkey.93 This was a point of strength for Ataturk to 
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fight. Thus, Ataturk was free to exercises ethnic cleansing against the Greeks,94 or 
displace many other minorities and relocate them within Turkish lands. 
The Treaty of Sevres was the last in a series of peace treaties concluded by the allied 
powers with Germany’s allies. The preparation for this treaty was the most prolonged, 
and in several respects, the most difficult of all the treaties, yet there was less to show 
for these efforts because the treaty never came into force, as previously mentioned.  
One of the early and less significant problems of the allies was the reshaping of Arabia. 
The secret partition treaties of the wartime period, in so far as they affected the interests 
of those great powers that still had a military presence in the Near East, proved more 
important than might have seemed from the various statements made during the last year 
of war. Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca who had proclaimed himself King of Hedjaz, 
together with his sons represented liberated Arabia at the Paris Conference, but he was 
forced almost at once to accept a curtailment of his sphere of influence. His eldest son, 
Feisal, played a less than happy role on the diplomatic stage in Paris which was 
unfamiliar ground to him. At the suggestion of his Foreign Office advisers he tried, by 
an arrangement with Zionist leaders, to deal with the Palestine problem independently 
of the Great powers in such a way as to meet the wishes of the Jews to gain the Zionists’ 
support for the Arab cause. The Feisal-Weizmann agreement of January 1919 was the 
result of the dynastic ideas of Hussein’s family which tried to achieve a rapprochement, 
through concessions, with the leader of Zionism. But with the growth of the Jewish 
settlement, Palestine became a crisis area and the presence of a strong protectorate power 
became justified, indeed inevitable.95  
As far as the nature of the mandates under the Sevres Treaty were concerned, there were 
three kinds of mandate. For the German colonies, annexation became an accomplished 
fact, although de jure the possibility of terminating this state was not excluded. Another 
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form of mandate was established in Arabia.96 Following the Wilson’s suggestion, the 
situation in the Near East, and particularly in Syria, was to be settled by an American 
commission which would establish the wishes of the population. The relevant clause of 
the fourth paragraph of Article XXII of the League of Nations Covenant clearly states: 
“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a 
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be 
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering administrative advice and 
assistance by Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone. This 
was more or less in line with the unknown protectorate principle. But another 
sentence followed: "the wishes of these communities must be a principal 
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” 97       
The Treaty of Sevres, though ultimately considered unsuccessful, showed that the treaty 
provided for Turkey’s Arab territories, and made clear that these territories were states. 
It referred to the ‘states’ detached from Turkey in its provisions on citizenship, on 
Turkish assets, and the Turkish public debt.  
When WW1 ended in the Middle East with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros by 
the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918, each nation and group came with its own 
agenda. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, while stating all the proper slogans 
about goodwill to Middle Eastern people, was there to advance the interests of the British 
Empire. These included British-controlled sea and land routes to India and assurance 
that no other power be given important strategic areas. French president Georges 
Clemenceau, compensating for heavy French troop losses, adamantly adhered to each 
wartime agreement signed by the Allies that would give France a hold on Syria and 
South Anatolia. He also hoped for dominance over the Turkish Straits and perhaps over 
what would become Turkey. The United States president Woodrow Wilson came with 
his Fourteen Points. Under this, clause XII states that “The Turkish portion of the 
present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other 
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security 
of life and an unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”98 Hence, the term 
‘other nationalities’ included the Kurds, notwithstanding that it was not specifically 
mentioned by name. 
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General Sharif Pasha was the only Kurdish representative at the signing of the Treaty of 
Sevres in 1920 in Paris. As recorded in Rafiq Hilmi’s Diary, Pasha was a Kurdish 
historian, writer and politician born in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. He founded the 
Kurdish party Hîwa in 1938, which will be discussed further in Chapter Five. His diary 
highlighted Sharif Pasha’s representation at the signing of the treaty. In this researcher’s 
view, Pasha’s role at this conference was to determine why the Kurds were not successful 
in gaining the status of an independent nation yet the Jews were, considering the same 
promises were made to the Kurds in this treaty that were made to the Jews in the Balfour 
declaration. According to Hilmi’s Diary:  
“Treaty of Sevres which was backbreaking for Turkey (Kemalists Turkey), three 
articles were included by Kurds independence freedom of Kurdish Nations, which 
means Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Sevres Treaty. The Transcript of Sheikh 
Mahmud and Iraqi Kurds had not been sent to Sharif Pasha by the French forces in 
Syria due to the English efforts and because Sheikh Mahmud’s representative had 
stayed in Aleppo and they had not been allowed to enter Paris. But the Kurds from 
Turkey and the Kurdish political associations from Istanbul were able to send 
general proxies to Sharif Pasha in their name and all Kurds and make him their 
own representative by the officials of peaceful conference”.99     
Hence, it can be argued as a negative that Pasha was the only Kurdish representative and 
that there were not Kurds representing other parts of Kurdistan at the conference. This 
would have increased the pressure on the superpower countries, yet as a result, the 
Kurdish lobby appeared weak and was unsuccessful. Therefore, Sharif Pasha was 
hindered to establish a strong lobby at the Paris Peace Conference.   
As for Hilmi said,  
“Except Sharif Pasha’s concern on the right of Kurdish nations, on the 22 
March 1919 under the title of Memorandum Sur Les Revendications Du 
Peuple Kurde, he presented it in the French language to the conference in 
addition to his efforts to include the mentioned Articles 62, 63, and 64 that 
were special to Kurds and independence of Kurdistan in the framework of 
other chapters of the Treaty of Sevres”.100  
Mohammed Sherif Pasha was an Ottoman diplomat that became a leading Kurdish 
nationalist. He was firstly an Ottoman Ambassador to Stockholm and before 1908, a 
supporter of the Young Turk movement; he provided economic support to Ahmed Riza, 
a Young Turk leader in Paris.101 After 1918, he rejoined the Ottoman government 
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service, however, he soon defected from the Ottoman side, joining the Kürdistan Teali 
Cemiyeti (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan) which will be discussed further in Chapter 
Five. He reached an agreement with the Armenian delegation in Paris which involved 
the division of eastern Anatolia into a Kurdish state and an Armenian state. In fact, his 
aim was to bring Kurdish issues into the spotlight, and to achieve legal recognition for 
the Kurds through diplomatic channels, but ultimately not successful.  
Expect local Kurdish efforts to support Sharif Pasha’s representation, there was no other 
outside supports for him. The countries of Britain, France and other participants of the 
conference did their best to divide the countries of the Middle East and Mesopotamia, 
especially Kurdish lands. The major allied powers formed a committee to determine a 
local region in a period of six months to draw the borders especially for those areas 
located in the east, west and south of Euphrates river as a border of Armenia, while south 
Turkey from the land of Syria which separates the border of Mesopotamia and where 
Kurdish race dominates. This plan was finally included at the Treaty of Sevres in Articles 
2, 3, 11, and 21. Although the members of the committee had been the official 
representatives of their countries for voting on this issue, a vote was not held as 
referenced in Hilmi’s diary mentioned above. That is why the three-men committee did 
not have an effective role in Kurdish history and the treaty did not affect the non-Kurdish 
minorities, considering that the rights of the Christians or Assyrians were protected.  
The issue of Mosul Villayet had changed the balance for the worse for Kurds and other 
minorities in the region. If it was not for the British oil privileges in Mosul, the Kurdish 
issue would have turned out differently. In other words, the clauses in the Treaty of 
Sevres may have materialized on the political map and the Kurds may have established 
their own state. However, the British government had ambitions in Mosul to access to 
its oil. Therefore, Britain assisted Ataturk in establishing the new Turkish state in the 
north, while allowing the establishment of other Arab states, such as Syria to the west of 
Mosul, and Baghdad as the capital of the newly formed Iraq. These newly formed states 
occupied a vast area of Kurdistan, and did not leave an opportunity for Kurds to settle 
on their own land. What remained was not enough for the Kurds to establish their own 
state on. This was the new reality. 
Another reason for the success of the new Turkish state and its allies was Mustafa Kamal 
Ataturk. He was such a charismatic figure that was not panicked by the Ottoman Caliph 
or by the Treaty of Severe, which was not in his interest. The Young Turks did not fear 
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the establishment of martial Diwan of the Ottoman Caliph nor did they fear the recent 
violence of WW1. In fact, at this stage, Tukey was divided by two forces, the first one 
was the Ottoman military forces in western Turkey and Istanbul, while the second one 
was in eastern Turkey led by Ataturk, who was also supported by the major allied forces. 
Eventually, Turkey was formed in a weak shape and each side had to take full control of 
the state to establish a strong Turkey. In this context, Rafiq Himli suggested that when 
Damat Farid Pasha who became the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire, and the head 
of the Ottoman’s Divan of Military, he sent an army led by Ahmad Anwer Pasha of 
Charkas to Anatolia, it suffered an embarrassing defeat at the hands of Mustafa Kamal’s 
forces. With the defeat of his army, Fared Pasha stopped his smear campaign against the 
newly formed Kamalist authority.  
The people of Anatolia were no longer influenced by the Ottoman army because Fared 
Pasha was no longer respected by the key military commanders in the army. Hence, the 
subsequent changes of ministries and the cabinet also effectively contributed to the 
Kamalists’ success, especially when Farid Pasha was removed as Prime Minister and 
Tofiq Pasha was appointed and he formed a new cabinet.”102 Hence, one can see that 
these changes to the political and high administrative posts in the Ottoman Empire to 
those closest to Ataturk himself, gave him a better chance to take power and freely act 
on behalf of the Ottomans.  
Ataturk’s cabinet was run solely by his close allies. They pursued a peaceful policy 
towards the Kurds and all minorities in Turkey until they submitted to their authority. 
This is evident when considering the time in which Ataturk’s authority in Istanbul 
worked for total peace and settlement of affairs in the region. In this period, matters were 
settled in the distorted status between the authorities of Ankara and Istanbul, in other 
words the Ottomans and Ataturks. It did not take long for Kamal Ataturk resumed his 
oppression of the Kurds and the era of Kurdish confrontation began. Here, the point that 
needs to be explained is the exacerbation of the Kurdish, Ottoman and Turkish conflict. 
Although it has a long history, Kurdish nationalism became more prominent after 1908. 
One can argue that the Young Turk revolution was a watershed moment in Kurdish 
nationalism, when the focus shifted to promoting Kurdish issues through civic activities 
and publications. This is evident as Kamal Ataturk started abolishing national and ethnic 
                                                          
102 Ibid, p.25.  
48 
 
rights for the Kurds, including language and education, although under the Ottomans, 
Kurds did not enjoy equal rights, as can be seen in the previously mentioned example of 
the Rushdiya Al Askari School.  
Under the Ottomans, Kurds had independent dynasties, an army and, to an extent 
sovereignty. This is despite the fact that sometimes the Ottomans used Kurds and their 
dynasties to strengthen their position and deprived Kurds of their rights.103 However, 
there was a sentiment that sharing the same religion meant that Kurds were closer to the 
Ottoman authorities during this time. Thus, it would be illogical for readers and the 
researcher not to differentiate between the two periods regarding the situation for Kurds; 
in the first period, Turkish nationalists rose to prominence during and after Ataturk’s 
reign, and in the second period, the Ottomans’ ruled until 1908. The Kurdish struggle 
entered a new phase during and after the Turkish nationalists came to power. This time 
was known for a phase of revolts, uprisings and the feeling of being different from the 
Turks. This feeling became the focal point in the Kurdish struggle for achieving the right 
to exist in an independent Kurdistan. These conflicts, though, have a deep history Sykes 
–Picot Agreement of 1916, yet this treaty became the turning point for Kurdish 
nationalism, and its effects can still be felt today. This is because the formation of the 
political map and the unnatural border of the Greater Kurdistan was orchestrated by the 
major allied power forces during WW1 for the sake of their political, economic, and 
military interests in the region.  
2.3 Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 
Many commentators have suggested that the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 remained a dead 
as it was not honored by its drafters nor its would-be participants. Simultaneously, the 
international turmoil in the area served to benefit the Turkish state and its transformation; 
which entailed the creation of a new treaty and convention to effectively replace the 
Treaty of Sevres.  
From the outset, the Peace Conference of Lausanne, held from 20 November 1922 to 4 
February 1923 and then again from 23 April to 24 July 1923, produced the Treaty of 
Lausanne and a specific convention dealing with the Straits. Under the treaty, Turkey 
had to abandon all its Arab lands within the vast Ottoman Empire, but it was able to 
retain all the territories that were inhabited by Turks. The loser in this redistribution of 
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territories in the Eaern Mediterranean was Greece, which yielded all of East Thrace, the 
area of Smyrna, and the islands of Imbros and Tendos to Turkey. Needless to say, the 
Kurds in the Southeast of Anatolia were in a better position for the fact that South 
Anatolia was had not fallen under the control of any allied powers during WW1, and the 
majority of Kurds were loyal to the Ottoman Empire. In addition to this, both French and 
British powers were not interested in occupying those regions, as clearly seen in 
provisions of the Treaty of Sevres.104 Regarding the Straits, a compromise was sought at 
the Conference of Lausanne between Britain, France and Italy (the major allied powers) 
on one hand, and Russia on the other. While the Great powers wanted to maintain the 
provisions established by the Treaty of Sevres as much as possible, Turkey was hesitant 
and inflexible towards the conciliatory approach. The Soviet regime in Russia proved to 
be extremely reluctant in accepting interference of extra-Black Sea powers in what 
Moscow considered to be an intra-Black Sea powers affair. Russian persistence in not 
recognizing the regime of free passage through the Straits led to Russian withdrawal 
from negotiations and the Lausanne Convention of 20 January 1923 was signed by other 
parties in the Soviet Union’s absence. Eventually, the Russian objections were curbed, 
as the Convention of Lausanne became a reality and the Soviet Union did not want to 
remain outside the new international agreement. Moscow signed convention in 
Constantinople on 14 August 1923. The Convention of Lausanne, related to the Straits, 
was concluded between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and, later, the Soviet Union. The convention accompanied the 
Treaty of Lausanne but it was not directly connected to it. The likely reason for this was 
the desire to ensure the viability of the Straits regime from possible adventures based on 
a peace treaty that was heavily dependent upon the political circumstances at the time.105  
The Lausanne conference resulted in seventeen diplomatic achievements. Turkey 
recognized the loss of its Arab provinces, but plans for an independent Armenia and an 
autonomous Kurdistan were abandoned. The reason was that the geographical location 
of both the Armenians and Kurds was attached to Turkish lands, thus if independence 
was granted to them, then the land of Turkey would become much smaller. Next, if the 
Kurds and Armenians were granted independence, then Ataturk had to deal with another 
two newly formed neighboring states, other than the Arabs. This would further limit 
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Turkey’s power in the region. The European powers no longer demanded capitulation, 
and although Turkey agreed to minor financial burdens and tariff restrictions, there were 
to be no war reparations. The Greeks lost their zone around İzmir, and no other powers 
retained zones of influence. Turkish territory in Europe expanded, but control 
over Mosul in Iraq and Alexandretta in Syria remained with the British and French, 
respectively. Finally, the conference recognized Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, 
although there were some concessions in the form of a demilitarized zone and an 
international commission to supervise transit through the Straits. In short, Ismet 
achieved virtually all that nationalist Turkey under Kemal’s leadership desired. 
According to several reports, there are close to fifty identifiable ethnic groups in Turkey. 
All rights indicated in articles 37 to 45 in section 111 of the Treaty of Lausanne apply 
only to non-Muslim minorities, which are explicitly named; they refer only to the 
established Christian minorities (including the Armenians and the Greek orthodox) and 
additionally confirm the rights of Jews. With regards to the non-Turkish minorities, the 
Treaty of Lausanne stipulated the right to use their own language in private conversation, 
in media, in publications and at public occasions (Para. 39). The treaty thus extrapolated 
the Ottoman understanding of minorities. It referred only to religious minorities; ethnic 
minorities were not mentioned. As a consequence, the Kurds were counted as Muslims. 
This seems odd because, initially, Ataturk used Islam and the term ‘Muslim’ deceitfully 
to convince the Kurds that he was going to recognize their right to independence once 
they, i.e. Turks and Kurds, removed the major allied powers in the region who were non-
Muslims. Therefore, as no special protection was required officially, Turkey had the 
basis to refuse acknowledgment of the Kurds’ existence. The treaty made no provisions 
for a future autonomous reign for Kurdish tribes on Turkish territory. On the country, it 
was silent on the Kurdish question and the fate of the Mosel region, and paved the way 
for the creation of a single ethnic Turkey. However, after the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Ataturk’s secularization of Turkey was revealed; he denied that Kurdish identity was 
different from the Turks and he merely called them ‘mountainous Turks’.  
Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne is still seen as the beginning of Kurdish displacement 
throughout the region that was their homeland. This has been part of Kurdish life since 
the treaty was signed. Nevertheless, the treaty signaled the beginning of a desperate 
Kurdish nationalist movement, which started in the 1930s. Simultaneously, successive 
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Turkish governments began a long and intense assimilation campaign. In parallel, Kurds 
have refused to assimilate. 
2.4 The Kurds: A critical appraisal 
For Kurds, the time as the best opportunity to proclaim independent state had come once. 
However, disunity among the clans and tribes did not provide the basis upon which a 
powerful resistance movement could be built. One of the reasons to consider was the 
newly installed borders and the actual partition of Kurdistan. Each Kurdish tribe was 
trying to protect themselves from either the Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi or Iranian central 
government. This, from the very start, minimized any chance of becoming an 
autonomous or independent state. 
The Kurdistan region was scheduled to have a referendum to decide its fate, which, 
according to Section III Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres 1920, was to 
include the Mosul Province. 
In fact, no general agreement among Kurds; as Özoğlu indicates, there was a disparity 
between the areas of Kurdish settlement and the political and administrative boundaries 
of the region.106 Sharif Pasha, who represented the Society for the Ascension of 
Kurdistan at the Paris Peace Conference, attended the conference in order to propose the 
outlines of Kurdistan as an independent entity. He defined the region’s boundaries as 
follows: 
“The frontiers of Turkish Kurdistan, from an ethnographical point of view, 
begin in the north at Ziven, on the Caucasian frontier, and continue westwards 
to Erzurum, Erzincan, Kemah, Arapgir, Besni and Divick; in the south they 
follow the line from Harran, the Sinjihar Hills, Tel Asfar, Erbil, Süleymaniye, 
Akk-el-man, Sinne; in the east, Ravandiz, Başkale, Vezirkale, that is to say 
the frontier of Persia as far as Mount Ararat.”107 
This claim seemed ambitious, as it defined the borders of Kurdistan that Sharif Pasha 
wanted the great powers should grand the independence to the Kurds in accordance with 
this map and discretion. However, this description excluded the Van region, which led 
to controversy among other Kurdish nationalists. Subsequently, an alternative map was 
                                                          
106 Özoğlu, Hakan., Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, 
and Shifting Boundaries, SUNY Press, 2004, pp. 38-40.  
107 Şerif Pasha, Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, Imprimerie A.-G. L'Hoir, 1919, p. 3.  
 
52 
 
proposed by Emin Ali Bedir Khan, who included Van and an outlet to the sea via 
Turkey’s present Hatay Province.108  
The Paris Peace Conference marked a turning point for both the Ottoman Empire and 
Kurdish tribes. It specified the precondition for the foundation of two independent states, 
namely Armenia and Kurdistan. Within one year, the Kurds and the Armenians could 
claim autonomy, provided that this wish was explicitly expressed. Moreover, the tribes 
had to internally support this process of autonomy; readiness and the capability to 
maintain a new state were preconditions for autonomy. However, at this stage, the 
international situation was not as favorable for the Kurds as it was for the Armenians.   
What happened, conversely, was that none of these proposals were endorsed by the 
Treaty of Sevres, which only outlined a truncated Kurdistan located on what is now 
Turkish territory (leaving out the Kurds of Iran, British-controlled Iraq and French-
controlled Syria). However, this plan was never implemented, as the Treaty of Sevres 
was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. The current Iraq-Turkey border was agreed in 
July 1926. At the same time, the clan system stood in opposition to the new state, which 
made autonomy impossible. Due to a lack of ethnic self-awareness and disunity, Kurdish 
nationalists were not successful in forming a unified nationalistic movement until 1923. 
Finally, international support for an independent Kurdish state was minimal during this 
time.  
Finally, o can argue that the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was the basis for the foundation 
of modern Turkey. It replaced the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which marked the end of 
the Ottoman dynasty. For the Kurdish tribes, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 brought a 
dramatic change. As planned in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, the former Arab provinces 
were separated from modern Turkey and became mandates of the League of Nations, 
and were subsequently transformed into independent states. However, the Kurdish 
provinces were given to Syria, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Soviet Union, all of which 
brought different claims on the basis of ideology, history and culture. 
2.5 Conclusion  
At the end of Chapter Three, a particular reference was made to the political and historic 
stages of those overt and covert international treaties and agreements that formed the 
foundation for the partition of Kurdistan. For instance, the chapter chapter discussed the 
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treaties of Zuhab 1639 and Erzurum I 1823. The it discussed the Treaty of Erzurum II 
1847 which opened the door for the major allied powers to interfere with the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the topography of Kurdistan, the motivation for 
each tribe to join the Ottomans or the Persians, the weaker regions of Kurdistan acted as 
the battlefield for the two empires. Kurdish leaders attempted to obtain autonomy, at the 
least cost against the Ottomans and the Persians in order to keep their Kurdish identity 
and protect Kurdistan. They did not favor confrontations with the two empires as long 
as they were not under pressure to engage in conflict. 
Although Kurdish nation, for the first time in its political history, saw the articles 62, 63 
and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 which formally gave the right for self-
determination for the Kurds, there were some related external and internal factors that 
the researcher has already mentioned in this thesis. In the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, 
the rights prescribed by the Treaty of Sevres were ignored and later excluded by major 
allied powers so that the Turkish and Arab nations would be supreme in the Middle East 
with their support. The Kurds have remained the only nation in the area without a state.  
Taking these agreements into consideration, it was only the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 
that indicated a desire to include Kurdish political circumstances, whereas the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923 not mention Kurds or Kurdistan at all. This was due to the strength of 
Ataturk in the region and his increasing influences after 1920 by virtue of winning battles 
against foreign powers and national movements. He organized several plans and 
deceived Kurdish elites while ceding to the allied powers by giving Mosul Vilayet to the 
Arabs in Iraq, which was under the British sphere of influence by virtue of the Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916. It was clear that the British interest to make Turkey an ally, 
rather than the Kurds, was better for maintaining British political, economic and 
historical interests. This will be clearly seen in Chapter Five in the discussion on Kurdish 
revolutions and the factors related to Kurdish nationalism, such as the lack of a strong 
Kurdish nationalism among the Kurds.  
The next chapter, will give a detailed analysis on the identity of Kurdistan as a prominent 
nation in the Middle East in terms of history, ethnicity, common religion and land, 
multiple ideologies and religious paths practiced by Kurds, and the national elements of 
language and culture, which are significant factors for the Kurdish nation. This will be 
detailed with a brief comparison with the history of the Jewish identity, particularly in 
terms of the Jewish religion. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF KURDISH NATIONAL IDENTITY 
3.1 Introduction 
The identity of any nation is directly associated to its history, in particular how it 
survived throughout history and how many historical stages it went through in order to 
survive till modern times. To be more precise, identity is related to how this history is 
actually remembered in popular and political culture History also shows us the social 
structure of a particular nation, in order to highlight the weaknesses or strengths of that 
nation. For example, Gellner was of the opinion that national identity, or more precisely 
nationalism, was a product or made possible by modern social developments.109 Thus, 
from this perspective, a nation’s identity connects its past to the present; this will further 
reinforce the nation’s identity, which will provide answers/reasons for any contemporary 
hardships. In this context, this chapter will mainly focus on the history of the Kurdish 
nation’s identity and nationalism through analyzing various aspects related to the Kurds, 
within the context of this thesis’s subject. This chapter will begin with an examination 
of Kurdish identity through analyzing the origins of the Kurds. The chapter will then 
analyze the shared history, religion, culture, territory and language of the Kurds in the 
Middle East. The contributions brought forward by this chapter to the thesis main 
question is that from sociological perspective, the chapter will analytically establish that 
the great Kurdistan belongs to the Kurds from the ancient time, and all the elements of 
nationhood for the Kurds as a nation can materialize.      
3.2 Kurdish Identity and Kurdistan  
Like all nations in the region, the Kurds have their own history of nationalism in the 
Middle East. This has multiple roots such as involving religion and competition with 
other nations. This chapter applies the elements of nationhood discussed in chapter two 
by initially focusing on the origins of the Kurdish people origin of the Kurds, Kurdish 
language, Kurdish culture, Islam and Kurdish national identity. This will be followed by 
a discussion of the geographical concept of Kurdistan. 
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3.2.1 Kurdish Language 
When we talk about the Kurdish language, we need to mention the era of the Mad or 
Medes, who were the ancestors of the Kurds and settled in the northeast of Persia. The 
origin of the Kurdish language is directly related to the Avestan language, which is also 
a Zoroastrian language. This language is closely related to the old Indo-Aryan language 
and the Medes language, which was the country where Zoroaster originally came from. 
Subsequently, the people of Zoroaster left Medes to live in Khorasan located in the 
northeast of Iran, which is further considered as the Zoroasters second hometown.  
As to the historical analysis of Kurdish language, Mirawdali suggested that the term 
‘Gord’ in Persian meant hero or brave, and it is possible that the Persians inherited both 
the name and the military training institution of Karda from the Medes. The Medes, in 
turn, might have used the Karduchis as the core force of their army and gave them a 
dominant military and political position to the extent that ‘Karda’ became identified with 
their military practice and institution as a whole.110 After many centuries, including the 
post-Sassanid period, the name Mad [Medes] changed into Mang then to Mas, and in the 
Islamic period into Mah, which gradually disappeared yet the people survived. The 
Parthian King Ardashiri Papakan111 considered the conquest of the Medes as his greatest 
enterprise, and he considered the Medes and the Kurds together as one nation. Thus, 
until the sixth century A.D. the Kurds and the Mad were mentioned as one people. After 
this the name Kurd gradually incorporated the name Mad to create the new word 
Kurdmad or Kurdmah- Kurdmanj.112 
Today, the Kurdish language has three man dialects that vary in each location where 
they are spoken. The three dialects are: north Kurmanji, which is spoken by the Kurds 
in modern Turkey and Syria; the central Kurmanji, which is called ‘Sorani’ and in mainly 
spoken by the Kurds of Iraq Iran; and south Kurmanji, which is spoken by other Kurds 
living in Iraq and Iran. It has been difficult for Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan 
to understand each other. A recent example of this can be seen in Iraqi Kurdistan; both 
Sorani and north Kurmanji are studied in school, yet it is still very different and therefore 
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difficult for all to understand properly. However, this low level of understanding among 
the Kurds has not been a problem for foreigners to certain degree, since they tend to use 
local interpreters or those who understand the individual dialects the dialects.    
Language can gather different dialects into one cultural and literary form. For example, 
Ahmadi Khani’s literature,113 a figure who is regarded as the father of Kurdish 
nationalism,114 can serve this argument, while Haji Qadri Koye (1815-1892), in one 
poem said: “If a Kurd does not know his father’s speech [Kurdish language], certainly 
he was born illegitimate.”115 One can understand from Koye that he meant that if a 
person claims to be a Kurd, he or she must speak the Kurdish language. 
When discussing the relationship between the Kurdish language and the notion of 
nationhood, it is noteworthy to mention that Kurdistan was partitioned between four 
contemporary deferent states, which are populated by three nations, they are; Turks, 
Arabs and Persians. Yet, the Kurdish language, with its three different dialects 
(Kurmanji, Sorani and Hawrami), has become one of the distinctive factors that 
distinguishes the Kurds from non- Kurds. In spite of the existence of other minor 
dialects, like Lori and Zazaki, it can be argued that such ‘non-unified Kurdish language’ 
phenomenon was due to the lack of a government that can control Kurdish territories 
and plan for such language unification. That is why, in any attempt to look at language 
as the strength of a nation, one must take into account the fact that governments can 
control the whole nation, including the official language. For example, the Hebrew 
language as a recognised language for the state of Israel, as Graham and Erik argued, “is 
very different from the original Hebrew taken from the Torah”.116 Hence, gathering all 
the dialects in one literary text and the choice of which which dialect should become the 
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official language needs a prominent individual’s awareness, determination and the works 
of experts in the field to be involved at the nation’s highest administrative levels. 
Therefore, in this context, national identity can, in many ways, be constructed. 
In fact, Kurdish identity is in dire need to have a standard language, to certain extent, if 
the Kurds want to establish a state. A similar example of this is, the nationalist Hebrew 
Jewish language which was created or reanimated when Israel was established. This 
language had been transmitted from a different area due to the suppression of Jewish 
culture in their adopted countries, many Jews had forgotten Hebrew. It is clear that 
language was not the basic element of Jewish and national identity; rather, that religion 
formed the basis of identity. Anderson in this context thought that the phenomena of 
abandonment of Latin language in Europe led to the return of the European nations to 
people’s language as a basic of their national awareness. Anderson stated that  
“in 1804, for example, Ukrainian literature appeared first through poetry and after 
forty years, the first nationalist Ukrainian organization was established and started 
striving for establishing a national state. The Hungarian nationalism had started 
striving for establishing national state by returning to the people’s language and 
abandoning the Latin language which was the official language of Borussia (a state 
of Austria-Hungary) until the middle of the nineteenth century.”117  
However, Kurdish language, in any period of time, could not get access to the outside 
world due to its closed geography. The only Kurdish cultural wealth was poetry, written 
in three distinct dialects (Kurmanji, Sorani and Hawrami) that were spoken in three 
disconnected geographical areas. Therefore, they did not have the literary or cultural 
power to influence the other cultures. Nevertheless, throughout hundreds of years, Kurds 
focused heavily on protecting the Kurdish language to prevent it being assimilated into 
the Turkish and Persian cultures, especially as the Ataturk authority in Turkey and the 
Pahlavi in Iran did not accept the Kurdish language as equivalent to their own.  
The Kurdish language was continuously attacked from many sides. The strength of the 
Arabic language was taken from the Quran and religious texts, and the strength of 
Persian was taken from literary cultural and philosophical texts, which was then 
confirmed in state power. As to the Turkish language, its strength goes back to the fact 
it was the language of the Ottoman Empire, although Ataturk later changed the alphabet 
and made it distinctly Turkish. For the Kurdish language, notwithstanding it has a related 
history dating back to the Avestan era, as well as the political influence of the Turks, 
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Persians and Arabs, experienced difficult stages until it reached a higher level of usage 
by the Kurdish elites during the first decade of the twentieth century up to the present 
day. Yet the Kurds did not have one single dialect, thus Kurdistan was unable to develop 
a single national literature and culture. This can be considered one of the fundamental 
factors that debilitated Kurdish nationalism in terms of linguistic usage. In addition to 
this, the division of the empires in the region added to such language fragmentation 
among different dialects. None of these dialects was able to impose itself on Kurdish 
intellectuals due to the power of the literature and knowledge of each dialect. For 
example, the masterpieces of Ahmad Khani were written in north Kurmanji, while 
Haji Qadir Koye, Nali, Salim and Kurdi wrote in Sorani, although both had contributed 
to and recorded Kurdish literature.  
If there was national awareness about uniting these dialects, Kurdish culture may have 
reached a level of healthy political organization during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in order to stand against imperial influences. Therefore, we can say 
that language played a good role for retaining Kurdish culture but at the same time was 
the source of Kurdish problems and the disconnecting of its culture. Not only that, but 
even had been more sacrificed due to political and local crises. Kurdish intellectuals did 
not fight against the distortion and dispersion of Kurdish language and culture and try to 
prevent its extinction Minorsky stated:  
“All the Kurdish dialects, except (Zaza and Goran), despite their differences, 
they could be wonderfully united in the content that their values appear when 
they are compared with the multi Iranian languages…There is a constitutive 
unity in Kurds sourced from one language that a large number of important 
people speak in it” 118 
In addition, Minorsky highlighted that the Kurds might be the Medes; “Kurdish 
nationalists prefer considering them their own ancestors”.119 
Furthermore, the famous linguist David Mackenzie criticized the views of Minorsky and 
suggested that here is in memories that in one hand there are few numbers of common 
moral and expression of Kurdish styles which organize each other. On the other hand, it 
is different from Iranian languages. He also thought that ‘native Kurds’ in terms of some 
basic sides from the language of Medes, while the Iranian languages also carry some 
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sides of Medes language. Thus, there are similarities between the two languages. Since 
the Medes were near the northwest of Iran, one can say that the two Kurdish accents of 
Zaza and Goran, which are located in the north-west of Iran, can suggest that Kurdish 
language is close to the language of Medes.120 Therefore, Mackenzie argues that there 
are some differences in origin of the accent of the northern Kurdish (Kurmanji) and the 
southern Kurdish (Sorani). This might be related to the great effect of the Goran accent 
upon the Sorani accent.121 
It is worth mentioning that the Kurdish language has insufficiencies in written 
expression, which draws to which draws attention to the fact that there is not a united 
standard language. As previously mentioned, language is considered one of the major 
elements of nationalism. Instead of strengthening the development of Kurdish 
nationalism, the variety of accents and dialects in fact had a negative influence on the 
notion of nationalism for the Kurdish people. To illustrate this further, it is imperative to 
refer to Kurdish intellectuals’ statements regarding this issue as most of them have 
specialized in addressing the weaknesses of this element of nationalism for the Kurdish 
nation. 
First of all, Mukryani suggested that those intellectuals came from the Ottoman Empire 
spread in different parts of Kurdistan, had published their writings in Turkish language. 
When Major Soane opened his publishing office in Sulaimani, he rewarded those who 
presented fluent Kurdish writings. Hence, one can understand that why Kurdish elites at 
that time could rarely write in Kurdish language. The language the Kurdish intellectuals 
wrote in generally included Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Encouraging people to write in 
Kurdish was a key concern for the British officials. Kurdish intellectuals published their 
writings on Kurdish culture and history in Turkish, such as Shukri Fazli (1882-
1926), who was a Kurdish intellect, journalist and poet, who wrote poems in Turkish, 
Arabic and Persian., Amin Faizi Beg (died in 1928) was another Kurdish intellectual 
who specialized in literature and mathematics. In 1893, he published a book in Turkish 
titled ‘Total Results’. The prominent Kurdish poet like Piramerd, wrote poems and 
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articles in Turkish for twenty-five years, particularly when he lived in Istanbul and 
served as a member of the High Majlis of Istanbul.122  
There is an opposing view to the argument outlined above. in a special recorded 
interview, Qazaz said; “Lack of a political independent entity is the effective direct factor 
of the lack of Kurdish standard language, because if we had an independent entity, we 
would have a better and stronger language. It might have settled an accent.”123 So, this 
can be a correct view of the historical space for Kurdish standard language from all the 
parts of Kurdistan. Yet we should not forget that the external factors mentioned earlier, 
like Kamalism, Arabism or Persianism, had a great impact upon imposing this political 
reality on the Kurdish language, though the Kurdish language has survived until the 
present day. However, Qazaz was of the opinion that this fact as a positive factor. He 
said “the division of Kurdish language is the result of the externally imposed division of 
Kurdistan, and the only positive feature of this division has enriched the language.” 124  
3.2.2 Kurdish Culture  
One of the most distinctive characteristics in identifying Kurds to people of other nations 
in the Middle East is Kurdish clothes. The traditional Kurdish dresses are still used for 
everyday wear and are not reserved only for holidays, especially by the older generation 
of men and women. The dresses worn on a daily basis tend to be modest in color and 
have little or no accessories or embroidery. In the present day, the Kurdish dress is more 
commonly worn on special occasions. 
A traditional Kurdish woman’s outfit includes either a vest or long-sleeved jacket or long 
overcoat worn over a gown. An under dress and puffy pants are worn beneath the gown. 
A belt over the gown is also needed. Traditionally, women wore Kurdish hats 
ornamented with valuable colored stones, beads and gold pieces. Over time this has 
become less common. Now it is more popular among women to only accessorize with 
gold jewelry. Usually younger women and young girls wear brightly colored dresses 
adorned with many beads and sequins, and the older women wear darker colors. 
However, older women tend to wear more gold jewelry because traditionally when 
women married they would receive a dowry of gold jewelry pieces from their groom; 
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the tradition implied that the amount of gold pieces a woman wore signified their status 
amongst other women in their society. This still applies today, to a lesser extent. 
As for Kurdish men, the traditional outfit comes as a set, a top worn over a shirt, then 
puffy trousers covering from the waist to the toe. Then, between both the top and the 
trousers there is a different colored belt. There are different styles which are still common 
in Kurdistan, like Rank u chogha, Sharwal u Mraxani, Kattafi and Star Xani, worn by 
men, each of which has a distinctive characteristic from the others. There are other 
accessories worn on men’s clothing which are not very common nowadays, like Kawa 
u Salta, PuzaVana and KolVana. Men’s shoes are called Klash and are sewn with 
thread.125  
Archie Roosevelt, in describing Kurdish clothes, said:  
“Kurdish dress consists of a tasseled turban of blue silk, embroidered vest, 
baggy gray pants of homespun wool, and a huge crimson cummerbund, 
intricately knotted in front, from which protrudes a pipe, the top of a tobacco 
pouch, and a long curved dagger…the Kurds are incorrigible dandies and a 
poor man among them would rather spend his last coins on a fine sash than 
on a good kebab”.126   
In another note, Roosevelt said “…the villager’s clothes and their buildings made me 
feel attached to the differences between Kurdish men’s and women’s dresses”. As to 
Kurdish women’s dress, Roosevelt said: “Kurdish women’s dress is not less gorgeous 
than men…” then he gave the above description.127 The reason for this is that Kurdish 
women like to appear in such a stunning dressing style especially silk clothes as it shows 
their reputation, pride and nobility among Kurdish society. This is one of the distinctive 
characteristics of Kurdish women’s clothes, which genuinely belongs to Kurdish culture 
even though it might have some similarities to Turkish women’s clothes. These Kurdish 
clothes did in fact resemble Kurdish national identity, as they were exclusively worn by 
Kurds in the region, in such a way that any foreigners who visited the Middle East and 
saw Kurdish clothe immediately knew that they were in Kurdistan, and not in other areas, 
like Arabic countries or Turkey. When the orientalists visited Kurdistan, they dedicated 
part of their writings to describing Kurdish cultural dress, like Claudius James Rich who 
visited Sulaimani during the early nineteenth century, as will be discussed further.     
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In fact, Kurdish culture is quite unique from other cultures in the region. It has aspects 
of both hardship and fascination. Life in Kurdish villages was traditionally hard; it was 
a difficult agricultural lifestyle and the land was covered in stones and rocks, making it 
hard to plant on. In addition to that, the villagers lived as migrants between summer and 
winter. Before the real heat of summer started, they migrated to the cooler hilly areas, 
and when the winter came again, they moved back to the plain areas to less harsh 
conditions.128  
Rich described Kurdish culture in his book during the nineteenth century when he visited 
Kurdish areas (presently located in modern Iraq). In fact, Rich and Roosevelt’s writings 
were imperative for the Kurdish nationalists of the early twentieth century. Therefore, 
descriptions of Kurdish history referred to the writings of these orientalists since they 
best described Kurdish culture in the region. Kurdish nationalist, historian and writer 
Muhammed Amin Zaki, writing in the early twentieth century, is one example of what. 
Similarly, Kurdish writer, poet and academic Aladin Sajadi, who lived during Sheikh 
Mahmud’s time and wrote the famous book titled “The Kurdish revolution and the Iraqi 
revolution”, referred to these nineteenth century orientalist’s writings on Kurdish 
culture. In short, one can argue that Kurdish nationalists of the early twentieth century 
have benefited from the orientalists’ writings in terms of culture and national identity.    
Hence, the researcher briefly refers to some of the descriptions of Kurdish culture written 
by Rich. He mainly talked about Kurdish parties and dances in which the Kurds pay an 
immense amount of attention and significance to even nowadays for national religious 
celebrations, or political parties and other occasions. One of the occasions he saw was a 
Kurdish party in a house in the entrance part of the city of Sulimani, which attracted 
Rich and made him get closer to observe how Kurdish parties are carried out. He saw a 
dance known as Tchopee in which people form a ring not joined at the end,129 which is 
still the dance practiced in Kurdistan for national and political parties, and is strictly 
particular to Sulaimani and its suburbs. Although this type of dance is exclusive to the 
people of Sulaimani, Kurdish dance in general has characteristics that belong to the 
Kurds only and no other nation has a similar type of dance similar type of it.   
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Furthermore, it should be taken into consideration that Kurdish culture is diverse and 
differs from one location to another. For example, Kurdish dance in Jwanro-Mariwan 
(presently in modern Iran) has many shapes, which is the same case as Hawrami dance. 
However, the dance is totally different in northern Kurdistan (presently in modern 
Turkey). This shows that Kurdish is a rich culture; as well as the various accents used 
by the Kurds, such as Sorani, the culture has traditions and customs that are unique in 
the region,  
To prove Rich’s statement, Kurdish women always fight against enemies, alongside their 
husbands, fathers, sons and brothers. Not only that, Kurdish women have a better quality 
of life than Turkish and Persian women. In this context, Rich said “The condition of the 
women is far better in Koordistan [Kurdistan] than in Turkey or Persia. That is to say 
they are treated as equals by their husbands, and they laugh at and despise the slavish 
subjection of Turkish women”. 130  
One can argue that the western policy towards the Kurds during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was shaped by these orientalists’ and foreign delegates’ 
writings about the culture and the nature of Kurdish personalities in order to find suitable 
ways of treating the Kurds and in what way they should approach them. That is why in 
the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, the major allied powers recognized the Kurds as a separate 
nation from the Turks, Arabs and Persians, and that they should have the right of their 
own independent state.    
Nevertheless, Kurdish societies were not aggressive, as Rich highlighted that the 
phenomenon of manpower in some Kurdish villages that created a sort of tranquility 
within the society. Rich said “There is something approaching to domestic comfort in 
Koordistan [Kurdistan]; in Turkey the idea is quite unknown.”131 
But some Kurdish rulers used force against the poorer families, whereas this was 
unacceptable among Turkish societies. He mentioned a species of tyranny practiced by 
some of their powerful and licentious princes, which would not be submitted to in 
Turkey. If a person of this character took a fancy to a girl, he would often force her 
                                                          
130 Ibid, p. 285-286.  
131 Rich, supra, note 301, p. 286. 
 
64 
 
parents to marry her to him.132 This practice is still the case in a few areas in Kurdish 
societies but does not occur often. 
It is true that men were the leaders of most Kurdish tribes, but this does not mean that 
Kurdish women did not participate in the concerns of their kin. In fact, in the history of 
Kurdistan, there are several cases in which Kurdish women successfully ran the affairs 
of their clans and became the focus of many foreign orientalists and local historians and 
writers when talking about the role of women in their societies. One of the reasons for 
this focus stems from the fact that these Kurdish women took two roles in the society, 
the first one to look after the family and indoor affairs as was required by tradition, while 
the second was to evolve in outdoor social progress and political affairs. Hence, they 
were not like Turkish, Arab and Persian women who were only involved in indoor 
matters.  
This high social and political respect enjoyed by Kurdish women came from their 
relatives and tribe leaders, and was a source of pride for their societies and Kurds in 
general that was hardly seen elsewhere. Thus, many Kurdish women have drawn the 
attention of world historians, orientalists and foreign travelers who have mentioned 
Kurdish women in their writings. In this paradigm, Minorsky considered Kurdish people 
as a more developed and civilized nation than the Turks, Arabs, and Persians, and women 
in Kurdistan enjoyed full independence and respect in their societies.133 It can be argued 
that Kurdish writers at the time seize on this point, like Zaki Beg who described the 
Kurds and the differences between Kurdish nation and the other nations in the region. 
This can be clearly seen in his writings. 
Jaff women are a good example of women who received this high degree of respect 
among the other Kurdish communities.134 In fact, Jaff women took an independent role 
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in supporting their kin especially those from the Bedouin families that journeyed 
between Germian and Kwestan annually. Moreover, Jaff women were independent in 
their views and handling of their affairs within their society and at social meetings where 
decisions had to be made in connection to Jaff affairs. They were also very well-known 
in Kurdish poetry and literature.135 Among the orientalists, Major Saone, the famous 
traveler who came to Iraq and Kurdistan in 1919, was astounded with Kurdish women’s 
performance in general and Jaff women in particular and he respectfully made known 
the liberty and independence of Kurdish women in his writings. He said in his book: 
The veil and all it implies is unknown, and the women are, for all practical purposes, 
as free as in England. My first walk through the streets of Halebja brought this 
vividly to view. In place of the black-draped ghosts which in other Mohammedan 
countries peep and giggle, or else bolt like frightened rabbits on the sudden 
appearance of a European, the good dames of Halebja sat and gossiped on their 
doorsteps just like Mrs Brown and Mrs Jones in any village at home, quite 
unperturbed by the passing of a stranger. The younger ones among them were 
strikingly handsome girls, a little Jewish in type, with a splendid bearing and an 
honest, frank expression, as different from the sallow, dark-eyed “beauties” of the 
harem as a healthy English country girl from a bedizened actress.”136  
Last but not least, the educational level of the Kurds is worth mentioning here. Rich said: 
“…the Kurds are generally very thirsty for knowledge and gather it.” He believed in 
general that the Kurds are much more eager for information, much more different of 
themselves and much easier to instruct than the Turks and even, to certain degree, the 
Persians. There are things which a Persian will readily adopt, but others in literature and 
science in which he conceives himself to be highly superior to other nations. Still, the 
Iranians are proud to have been the Be more specific here – ‘the first nation to have 
discovered these fields. Meanwhile, Rich suggested that a Turk has a comfortable idea 
of his own superiority in everything, and has a thorough contempt for whatever he does 
not understand.137 However, he declined to admit/acknowledge that the Turks and 
Iranians were better than the Kurds; he used the proverb of “one swallow does not make 
a summer” to illustrate this view”.138 
The importance of referring to Rich’s work written during the nineteenth century and 
Major Soane’s work of the early twentieth century, is that they highlight the distinctive 
characteristics of Kurdish men and women for the two different times that Kurds served 
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their colonial empires, when they set plans for their new territories in the Middle East. 
This was the case not only in this region, but everywhere that the British and French had 
colonized. In this context, Edward Said stated that, “During the early years of the 
twentieth century, men like Balfour and Cromer could say what they said, in the way 
they did, because a still earlier tradition of Orientalism than the nineteenth-century one 
provided then with a vocabulary, imaginary, rhetoric, and figures with which to say 
it”.139 However, he criticized the Orientals and named them ‘antihuman and persistent’ 
people since they were the road mappers for the colonial powers to take over the lands 
of others.140   
Referring back to Rich’s views of the Kurds, one can understand that he was was 
describing the general population, not solely a few elites and Kurdish leaders. At this 
point, one significant question arises: if the Kurdish nation is considered as a nation 
thirsty for knowledge and development, as Rich described, why could it not establish an 
independent state in the region, notwithstanding the fact that it is the fourth largest nation 
in the Middle East? Any attempt to answer this question should stem from analyzing the 
emergence of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish issues. 
3.2.3 Sufism and Kurdish national identity  
Religion as an ideological and spiritual system might be the factor of separation of (me) 
and someone else. That is, common history, language and land are important as the basis 
of nationality. Humans, at the same time, have a group of identities, including 
nationality, religion, social class and gender, among others. There are some important 
points to mention as follows:  
Firstly, generally speaking, the majority of the Kurds are Muslim with practicing Sufism, 
to some extent they were influenced by Islamic teachings in terms of their social life, 
principles and social and moral values. Most Kurdish literature was produced by 
religious centers, which were influenced by Islamic philosophy and nations. Therefore, 
religion had a significant influence on Kurdish culture, morality, society and tradition. 
However, religion, particularly Islam and Sufism did not partake any role in the political 
and ideological elements, did not have significant influence on the development of 
Kurdish nationalism in comparison to other aspects of national identity. Besides that, the 
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religious struggle for protecting Kurdish identity was not a factor to encourage the Kurds 
to stand against the invaders, and to support the political principles of Kurdistan of 
independence.  
Secondly, the two empires in the region, instead exploited religion to use the Kurds for 
their interests, and later on wanted to abolish Kurdish language and culture in order to 
impose their languages and cultures on them. Accordingly, the Kurds were never 
tortured by the Ottoman Empire for the cause of religion, since the Kurds are Muslims. 
On the other hand, they tried to oppose Kurdish issue through dismantling Kurdish 
culture and identity. If the Kurdish language began to fade, Kurds would assimilate and 
become part of more dominant nations. An example of this is the imposing of the French 
language upon millions of Arab people in Algeria and Tunisia. This did not have the 
desired effect of Arabs assimilating into the French culture because Arab people 
in Algeria belonged to another religion, Islam.  
Thirdly, if we compare the role of Islam for Arab and Kurdish nationalism, it comes to 
the minds that as for Arabs, Islam was often a part of Arabic cultural, ideological and 
political life, and to certain degree was exploited during the early days of Arab 
nationalism. This is not the case for Kurdish nationalism because there were so many 
different religions, including Kakaei, Yezedi, Shabak and Christianity, as well as the 
methods of Qadiri and Naqshbandi who are Sufi Muslims. Therefore, Kurdish 
nationalism did not have strong relations with religion because it did not have a great 
influence on it. Another point was that for Arabs, religion was an important basis of 
Arabic nationalism; firstly, Islam was a basic religion and unity of spirits and the Arabic 
civilization totally depended on the Quran and Sunnah that with the help of other nations 
this religious message would spread across the world. Secondly, Islam, for Arabs 
provides spiritual, cultural and ideological armor against the forces of Latin cultures, 
such as atheist Europeans and the Pope, and against the cultural and civilized momentum 
of western colonialism. Nevertheless, for the Kurdish nation, although the methods 
of Qadrie and Naqashbandi appeared as two religious forces that were to some extent 
disharmonious, religion generally was not able to impose its ideological system upon 
Kurdish nationalism.  
Fourthly, the Kurdish revolutions and movements, from the uprising of 
Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri to the uprising of the Khoibuni Association in north Kurdistan 
in 1925 and the uprising and revolution of Sheikh Muhamud Hafid in 1918 by Kurdish 
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religious figures was not considered a religious element in Kurdish nationalism because 
the goals and requests of these Kurdish leaders was for national rights and the 
independence of Kurdistan against invaders. This is evident when we consider that when 
the Kurdish Revival Association was established, most of their members were students, 
religious men and members of religious centers in Kurdistan. They were not graduates 
of Tehran and European universities. Despite their strong belief in Islam, they 
established the first Kurdish Nationalist Association in eastern Kurdistan, which had 
been the basis of establishing the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad in 1945.  
Finally, even in north Kurdistan, this was the same. For example, 
Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri in 1878, as a religious man supported the Ottoman military 
not only with weapons but with military individuals against the Russians.141 In addition 
to this his intention was not to establish an Islamic State in Kurdistan because he started 
to struggle against the Ottoman authority and Iran two years later. He turned against the 
Ottoman state. If the revolution of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri was given a religious 
background, he would not have struggled against the Ottoman military; he would have 
followed Islamic principles. So, any Islamic explanation and interpretation for the 
revolution of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri was completely wrong to reduce the value and 
importance of their patriotism.142 This uprising, and the previous uprisings, were the 
result of oppression and disunity between Kurds and non-Kurds.143    
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3.3 Conclusion  
This chapter examined Kurdish identity as a nation. It started with defining Kurdish 
nation, followed analyzing the origins of the Kurdish people, how Kurdish language 
developed with diversified dialects, the differences of Kurdish culture with the cultures 
of the neighboring nations. Then the chapter turned into another important topic, which 
is related to Islam and Kurdish national identity, which was later one compared with 
Judaism and Jewish national Identity. Finally, the chapter briefly discussed the 
geographical concept of Kurdistan. 
In their writings, Orientalists defined the Kurds, their culture, language, religion, and the 
fundamental elements of ‘nationhood’ existed in the Kurds. In this thesis, the researcher 
has referred to the different views of Rich, Edmonds and Archie Roosevelt, along with 
some others depending on the availability of primary sources in archives These 
historians, diplomats and politicians, in their definitions and writings, defined the Kurds 
as a different and independent nation. 
Kurdish language forms the second basis of nationhood and Kurdish identity in the world 
and differentiates Kurds from other nations of the region. It is also the reason for the 
survival of Kurdish identity in the world in general and the Middle East in particular. 
Earlier historians mentioned that Kurdish language rooted back to the Indo-European 
languages, and specifically originated from the Medes civilization. Despite the Kurdish 
language has various dialects which was the source of problems as the language was not 
standardized. In addition to, this different topography in the different regions of 
Kurdistan also form the basis of Kurdish identity. Throughout history up until the present 
day, the Kurdish language consists of the Sorani, Kirmanji, Haurami, Zazaki, and 
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Kalhuri dialects, and because of the various invasions in, these dialects remain distinct 
from one another. However, Kurds have managed to prevent these dialects from 
disappearing. Those which are in the most danger of fading away are Zazaki and Kalhuri 
which do not holding a strong position among Kurds.  
Although the Kurdish language is one of the richest foundations of Kurdish nationhood, 
it is the main problem for Kurdish nationalist identity. The reason can be given through 
an example of Kurds in the north who speak Kurmanji who do not fully understand those 
in the south who speak the Sorani dialect, even though they are all Kurds. On top of this 
problem, in terms of alphabets in Kurdish writing, it has become an issue for Kurdish 
nationhood identity. That is why these Kurds are forced to rely on the language of those 
who have invaded their land, such as Turkish, Arabic, Persian and sometimes English to 
talk to each other. 
Next, Kurdish language became subject to genocide in the 1920s and 1930s, at the hands 
of the Turks and Persians. The secular system of Turanism was established by Kamal 
Ataturk and became the core of Turkish identity, and Turkish nationalism further 
imposed itself and its fundamentals on Kurds, making Kurdishness disappear into 
Turanism. This meant that the Kurdish population in this large part of Kurdistan, which 
accounted for millions of people, were deprived of using their mother tongue. 
This chapter also examined culture, and manifested itself in a variety of characteristics 
and distinguishing features of Kurdish identity.  
With regards to Kurdish religious identity, the majority Kurdish people were and still 
practicing Islam, while some of them followed the sect of Sufism either Naqishbandi or 
Qadiri. The researcher argues that the religious factor did not have significant 
contributions to Kurdish nationalism.      
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH ISSUES AND NATIONALISM 
4.1 Introduction  
Kurdish national issues are central to the contemporary Middle East and are considered 
to be deeply rooted in the struggle for nationalism, a struggle for which no practical 
solution has emerged, and which has not yet been achieved for a number of significant 
reasons. This chapter will examine the weaknesses and strengths of Kurdish nationalism 
during the time of the Kurdish dynasties but will focus more broadly on the period from 
1850 to the 1930s and the stages that Kurdish nationalism went through, including 
Kurdish literature, poetry and the role of newspapers and political organizations which 
were the voice of the Kurdish struggle and displayed Kurdish identity to the world. The 
chapter will then analyze the role and impact of suppressing the Kurdish revolts and the 
execution of Kurdish revolutionary leaders. The chapter will finally examine whether 
Kurdish nationalism was too naïve to be relied on for establishing an independent state, 
or whether it was capable yet overlooked. Hence, it is imperative look back through 
history to find out when and how Kurdish issues emerged and evaluate the progress of 
Kurdish nationalism.  
4.2 Kurdish Issues 
Most Kurdish and non-Kurdish historians are of the opinion that Kurdish issues first 
emerged when the Ottoman’s conquered Kurdistan, after their victory at the Battle of 
Chaldiran in 1514 A.D, which established the partition of Kurdistan into two parts. One 
part was controlled and ruled by the Ottomans, while the rest remained under the control 
of the Safavids.144 
This incident supports the argument that the year 1514 was when the struggle for Kurdish 
nationalism emerged. The late twentieth century prominent Kurdish nationalist, 
historian, writer and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) 
Ghassemlou considered the year 1514 as ‘doom year’ for the history of the Kurdish 
nation.145 He looked at Kurdish history in a more general sense, focusing on the rule of 
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the Kurdish dynasties. In fact, the history revealed that the Ottoman Empire carried out 
strict policies against the local Kurdish dynasties while simultaneously attempting to 
weaken the power and reputation of the dynasties. The Ottomans replaced any ruler with 
someone else if they wished. This fact had been clearly mentioned in the Sharafnama, 
when the author said: “when Umattulgolu was the ruler of Azerbaijan, he ran away from 
the imminent attacks by the Safavids and went to meet Sultan Suleiman Qanoon (1520-
1566) who instead empowered him to rule Badlis,” where Sharafkhan, the grandfather 
of Sharaf Khan of Badlis, the Kurdish historian, lived. Sharaf Khan of continued, “...this 
step by Sultan Suliman Qanoon led the ruler of Badlis side. As a result, war between the 
Ottomans and the Safavids broke out which subsequently led to the Kurds being dragged 
in to the war.”146  
The geopolitical structure of Kurdistan had a great role in bringing the Kurds into the 
battle of Chalderan. At this time, the Persian Safavid Empire controlled the east of 
Kurdistan and the Ottoman Empire in the northern part, which meant the Kurds were 
trapped between the two empires. Shah Ismail Savavid’s policy replaced Kurdish rulers 
and the mirs of Kurdish dynasties with members of the Qizilbash 
tribe/group/clan/people, who made up several Turkish Shia groups living in northwest 
Persia (Azerbaijan) in the fifteenth century.147 Shah Ismail went further to force and 
oppress the Kurds to convert from Sunni Doctrine into Jaafari Shia Doctrine. The 
Kurdish mirs finally responded to the Shah’s policy, and together went to see him in 
order to pledge allegiance to him but Shah Ismail did not accept this. Instead, he captured 
them and handed them to the Qizilbashs, then gathered a strong army and mobilized it 
from Azerbaijan and across Kurdistan, towards Diyarbakir, Mosul and Luristan. When 
the Shah’s army crossed into Kurdistan, they destroyed many places and implemented 
strong Shia religious policy against Sunnis in Kurdistan and even Arab areas. The Shah 
then incorporated the new occupied land into the Persian Empire. Thus, hatred between 
the two Sunni-Shia doctrines emerged. In response, the Kurds and Arabs sent messages 
to the Ottoman sultans Bayazid and Salim requesting help in defeating the Persian army 
and removing their influences from the region.148  
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The Kurds gradually gave their support to Sultan Salim and soon established an army, 
which was mobilized to march to Azerbaijan, the central area of power for the Safavids. 
After a battle, the Safavid’s army withdrew from Azerbaijan, but during their 
withdrawal, whenever they came to a Kurdish village, they burned it down and destroyed 
it so that the Ottomans could not gain support from Kurdish villages. When both the 
Ottomans and Persian met at Chalderan Valley, which is located at Werme Lake, battle 
broke out. Following the Ottomans’ victory, a large part of Kurdistan fell under their 
power. Later, the Ottomans re-instated the Kurdish mirs to their original positions. The 
Ottoman and Persian empires remained steadfast against each other in the region and 
from this time onwards, they forcefully recruited Kurds to fight for them.149 
The endless conflicts between the two empires and the frequent army deployments to 
battlefields in Kurdistan led to the destruction of Kurdistan through dividing Kurdish 
communities and engaging them in the war.150 When the two empires exhausted their 
armies in Kurdistan in a no-win situation, they decided to stop the war and enter into a 
pact regarding a geographical location that did not originally belong to them, but to the 
Kurds. Thus, Kurdistan became the prime victim of this conflict, which ignited Kurdish 
issues. The Ottomans and Safavids had agreed to a number of treaties throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the Treaty of Amasya 1555, the Treaty of 
Constantinople 1590,151 the Treaty of Nasuh Pasha 1612,152 however, the most important 
one was the Treaty of Zuhab 1639. This formally restored all the borders between the 
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two empires that had been agreed upon in the previous treaties, but particularly in the 
Treaty of Amasya 1555.153 
It is worth mentioning that these treaties had mentioned border issues and land controls 
in geographic locations that Kurds inhabited. For example, the Treaty of Amasya 1555 
established the division of Kurdistan between the two empires, just as non-Kurdish areas 
were divided between them, like any other non-Kurdish areas in the region.154  
In addition to this, a number of Kurdish castles were destroyed as a result of the wars or 
as part of treaty commitments, such as Qutur and Mako castles in the Van region, and 
Maghazird and Zinjir castles located near Qaris. Needless to say that travel between 
Kwestan and Garmian was prohibited. At the social level, this treaty led to social 
fragmentations, for example, the Jaf tribe became fragmented into two parts.155 The 
Treaty of Amasya was in fact regarded as the cornerstone of subsequent treaties between 
the two empires.156   
In this context, Ghassemlou stated that the partitioning of Kurdistan in the Treaty of 
Zuhab 1639 was a disaster since it had a significant impact on all subsequent events 
recorded in the history of the Kurdish nation.157 As a result, the Kurds could no longer 
control local political turmoil and they were incapable of avoiding the political pressures 
set upon them by the two empires. This situation led to the Kurdish uprising that further 
developed into a military movement in some regions in Kurdistan. The main objectives 
of those uprisings were demanding freedom and reformations of their territories. That 
means, they were not considered revolutions in their perfect meaning, but uprising in a 
broader sense. Revolution has a broader meaning than uprising. Revolution can take 
                                                          
153 A’goston-Nikolova, Elka., Shoreless Bridges: South East European Writing in Diaspora, Rodopi, 2010, 
p. 280. See also ‘Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, July 13, 1978’, International Boundary Study, Iran – 
Iraq, Boundary (Country Codes: IR-IZ), USA Department of State, USA: The Geographer, Office of the 
Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 
154 According to the Amasya peace agreement, the Ottoman Empire and Iran divided countries of 
Transcaucasia and the Near East between them. Iran took for itself: Kartli, Kakheti, the East part of 
Samtskhe-Saatabago with Akhaltsikhe, the East Part of Armenia with Yerevan, North and South Azerbaijan 
with Tabriz, East Kurdistan, whereas the Ottoman Empire took for itself: Imereti, Guria, Samegrelo, and 
western Kurdistan. The Ottomans also took Kars, but they were not allowed to restore fortresses and 
strongholds there. Giorgi, Mikheil Svanidze., ‘The Amasya Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and 
Iran (June 1, 1555)’, Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2009, pp. 191-
197, at http://www.science.org.ge/3-1/Svanidze.pdf, re-visited on 09 June 2016. 
155 Barasdust, Manuchahr., Rishai Ta’rikhi Ikhtilafati Iranu Iraq 1514-1980 (Persian), (The Roots of 
Historical Conflicts Between Iran and Iraq, 1514-1980), Forth Edition, Tehran, pp. 482-487.  
156 Hussein supra note 144, p. 114.  
157 Ghassemlou, supra, note 145, p.42. 
 
75 
 
even from outside, while uprising normally take at internal level, which is to remove the 
current authority from power by the people. Examples of these uprisings are, the uprising 
of Jan Pola Beg of 1605 and the series of uprisings throughout the eighteenth century, 
including the one led by Abdul Rahman Pasha of Baban from 1806 to 1813.158 
Despite the Ottoman Empire’s strict policy against the Kurdish dynasties, these dynasties 
continued to expand until the second decade of the nineteenth century, which to certain 
degree impeded the active functions of the Ottoman’s administrative bodies. Therefore, 
the Ottomans thought it necessary to eliminate them and accordingly introduced a 
harsher policy that would mean the entire empire would be governed by a centralized 
system during the reign of Sultan Mahmood II (1808-1839) in the 1830s. According to 
this new centralized system, which was called Tanzimat, and carried the policy of so-
called Ottomanism, all of the different peoples living in Ottoman territories must unite, 
no matter who they were; Muslim and non-Muslim, Turkish and Greek, Armenian and 
Jewish, Kurd and Arab. This was a declaration of equality before the law for both 
Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans.159 In fact, this Tanzimat policy was part of the 
reformation process for the entire Ottoman Empire following the losses in the wars 
against European nations. This is the reason why both Sultan Mahmood II and Sultan 
Abdul Majid and the men of Tanzimat decided to abandon the decentralized Ottoman 
system which was based on the Vilayat system. They wanted to change the Ottoman 
Empire, which was established by various nations, into a one nation-state based on the 
model of the western nation-states. It is worth mentioning that this policy (Ottomanism) 
continued from 1839 until 1879, and was subsequently developed into Turkism by 
Ataturk through the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter the “CUP”) in 1889 to 
1920. The CUP will be discussed further later in this chapter.        
According to the Tanzimat system, all Kurdish regions must fall under the direct 
supervision of Babi Al-a’li in Istanbul, and all the local or regional dynasties were 
removed one after another despite the fact that they were self-governed and had a local 
semi-autonomous governing form. Before Tanzimat, the Soran dynasty had a battle in 
1836 with the Ottoman army, under the command of Rachid Muhammad Pasha. Soran’s 
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territorial boundary extended to Hakari (eastern Kurdistan) and was located between the 
Greater and Lesser Zabs rivers (the two tributaries of the Tigris River). In the south, it 
was connected to the Baban dynasty and in the west was connected to the Badinan 
dynasty. Soran’s capital was Rawanduz. While the dynasty’s territory was under 
Ottoman siege, mir Muhammed left for Istanbul to meet Sultan Mahmood II, who later 
set him free. Upon his return to Soran, he was ambushed and killed. The Soran dynasty 
was left with no mir, and no one could take his place while under Ottoman siege, thus it 
finally collapsed. In fact, Soran’s location was strategic for the Kurds as it was in the 
center of the region and connected all the Kurdish dynasties together. Upon its collapse, 
then the western and eastern dynasties were disconnected, which further weekend the 
Kurds in the region. Thus, Badinan dynasty was located in what is today northern Mosul 
in Iraq and collapsed in 1842 due to the Ottoman Tanzimat policy. This was followed 
by the Bohtan dynasty’s collapse in 1847, which was located in Cizre of Bohtan, between 
the Badinan and Hakari dynasties. Mir Badir Khan was the final mir of the dynasty, 
whose territories expanded into the Ottoman Empire’s land. The Ottomans did not accept 
this expansion. Hence, both the British Empire and the French supported the Ottomans 
in limiting this expansion. At the internal level, Yazdansher, who was the Bohtan army 
commander and the cousin of Badir Khan, was said to have betrayed the latter, and 
finally surrendered all the weapon stores to the Ottomans. Although the political and 
administrative system of the Bohtan dynasty collapsed in 1847, the family of Badir Khan 
managed to sustain itself and migrated to different parts of Kurdistan. In subsequent 
decades, this family became a dynamic source for reviving the Kurdish liberation 
movement through the means of journalism not military, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. After Bohtan, the Baban dynasty collapsed in 1851.160 The Babans revolted 
against the Ottomans for independence for three years. This revolutionwas defeated by 
a coalition of Ottoman forces and Kurdish tribes who disliked the Babans and its ruler, 
Ahmed Pasha Baban. When the Baban army was defeated near Koya in 1847, the region 
of Shahrazur was annexed to the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Pasha left Sulaimaniya in 
1850, and in 1851 his dynasty finally collapsed.161 
Eastern Kurdistan, which was under control of the Persian Empire, was in a similar 
position to the Kurdish people living under the Ottomans. For example, during the reign 
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of Nasrading Shah Qajar of the Persian Empire (1836-1896), the Ardalan dynasty, which 
had a semi-autonomous administration for seven hundred years, was tremendously 
weakened and finally eliminated in 1867.162 In fact, the geopolitical location of these 
Kurdish dynasties did not encourage the Kurdish uniting and standing together. The 
internal circumstances of the dynasties led to a greater weakening of their positions. 
Sometimes the rulers were betrayed by close family members to secure a new ruler’s 
position. The Ottomans and Persians had knowledge of these tense internal affairs and 
used it to their own advantage, and to easily skirmish their status. Finally, the strength 
of the Ottomans and the arrival of the great allied powers in the region were further 
factors in the demise of these Kurdish dynasties. Hence, after the collapse of the Baban 
dynasty in 1851, one can suggest that Kurdistan fell under the complete control of the 
Ottomans and Persians, which created a political vacuum for the continuation of Kurdish 
nationalism until a new era dawned with Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri’s Revolution of 1880-
1881. In other words, by the end of the nineteenth century, no dynasty in Kurdistan 
remained; this led to the disintegration of the relationship between the communities that 
had lived under the rule of these dynasties, and consequently had negative impacts on 
the development of Kurdish nationalism. This situation made it necessary to revive 
nationalism in Kurdistan in the form of revolution, the following sections of this chapter 
will focus on Sheik Ubeydullah Nehri’s Revolution of 1880-1881 and Sheikh 
Abdulsalam Barzani of 1908. 
It is argued that implementing such a strict centralization policy by the Ottomans and the 
Persians created an internal balance in order to control the other internal crises occurred 
due to their wars. This process was useful in the short-term, but this imbalance continued 
in an unsustainable manner and created more burdens for the empires that almost ruined 
all their administrative functions, which extended to Kurdish regions. Thus, the Kurds 
had to struggle even more while living under the control of the two empires.  
As evidence for this, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 resulted in Ottoman defeat, 
which substantially weakened the empire’s control in many regions, particularly in 
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Kurdistan.163 This brought Kurdistan into a more volatile situation particularly when the 
power from the central Ottoman administration was the gradual retreat of the empire 
from the region. 
When the Ottomans were defeated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, the Treaty 
of San Stefano was agreed in March 1878.164 The treaty ended the Ottoman presence in 
the Balkans and established Russian dominance over South Europe and the Turkish 
Striates. Ga’bor A’goston and Bruce Alan Masters suggested that this radical shift in the 
European power balances was opposed by the rest of the great powers, particularly 
France and the British Empire, leading to a new peace settlement at the Congress of 
Berlin in June 1878, in which the Ottoman presence was restored in Albania and 
Macedonia despite territorial losses in Europe and Anatolia,165 which is still part of the 
Kurdish populated area in the present state of Turkey.   
The most important fact to mention about the Congress of Berlin of 1878 is the 
significant part of the treaty referring to Kurdistan as a specific land, that is to say as a 
geographic term and not to the Kurds as a nation. For example, the Russians returned 
occupied Kurdish territories, such as Bayazid and Alaskir Vally, to the Ottomans in 
consideration for the Ottoman’s returning the Qutur region to the Persian Empire. 
Therefore, the Congress clearly showed no reference to the Kurds as a nation, however, 
it explicitly mentioned the Armenians as part of protecting a nation. This undermined 
and challenged Kurdish issues and rights.166 In other words, Kurdistan as a region 
became an item for exchange between the rival empires without recognition of the rights 
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of the local Kurdish inhabitants. This greatly disappointed the Kurdish people and 
quickly sparked the first major Kurdish revolution led by Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri in 
1880 and 1881 in the northern Kurdistan.  
4.3 Kurdish Nationalism 
Roosevelt stated that, up until the mid-nineteenth century, Kurdish nationalism was very 
different to the nationalism that developed later and the Kurds did not consider 
themselves different to other nations within the Ottoman Empire. As previously 
mentioned, mir Badir Khan was in the process of expanding the territory of Bohtan 
within the land controlled by the Ottoman Empire, and he began to remove Turkish 
inhabitants in the Kurdish areas and established a form of autonomous administration 
separate to the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Kurdish nationalism was born, albeit initially 
on a temporary basis.167 One can support Roosevelt’s opinion about Kurdish nationalism 
by taking into account Badir Khan’s attempt to gather smaller Kurdish tribes first, and 
then the greater ones, under one umbrella to strive for Kurdistan and develop Kurdish 
nationalism, instead of tribal nepotism and local affiliation. He successfully 
implemented the Piroz Pact (Sacred Pact) in 1839 with the agreement of all Kurdish 
tribes, which aimed to end all internal conflicts and unite the Kurds against the Ottomans. 
In fact, the political circumstances favored Badir Khan as he gained advantages that 
arose from the conflict between Sultan Mahmud II and his son Abdul Majid I and the 
Ottoman army’s defeat by Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1839. For Badir Khan, 
Muhammed Ali Pasha was a source of inspiration and they later communicated in order 
to limit Ottoman power in both Kurdistan and Egypt.168 Badir Khan’s actions can be 
considered the first attempt in gaining Kurdish independence during the Kurdish 
dynastic periods.  
In the early twentieth century, inside the Ottoman Empire, as a political reaction against 
the danger of Turkish nationalist authority, the Kurds began to outwardly or publicly 
display their nationalism. Kurdish nationalism, was reflected in Kurdish poetry and 
literatures but it had no proper modern shape. Kurdish nationalism was quite contrary to 
Turkish, Persian and Arab nationalism, and did not have a chance to change their ideas 
and beliefs into reality. Instead, the major allied powers of WW1, divided the 
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country. Then Kurdish nationalism faced severe internal oppositions among the Kurds 
themselves.  Kurdish nationalism, therefore, fought to protect itself at the local level 
from all parts of Kurdistan. This led to Kurdish nationalism development at the local 
level based on the local conditions that could not go beyond its boundary and reach to 
the other parts or could be a part of it.  
In order to understand Kurdish nationalism more clearly, some key points are necessary 
to bear in mind. 
Firstly, Kurdish culture; Kurdish nationalism is a product of this 
culture. Secondly, the nature of society, politics and the authority of dynasties were the 
only model for Kurdish political authority. Thirdly, the nature and specification of 
regionalism of Kurdish nationalism.  
To illustrate the first point, the Kurds were able to protect themselves because their 
culture as an ethnic group differed from Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures. 
Therefore, the division of Kurdistan and separating Kurds resulted not only in political 
and geographic divisions, but cultural divisions as well, was the main factor for Kurdish 
survival. Therefore, the cultural and geographic divisions gradually appeared in the 
Kurdish language. In fact, the survival of the language and different dialects protected 
Kurdish culture. The process of such protection was first started via poetry. Poetry 
gradually become the Kurdish cultural identity. Kurdish language through the medium 
of poetry has changed from the spoken language to written language, with distinct 
Kurdish style that was different to neighboring countries.  
The poets were part of the Kurdish Literate Staff who were educated in mosques and 
religious centers. These poets had written on their subjects, including philosophy and 
history, in Persian and Arabic, up until the early nineteenth century. However, during 
the tenth century, poets like Baba Taher Oryan Hamidani (938-1021 A.D) wrote in 
Arabic and Persian. Even during the sixteenth century, Malaye Jaziri (1570-1640) wrote 
his poems in both Kurdish and Arabic. Yet, there were not any great Arab or Persian 
poets writing in Kurdish, since the Kurdish language was not that important to them, 
however, Arabic and Persian were important to the Kurds. In this context, Ricks 
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Christopher referred to Eliot’s statement who said: “…it is easier to think in a foreign 
language than it is to feel in it”.169 
By the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Goran dialect appeared in poetry 
in western Kurdistan particularly during the period of the Ardalan Dynasty and was used 
by poets such as Mawlawi, Besarani and Qwbadi. However, by the early nineteenth 
century, this form of literary language had weakened. In Sulaimani, in southern 
Kurdistan, a new form of language emerged during the reign of the Baban Dynasty. 
Poets including Nali, Kurdi, Salim and Mawlana Khalid used this language in poetry 
and it is now the form of written language in southern and eastern parts of Kurdistan.170  
Rasul, in his book titled ‘Some Focuses on the United Kurdish Language’, said: 
“…concerning quick spreading of this literary language from the age of 
Haji Qadiri Koye 1815-1897, the Kurdish Poet Akhtar 1832-1866, 
Kayfi Jwanroyee from the Soran land, Majdi 1849-1925 from Ardalan and many other 
poets from other areas of Sanandaj and Mukryan. They wrote with the same style 
that Nali and his friends had written a century before their lifetime.”171 This depends on 
various literary documents. We can say the literary language which is referenced in 
Sulaimani from the beginning of its construction, was the literary language of the 
Kurmanji dialect. 
This is part of an incomplete process of attempting to separate the Kurdish language and 
culture from Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures. This process occurred at a time when 
Kurds had an opportunity to fight against the geographical restrictions placed upon them 
by dominant powers, and as result, the Kurds were able to prove their cultural and ethnic 
differences from Turkish, Persian and Arab peoples. Hence, Kurdish nationalism first 
emerged from this environment through the medium of poetry. Although Kurdish culture 
was under a strong influence of the great power nations. Yet, the Kurds were able to 
preserve its culture and its identity despite the fact Kurdish culture was different from 
one part to another.  
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In short, the Kurdish nation not only contended with political and geographical 
divisions, but also with the separation of cultures in the three different regions. However, 
this diversified culture sustained itself by emphasizing elements of Kurdish cultural 
identity at the local level, such as clothing, language, literature, and antiques. All these 
elements reflected on the national identity of the Kurds, and further became the root of 
Kurdish political nationalism on the local level, and not within the context of the greater 
Kurdistan. In other words, there was no one unified culture to support one nationalist 
political system, however Kurdish culture in general still protected the identity of the 
Kurds. This is, if the separation of Kurdish culture was the result of the political division 
of Kurdistan, then attempts to unite Kurdish culture could formulate the basics of 
political union. As the German philosopher Frederick Engels said, “Every step forward 
to culture is a step towards freedom”.172 Apart from the issue of Kurdish culture, the 
differences in ideology, spiritually and physiological circumstances provided the 
foundation for an independent Kurdistan. 
Kurdish nationalism weakened further after the year 1889, particularly after Abdulrazaq 
Najib Badir Khan, who was a member of the Badir Khan family and head of the Divan 
of the Sultan, tried to establish secret communications with the Russians. When the 
Sultan became aware of this, he exiled the Abdulrazak to Libya. Amin A’li Badir Khan 
and his brother Saleh were also exiled to Sparta until 1908. In 1908, they returned to 
Istanbul under pressure from the Kurdish elites on the basis of the 1876 mandate of 
equality and justice for all. Upon their return to Istanbul, they immediately established 
the Kurdish Association for Development, which was later banned by the Ottomans in 
1909, as it was seen as a threat to the security of the Ottoman Empire. The founding 
members were once again sent into exile, in Palestine, Greece, Akka and Nablus.  
Moreover, in 1922, the Badir Khan family faced another torture and were subjected to 
elimination by Ataturk, as he saw them as a threat to the newly established state of 
Turkey. Amin A’li Badir Khan and his five sons left Kurdistan to live in Cairo. The 
second prominent Kurdish nationalist group was considered the first generation of 
Kurdish secular nationalists, inclusing Ishak Skuti, Abdulla Jawdat and Sharif Pasha of 
Khandan. These elites were popular Kurdish nationalists in Turkey who came into 
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conflict with Ataturk, who considered himself to be in alliance with them in order to gain 
support for his coup in 1908. After the coup, Ataturk started a conflict with the Kurdish 
nationalists, and as a result, they escaped to Europe.173 From 1908 onwards, Kurdish 
nationalism went through gradually tougher stages and had to prove itself and survive 
between three other nationalist movements, Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Meanwhile, 
the goals of Kurdish nationalists were the protection and confirmation of their nation’s 
rights. This fight in southern Kurdistan in the 1920s had spread from the struggle inside 
cities to a struggle in the countryside and mountains, and armed conflict had arisen.   
4.4 Emergence of Kurdish National Awareness  
The emergence of Kurdish national awareness in southern Kurdistan was related to the 
political circumstances, economic deal and culture of the second half of the nineteenth 
century, particularly during the time of the Baban dynasty in the 1850s. At that time, the 
Ottoman Empire faced economic, social and political difficulties. European powers were 
encroaching on the empire’s lands, and connecting the region to an emerging global 
capitalist economy. On the other hand, the struggle of freedom fighters in non-Turkish 
nations and the continuous war between the Ottomans and Russia, Britain and France 
caused economic, social and political troubles for the Ottoman Empire.  
The southern Kurdistan was independent by virtue of its geographical location. This 
condition empowered Baban dynasty’s cultural and economic revival that led them to 
build a new city called ‘Sulaimani city’ in Kurdistan. This step was considered as a new 
civilization phenomenon by Baban dynasty. This was due to the economic revival of the 
Baban dynasty on one hand, and rural tribal power on the other hand. Opening factories, 
such as; weaver, soups, fabric, and schools connected the city of Sulaimani to other cities 
in Kurdistan and even outside Kurdistan, which gave prestige to this city in the Middle 
East. As Lazarev added that from the early nineteenth century, and after Caucasus were 
joined to Russia, Russia began trade with Kurdistan because Kurdistan’s border was 
adjacent to Caucasus. Thus, commercial roads in these areas towards west near eastern 
Kurdistan were established. In addition, Russian businessmen had interest that they 
opened a bazaar for selling goods. 174 
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Similaly, Kamal Mazhar stated that:  
“From the nineteenth century was the beginning of building one bazaar from all over 
Kurdistan. This was important because the bazaars of Kurdistan linked to bazaars of 
global capitalism, which improved gradually to the level that the division of 
Kurdistan could not have obstacles in front of them. The road of northern and 
southern Kurdistan was developed further.”175   
In addition to this, Jamal Baban mentioned that during WW1, that:  
“with the help of Russian and French specialists, the weapons factories were 
established; most of the weapons and cannon at that time in Kurdistan were 
made by Kurds. The changes appeared when there was the danger of threats 
on Kurdistan by the Ottoman and Iranian militaries. Due to the lack of a legal 
guarantee and great political power, which was the main conditions of 
success, capitalism had not reached the level in which it had political and 
cultural influences.”176 
In addition to these factors, the researcher suggests that there were two other main factors 
that influenced Kurdish national awareness; firstly, the emergence of a Kurdish literary 
language or lyrical language transformed into spoken and written languages that sparked 
the beginning of a new intellectual movement, compared with previous periods. In other 
words, they transformed learning environments from religious chambers to modern 
schools and used Latin words, as mentioned earlier. This was evident in 1889, when 
Abdullah Jawdat established the Committee of Union and Progress. The second key 
factor was, the oppression and attacks by the Ottoman and Persian empires and the 
problems between the Kurds and those empires throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  
Religious centers were the only places for education and writing in southern Kurdistan. 
There were some religious and scientific centers which improved science and literacy; 
the great scientists from other parts of Kurdistan came to southern Kurdistan, which 
was ruled by the Baban dynasty in Sulaimani city. When the Italian explorer Alexandro 
visited Kurdistan during the nineteenth century, he said: “From the nineteenth 
century, Sulaimani has been the Kurdish cultural and nationalistic center”177 There were 
the poets in Sulaimani city, including Nali (1797-1855), Salim (1800-1866), Kurdi 
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(1809-1849) Mawlana Khalid Naqshbandi and Haji Qadir Koyee, who played a 
significant role in raising the spiritual and national awareness for the Kurdish nation.178  
Another aspect of this cultural movement was that a new literature school was 
established in southern Kurdistan known as ‘Nali School’. The poets Nali, Salim 
and Kurdi established the school and soon after, similar schools were set up in eastern 
and southern Kurdistan. This school was important to Kurdish spiritual, and ideological 
nationalism. Firstly, through this school, the Kurdish language in southern Kurdistan 
was built and fixed in all the five Sorani regions, which are 
Silemani, Sanandaj, Soran, Mukryan and Garmyan. Soon after, due to high levels of 
awareness of the literary language, the poems of Nali, Kurdi and Salim soon spread to 
all other parts of Kurdistan. Secondly, through this school, the traditions of classical 
eastern literature, the beginning of philosophy mysticism thoughts, and the spirit of 
patriotism appeared in Kurdish literature from eastern and southern Kurdistan. 
Therefore, for the first time through these texts, the image of the Ottoman military 
attacks upon Kurdistan was reflected in Salim’s poems, and later in Haji Qadir Koye’s 
work (1816-1897) and other poets. In their work, all wars and crimes took place in 
Kurdistan were mentioend. For the first time, a line was drawn between Kurds and non-
Kurds in Kurdish history, although the literary language did not spread further because 
the development of national awareness needed economic capitalism in order to produce 
campaign materials such as printed leaflets. 179  
In this context, Anderson believed that by virtue of print-capitalism, nationalist 
awareness and the literary language was established on a stronger basis since printing 
and publishing books in the national language became the direct form of communication 
with the people.180 In applying this context to Haji Qadir’s poetry, he developed a 
nationalist perspective after reading Mamu Zin’s book and various European works that 
were available in Kurdistan, and wrote his first poem in 1863. When he left Koya for 
Istanbul to study, he felt homesick for Koya, but he overcame it by approaching the 
Badir Khan’s family. This made Haji Qadir’s sense of nationalism stronger. Haji Qadir 
knew that Kurdish society was suffering from illiteracy, which is why he relied on poems 
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to propose his nationalists’ ideas to the Kurdish people. The best place for the poems to 
be recited were the mosques, attended by many people on a daily basis.181 His poems 
were very influential and will be discussed further in this chapter. Thus, one can see that, 
instead of proposing Kurdish nationalist ideas in halls and education centers, which were 
not available in Kurdistan during the middle of nineteenth century, Kurdish elites used 
mosques to spread their ideas, but did so without using Islam.  
One should not forget that in 1880 Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri raised the issue of Kurdish 
nationalism without print-capitalism and started a revolution in the areas under Ottoman 
jurisdiction and other parts (East Kurdistan) under Iranian jurisdiction. By virtue of his 
religious background (from Naqishbandi path), which allowed him to be followed by 
thousands of Imams, tribal heads, and the ordinary public followed him, and his political 
status among his people and his level of education he had all were supported him in 
becoming a prominent leader in Kurdistan. As Nehri village was located between the 
Ottoman and Persian lands, he was able to travel from one location to another and gather 
people and talk to them. Not only by traveling, but according to Curzen, he was visited 
by a number of people, between five hundred to one thousand people at his Divan on 
daily basis. This is how Nehri’s pronouncements reached among the wider Kurdish 
population 182 and that is why he is regarded as the ‘father of Kurdish nationalism’.  The 
people were drawn to him because he argued for the following points: 
Firstly, he wanted to unite all the Kurds together regardless of their genders, races, tribes, 
languages, idioms, dialects, religious background or geographical location, and to isolate 
Kurdistan from both the Ottoman’s and Persian lands. Secondly, to separate the land of 
Kurdistan completely from the Ottoman and Persian empires, then unite it, and provide 
security for trade, literacy, council services and industry. Thirdly, he wanted to create an 
alliance with other Muslim nations in the region, mainly Arabs from Mosul, Baghdad, 
Hijaz and Egypt, and other Iranian nations. He also wanted to build cooperation with the 
Christians and Assyrians in the region, and to educate Kurdish citizens on religious 
tolerance. Finally, he attempted to obtain international legal and political recognition for 
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the implementation of his main political goals. This was to be achieved through 
diplomatic, political, and military means.183         
It was considered the first political and military struggle in the fight for Kurdish 
nationalism. Whatever the background to the revolution might have been, historians 
argue, the letter that was sent to the British delegates from Kurdistan displayed a national 
awareness and nationalistic view of the revolutionary leadership and stated: “The 
Kurdish nation is independent. Its leaders, Muslims or Christians, those under Ottoman 
and Persian authorities are united and agreed on rejecting their current status of their 
affairs with these two states and do not wish to continue. We want to rule ourselves.”184  
Although the uprising was repressed by the Ottoman army and many areas of Kurdistan 
were destroyed, it played an important role in raising national awareness in Kurdistan. 
It also paved the way for the Kurdish nationalistic movement. That is why towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, the crisis of the Ottoman Empire deepened. It became so 
financially dependent on the European states that it became very much like a classical 
colony of theirs. It intended to end these crises through a series of reforms; however, the 
crises were related to the political, social and economic structure of the state. They were 
too deep to be resolved by such reforms.185 In fact, the Ottoman constitution and its other 
legal restraints were the main obstacles for the development of social and economic 
relations to develop. On the other hand, the nations within the empire were on a 
continuous progression towards democratic awareness and revolutions. In particular, the 
impact of the French revolution which spread quickly and influenced the intellectuals.186  
It was then for the first time, a new group of intellectuals appeared who were educated 
at the most advanced political schools in the Ottoman Empire. The publishing of the first 
Kurdish newspaper (Kurdistan) in 1898 by Miqdad Madhad Badir Khan and his brother 
Abdulrahman Badir Khan, who were part of Badir Khan family, as the most important 
activity for became the voice for announcing the Kurdish nationalist agenda’to the 
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outside world.187 Kurdistan Newspaper was a new beginning for the Kurdish political 
and intellectual life and was a sign of the development of Kurdish nationalistic 
awareness. As part of Kurdish history, this period considered as the eve of Kurdish 
nationalism. At this time, a nationalistic tribe, i.e. Badir Khan’s family, wanted to put 
forth a special view about Kurdish culture, giving it a political insight defined as ethno-
cultural and making nationalism a popular movement. As Sherko described, Kurdistan 
Newspaper was the representative of the Kurdish patriots from its first publishing,188 
while Jalili added that it expressed the Kurdish movement’s ideology at the end of 
nineteenth and the beginning for the twentieth century.189 If we look at the articles and 
materials published in the newspaper, one can see that they are different in their levels.  
It is worth highlighting some aspects of the writings of that time, as they were important 
and necessary. A certain degree of intellectual nationalism can be detected in these 
writings. Such nationalist topics include the importance of education and confronting 
illiteracy and social underdevelopment, ethnic segregation and tyranny against Kurds. It 
was aimed to create a united nationalist sentiment among the Kurds, and the importance 
of a Kurdish-Armenian friendship since they were geographically adjacent to each other; 
and the Kurds did not want conflict with other ethnicities in the region on the account of 
protecting Kurdish interests and to show that Kurds accepted harmony with other 
nations. The Newspaper also emphasized freedom guaranteeing the constitutional rights, 
and the granting of the rights to the Kurds by the central Ottoman and Persian authorities 
were the Newspaper’s key mottos.190  
When Kurdistan Newspaper talked about the issues of Kurdish and Armenian peoples 
under the Ottoman Empire, it described the Ottomans as the enemy of the two nations, 
and also displayed the political and ideological disputes in the society at this time. The 
Newspaper similarly reported on the crimes of Hamidiye Cavalry, some Kurdish tribes 
who fought with the Ottomans against the Armenians, that had been condemned and 
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regarded as attempts by the Ottomans to encourage enmity between the Kurds and the 
Armenians.191  
In addition, reporters focused on those Kurdish representatives who worked for the 
Ottoman state government. This evidently illustrates the Kurdish people’s level of 
awareness of these crimes. That is why Kurdistan Newspaper was repeatedly proclaimed 
to be the newest cultural and political endeavor of the educated Kurds in the history of 
Kurdish nationalism as it sought to gather the Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists on a 
cultural and intellectual basis within a political organization. The writers of this 
newspaper wanted to publicly portray the Kurdish struggle and the realities of the 
Kurdish society. When the Kurdish intellectuals were let down by the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908, they formed their own organization under the name 
of Kurdish Knowledge Publication Society in 1910, which will be discussed in further 
detail later. They paved the way for the publishing of many political and cultural 
newspapers and magazines, including Kurd in 1908, The Kurdish Sun in 1909, Kurdish 
Day in 1913. In addition, some social and cultural clubs were established in Istanbul and 
other cities of northern Kurdistan. They were demanded the recognition of the Kurdish 
language and culture, and the creation of Kurdish schools. In their immediate areas, they 
promoted Kurdish patriotism.192  
With regards to the education system within the Ottoman Empire territory in general, 
and in Kurdistan in particularly, we need to again refer to the years around the middle of 
nineteenth century. In 1846, the Ottoman government for the first time introduced an 
institutionalized system for compulsory and free education through passing a special 
law,193 although this law was not fully implemented. While there is no accurate record 
of the number of in Kurdish areas, there are some documents dating from the twentieth 
century illustrates that there a small number of Kurdish students that received an 
education’ or ‘benefited from an education in these schools. for education as 
Alexander Jaba, who was a Russian Consul for thirty-three years in Erzurum form 1826 
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to 1869,194 he referred to developments in education and schooling in the Kurdish areas 
of Jazira, Amedy and Soran.195  
There is a limited information regarding that we have got in this field in terms of 
education and schooling in south Kurdistan in the last of nineteenth century, however, it 
does highlight the education levels in Kurdistan. As previously mentioned, at the 
beginning, education was only available to children of tribe leaders and rich men in the 
Kurdish areas. For example, in 1892, a school was opened in Istanbul with the name of 
‘School of Clan’, which aimed to educate a group of Kurdish literary figures with 
political affiliations with the Ottoman Empire, who cared about this type of schooling. 
They educated individuals from different societies but also had another aim; those types 
of school as stated in Hilmi’s Diary “a foreign commissioner said: indeed, the Sultan 
was able to keep the children of tribe leaders as hostages”.196 On the other hand, these 
Kurdish students of this school made a lot of troubles for the Ottoman states because 
they were directly influenced by the intellectual and cultural movement in Istanbul, and 
thus, the idea of Kurdish independence was born here. As a result, the Ottoman state 
closed the Clan School in 1907.197  
Throughout the history of the Kurdish nationalist political movement, there were some 
political figures like Sharif Pasha, Miqdad Badir Khan and Abdulla Jaudat in northern 
Kurdistan.  Simultaneously famous poets appeared in southern Kurdistan like Piramerd, 
Ahmad Mukhtar Begi Jaff, Haji Qadiri Koyee, Dildar, Ramzi, Salam and Ahmad Begi 
Fattah Beg in southern Kurdistan between 1880s and 1930. Their poems’ contents were 
expressing the feeling of Kurdish nationalism against the Ottoman and Persian empires, 
and the existence of foreign powers in the region. However, the Kurdish nationalist 
movement was unable to use this poetry to influence a united discourse that would 
promote Kurdish nationalism. That is why after 1908, which is considered the year that 
the Ottoman state began to weaken, the Turks, as the prominent nation within the empire, 
were able to quickly increase the strength of their own nationalism in the region. They 
became a major threat for the other nations of this weakened empire, mainly the Kurds 
and Armenians, and the Arabs to a minor degree. Consequently, the Turkish nationalist 
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struggle against the Sultan shifted focus and became a struggle against other nationalist 
movements in the region. They tried to impose their political authority and culture on 
the neighboring nations. In this context, Mazhar referred to the situations in Kurdistan, 
stating “…the discontent and disagreement of the Kurds about the general status in 
Kurdistan was quite clear before the WW1, in which assuming that that this war had not 
happen, then Kurdistan could have become a new Balkan.”198  
The weakness of Kurdish nationalism was that the Kurds were not united; while the 
Kurdish elites and leaders in Istanbul were far away and disconnected from the Kurdish 
people in the other parts of Kurdistan, and therefore their voices could not reach to the 
Kurdish population in general. Hence, as Hilmi said:  
“We live in the stage of nation making, and a nation is the people who have 
independent and special figures. A nation which does not know and understand its 
past cannot determine its future: nor can it be the host of its land. A divided nation 
cannot have freedom and is always persecuted by others. Talks and discussions from 
Istanbul do not benefit those people who are minding their daily business (eating 
bread) in the villages, unless there is clear encouragement toward civilization. Is this 
all that a Kurdish young man can do! A sound and solid mind and soul cannot be 
obtained from a sick body.”199  
Hilmi’s statement indicates that Kurdish nationalism was limited to a fragmented 
agricultural society and that its socio-economical and geopolitical circumstances were 
not supportive in harnessing Kurdish society to move towards a wider intellectual 
society. For Hilmi, Kurdish nationalism was a kind of disjointed, locally base; and was 
not inclusive. Thus, it can be argued that Kurdish nationalism was unable to take 
advantage of the opportunity that arose after WW1for the nations under the Ottoman 
rule. The victorious allied powers which won the war did not show much interest in 
cooperating with the Kurds. They did not even allow them a minimal form of 
independence in the different parts of Kurdistan, like the Arabs and the Jews were given.  
After the war, although it was a new era for the nations under the Ottoman rule, the 
situation was even more difficult for the Kurds, which was the only nation to lose their 
land. Kurdish nationalism, the political movements and the revolutions, distanced itself 
from the Turkish, Persian and Arab nationalist movements This was especially apparent 
in northern Kurdistan as it was the center for growing Kurdish nationalism because of 
its location within Turkey. For example, the Sheikh Said Piran revolution and the Self-
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Determination Group did not gain the least democratic rights for Kurds but rather faced 
a campaign of extermination, with most of their leaders being executed. Following this, 
Kurdish identity and culture was placed under apartheid policy in that part of Kurdistan. 
Those who worked with the Kurdish nationalist movement in the northern Kurdistan 
were originally from the south, and later on returned to the south after 1908. Their return 
created an opportunity for south of Kurdistan to become a center of political and cultural 
activities for the Kurds, to an extent. However, this did not happen.200  
In fact, the problem of this persistent tribal and clan loyalties were existed even before 
1847. The researcher argues that there were differences between the northern and 
southern nationalist intellectuals; was the fact that unlike in the north, a suitable political, 
cultural and social environment did not exist for the Kurds in the south. Rather, they 
were forced to be part of a new political and cultural reality created under the British 
major allied power system of the south which had no intentions of granting Kurdish 
independence. They tried to advance their political and cultural struggle under Sheikh 
Mahmud’s mandate. Here, the Kurdish intellectuals in the south split into two groups. 
One supported Sheikh Mahmud, while the others supported the British. In this regard, 
Jamal Nabaz considered this group as a fairly bourgeois, who did not have the support 
of the people and could not work independently, they worked for their own interests. 
Hence, their role on the political scene did not exceed beyond that of the follower of a 
Kurdish classical leader.201 At this time, the northern Kurdish nationalists became 
increasingly active with the aim of achieving independence for the Kurdish nation. 
Although their activities took different forms, there were two main types, foreign 
diplomacy and internal circumstances, as discussed below:  
As far as the foreign diplomacy was concerned, some of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement leaders addressed European audiences at various forums to explain their 
agenda, including European parliaments, national audiences, the League of Nations, 
particularly the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 in 
particular, which we explained earlier. In these sessions, Kurdish leaders explained their 
reasons for establishing an independent nation-state from the Ottomans. Yet the 
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European powers did not keep their promises and sacrificed the Kurdish cause for the 
sake of their own interests. The best illustration for this case is the role of General Sharif 
Pasha as the only Kurdish representative at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, as all 
were Although you mentioned this in chapter three, perhaps repeat briefly here 202 
As to the internal circumstances, the role of the Kurdish intellectuals inside Kurdistan 
are referred to. They conducted many cultural and political activities in order to raise 
political, national and patriotic awareness among the Kurds. Newspapers, magazines and 
political organizations played a significant role in the effort to raise awareness. The 
issues tackled included Kurdish independence, annexation of Kurdistan to Iraq, and 
fighting against Britain major allied powers. They appeared in the headlines of these 
publications This was because, after 1922, the British used force to strengthen their 
position in Sulaimani and its surroundings and clashed with the political forces of Sheikh 
Mahmud.203 The most prominent Kurdish organizations and newspapers at this stage and 
their role in the national awakening of Kurdish people will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  
Despite this, the main weaknesses of Kurdish nationalism at this stage was the inability 
to act on political principles when treating their opponents, this included the British, the 
Arabs in the newly-formed Iraq and the Turks, although the Turks took a radical 
approach towards the Kurdish struggle. Nevertheless, Kurdish nationalists did not 
originally have a developed political program that would create a popular movement, 
as Hilmi recorded in his Diary that Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists were in general 
divided and had problems among themselves. They were basically divided into three 
political groups, the patriots and independence supporters, supporters of the Turks, and 
the supporters of the British.204  
Although the majority of the Kurdish intellectuals were educated at the top Ottoman 
schools, as explained earlier, and some held key positions in the Sheik Mahmood 
government, particularly in the fields of education, publication and culture, although 
they did not have much involvement in the leadership and organization. Therefore, when 
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Sheikh Mahmud’s government collapsed, a political vacuum grew which could be filled 
only by political organizations, which did not develop in Kurdistan until the 1930s.205  
In this context, it can be argued that the Kurds in both eastern and southern Kurdistan 
were undermined because the project to create a Great Kurdistan was based on the local, 
rather than national, level, Thus, Kurdish nationalism was reduced to the extent that it 
could not progress achieving limited national, cultural and administrative autonomy 
requirements within the boundaries of the newly formed Iraq, Iran and Turkey. This 
shows another failure of Kurdish nationalism that led to a new crisis that had an impact 
lasting half a century i.e. from the leadership of Sheik Nehri in 1880 until the collapse 
of the Mahmud Kingdom in the late 1920s.  
4.5. Kurdish Organizations before 1930  
After the destruction of the Kurdish dynasties one after the other by the Ottomans and 
Persians, form 1851 onwards there was a political and historical vacuum in Kurdish 
history in terms of political activities, revolutions and the fight for independence. When 
the major allied powers arrived the region, and the continuous dissensions between the 
Ottoman and Persian empires in the region, the Kurdish freedom fighters’ movement, 
which was the Kurdish dynasties before, change to revolution and serious political 
conflicts between Kurds and the Kurdish rivals either inside or outside the great 
Kurdistan. We can see two apparent stages of this. 
Firstly, The first stage can be named as the stage of revolution and took place in the time 
of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri, who was known as the father of Kurdish nationalism in 
history. The second stage refers to Kurdish nationalism which belongs to the time of 
those civil, cultural and political organizations emerged that their goals and slogans of 
each organization have been illustrated briefly. They were established at the end of the 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. Each of these Kurdish 
cultural and political organizations raised slogans of independence for Kurdistan in 
content. They had tried to develop the idea of Kurdish nationalism among the people of 
Kurdistan.  
Although the majority of these organizations were from the northern Kurdistan and they 
were established by the descendants of Badir Khan and Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri, there 
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were varying levels of awareness of Kurdish nationalism in different parts of Kurdistan. 
compared to southern Kurdistan.   
At this point, some political and cultural groups and organizations emerged; even before 
the rise of these organizations, there were Kurdish individuals who actively sought to 
inspire Kurdish awareness while working for non-Kurdish organizations like Abdullah 
Jawdat and Ishaq Skuty who both worked for the Party of Union and Progress, which 
was established in March 1889. Jawdat and Skuty worked for the. Osmanli Newspaper 
(1897-1904) and Ijtihad Magazine (1904-1919) in order to spread the Kurdish voice and 
culture to the world outside the Ottoman Empire, and focused on reforming the internal 
problems of the Empire. 
Among The most important organizations established at this stage that played a 
significant role in inspiring Kurdish nationalist awareness included: 
First, Kurdish National Determination Group 1900-1904: this was established in Cairo 
in 1900 by Ahmed Ramz. However, there is little information about this group, and thus 
not enough for an analysis here. 
Second, Kurdish Progress Society 1908: this was established in Istanbul by several 
Kurdish politicians and elites after the constitutional revolution to overthrow the 
Ottoman Empire. The most prominent figures were Amin A’li Bader Khan and Sheikh 
Abdul-Qadir Nehri. This organization had five hundred members and supporters. One 
of the most important figures was General Sharif Pasha, who published the ‘Kurd’ 
Newspaper which was managed by Haji Tofiq Beg known as Piramerd and was a 
prominent Kurdish poet. The writers of this newspaper were Said Nawrasi, Abdulla 
Jawdat and Ismail Haqi Baban. These individuals were successful in spreading Kurdish 
nationalist awareness inside Kurdistan. These individuals are still respected today and 
are well-known people in Kurdistan. The establishment of this Society came as a reaction 
to the Turkism policy implemented by the Party of Union and Progress.206  
One can argue that this Society wanted to make sure that Kurdish nationalism would not 
dissolve into Turkism and fade away for good. According to Aziz Yamulki, believed 
that this Society had religious and cultural goals and worked for the independence of 
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Kurdistan.207 Also, they wanted to save the Kurdish language and establish a friendship 
with the Armenians. Ramzi Qazaz added that when the Turks found about the activities 
of this Society, they banned it in the same year and sought to execute its founding 
members. That is why Sharif Pasha and Amin A’li Badir Khan fled Kurdistan.208        
Third, Hevy Group 1910-1912: this was formally established in Istanbul in 1912, 
although its foundation was laid in 1908. This group was considered as the first Kurdish 
political and cultural group in the political history of the Kurds that particularized and 
focused on Kurdish students. It was established in Istanbul in 1912. The founders were 
Jamil Pasha, Qadri Jalil Pasha, Khalil Khayaly and some other learned Kurdish 
individuals. They were mainly interested in developing Kurdish national thoughts and 
were successful, especially after they published Rozhi Kurd (Kurdish Day) magazine, 
which was subsequently changed to and Hatawi Kurd (Kurdish Sun) magazine. Both 
magazines were managed by Abdul-Karim Afandi.209 As Bruinessen suggested, that the 
members of this group were influenced by the Ottoman bourgeois and the Young Turks, 
thus they had a nationalist approach. This group is also considered the first to have 
participated in the Kurdish liberation movement after it opened a branch in Lausanne in 
1912 by a supporter of the Badir Khan family. Both the ‘Kurdish Day’ and ‘Kurdish 
Sun’ magazines played a great role in advancing Kurdish nationalist awareness. This 
group remained active until the dawn of the WW1, but due to the fact that most of its 
members were sent to the war zones, the group’s activities were stopped.210 
Fourth, Kurdistan Istikhlas Society 1912: this was the first organization created in 
eastern Kurdistan and was established in 1912 in the Urmiar region. The founder was 
Ubeydullah, the son of Sheikh Abdulqadir Nehri. It was supported by said Taha Nehri, 
and Smkoi Shikak, who was the leader of the Kurdish revolution in Iranian Kurdistan.   
Fifth, Jihandan Group 1912: This was a cultural group which was established in 1912 
by Abdul Razaq Badir Khan, supported by Smkoi Shekak in Khoyee city which was 
located in eastern Kurdistan. One of its important activity was establishing a primary 
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school and teaching Kurdish children in the Kurdish language. Their teachers were 
Kurds and from Yarivan city. It was for the first time In Iran, this group published a 
newspaper called “The Roji Kurd (day of the Kurds), and the night of the a’jam 
(Iranians) in both the Kurdish and Persian languages”. Later, on the name of the 
newspaper was changed into Roji Kurd (Kurdish Day) and then production moved to 
Kurdistan. It is worth mentioning that this group sent several students to Russia in order 
to gain the experience of the outside world and to import it to the local Kurdish 
communities. Although this group was an intellectual and political group with many 
supporters, yet it did not last for long and was dissolved later on due to the onset of 
WW1.211     
Sixth, Kurdistan Superiority Association 1917:  This was established in November 1917 
in Istanbul, by Sheikh Abdul Qadir Nehri. This association at that time, since it brought 
together Kurdish elites and learned individuals. They also established Kurdistan 
Women’s Superiority Association in 1919, and also published Zhen Magazine (1918-
1919) and Kurdistan Magazine (1919-1920).212 
Seventh, Kurdistanian Group1922: This was considered as the first group founded in 
Sulimani city under the leadership of Mustafa Aziz Pasha Yamolky. The most prominent 
member was Rafiq Hilmi, the Kurdish historian, Azad Beg, Tawfiq Beg and Shukiri 
Beg, who published Bangy Kurdistan (Kurdistan Call) on 2 August 1922. One of its 
major aims was to support Sheikh Mahmood’s revolutionin south Kurdistan, which was 
to a certain degree an autonomous government in south Kurdistan and most particularly 
located in the heart of the Ottoman, Iraqi and Persian states.213  
The researcher argues that the Kurdish nationalist movement, when taking into account 
the above-mentioned organizations, was evidently a local movement, one that could not 
become a national movement for the whole Kurdistan. The reason for this was be that 
the organizations established in Istanbul were only focused on political and civil 
activities and did not have military supporters, whereas the organizations established in 
southern and eastern Kurdistan were mainly focusing on military activities rather than 
civil activities. In other words, there was no balance between the two sides, and thus no 
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organization could represent Kurdish nationalism for all Kurds. Even Haji Qadir Koye 
attempted to make the Kurdish elites and intellectuals aware of this imbalance long 
before these Kurdish organizations were established. He said in one of his poems during 
the nineteenth century:  
“With Sword and Pencil, the state will stand powerful and sovereign, I have the pencil, 
but the sword is missing!”214 
4.6 Kurdish Newspapers and Magazines before 1930 
The Kurdish nationalist movement was reflected in the Kurdish newspapers and 
magazines of this historic time. This section analyzes these publications according to the 
available documents. They were the key way for expressing of Kurdish intellectuals’ 
nationalist views. They are as follows:  
First, Kurdistan Newspaper: This was published in Cairo, Geneva, London, and 
Folkstone from April 1898 to April 1902, in the Kurdish and Turkish languages.215 To 
elaborate more on that, this newspaper is still considered the first in Kurdish journalism. 
It was published by Miqdad Madhat Badir khan during 1898-1902. and its role was so 
influential that even today when the start of Kurdish journalism is celebrated the articles 
written by Kurdish intellectuals are still praised are well praised which were written by 
the Kurdish intellectuals of the time. The newspaper presented Kurdish rights to the 
world, and for political reasons (pressure from anti-Kurds forces) it was published in 
many international cities. It was first published in Aleppo, then moved to Cairo and then 
to Geneva for its final issues. It opened a door for spreading Kurdish voices around the 
world. It also laid the foundation for the publication of another magazine, called Ijtihad 
in Geneva in 1904.216 It served the Kurdish cause well as writers were able to publish 
articles about Kurdish history in the Ottoman languages. Some of its well-known editors 
included Abdula Jaudat (1869-1932) and Abdulrahman Badir Khan, the brother 
of Miqdad Madhat Badir Khan.  
These endeavors by Kurdish intellectuals to develop Kurdish publishing continued, 
especially after the famous Kurdish political figure Hussein Hussney Mukiryani opened 
a publishing house in Aleppo. This was after he had visited Germany and learned the 
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Arabic alphabet and tried to mix some Persian alphabets. After moving this publishing 
house to Rawanduz City in southern Kurdistan in 1926, Mukiryani was able to publish 
a magazine in the Krmanji dialect. Later, the publishing house was moved again to Erbil, 
by his brother Guiy Mukiryani and renamed Kurdistan Publishing House. However, at 
this stage the British authorities brought with them some old publishing equipment to 
South Kurdistan. They established a publishing house in Kirkuk,and published a 
newspaper named Understanding the Truth in 1918. Also, the British governor of south 
Kurdistan, Major Soane,217 established another publishing house in Slemani and 
published a newspaper named Peshkawtn (Progress) on 29th April 1920 and this 
remained active until 1922.218  
Despite the flaws and deficiencies of the Kurdish publishing houses, newspapers, and 
magazines we might see about them, for that phase of the Kurdish movement they were 
new and effective in making Kurdish voices heard around the world. Linguistically and 
in terms of the usage of the proper Kurdish alphabet, they were not impeccable, 
especially as most of them used a mixture of Farsi and Arabic or Ottoman Turkish letters. 
However, in later years they switched to the Kurdish language and were able to do a 
linguistic innovation in their writings. Kurdish intellectuals perceived the alphabetic 
mixture on the political of Kurdistan, being influenced by the Kurdish enemies who 
imposed their languages and cultures. The most famous newspapers and magazines 
which were published between 1898 and 1932 are the followings which we try to 
mention briefly.   
Second, Kurd Newspaper: This was published by Tofiq Slemani (Piramerd), who was a 
poet. Its first issue was published on 5th January 1908 and was printed until 30th January, 
1909 in Turkish and Kurdish.219 
Third, Understanding the Truth Newspaper: This was published in Baghdad on 1 
January 1918 and was printed until 27th January 1919 in Kurdish, with Major 
Soane and Shukri Fazli as its editors. A total of 67 issues were published.220 
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Fourthly, Progress Newspaper: this was published in Slemani on 29 April 1920 and was 
printed until 1922, supervised by Major Saone. A total of 118 issues were published in 
Kurdish.221  
Fifthly, the Call of Kurdistan Newspaper: this was published in Slemani in 1922. It was 
printed from 2 August 1922 to 1 April 1926 in Kurdish, Turkish and Persian languages. 
Mustafa Beg was in charge of  the Kurdish and Persian sections and Rafiq Hilmi was in 
charge of the Turkish section.222 
Finally, the Hope of Independence Newspaper: this was published in Slemani in 1923 
and was printed  until 1924 in Kurdish language. Khuaja Afandi was the editor-in-
chief.223 
When looking at the life-span of these Kurdish newspapers, we can see that they were 
short-lived for political and financial reasons of that time. The political reasons refer to 
the lack of an independent Kurdish state to politically support the publishers, while the 
financial reasons refer to the fact that the economic circumstances of Kurdistan were not 
encouraging at this time. Thus, none of these publications could last for a long period 
since the political situation was mainly in the hands of the Ataturk, who stood against 
them due to conflict of interests. As a result, these publishers were either tortured, 
imprisoned or executed. Then, Both the Ottomans and Ataturk banned these 
publications, which is why we can see Kurdistan Newspaper 1898 was forced to move 
to five different locations throughout this period. 
If education was available, it was for the specific few and in generally taught Turkish, 
or Farsi or Arabic. Despite this, the Ottomans purposefully accepted the children of some 
noble Kurdish families with authority in their schools. This was not to simply educate 
them but rather to create a a more positive sentiment in them and their families towards 
the state. This had a direct impact in later years on the lower classes in Kurdish society. 
The education of Kurdish nobles sought to encourage them to support the Ottoman 
Empire rather than outside forces. This is evident when considering the opening of 
the Maktab Ashirat (Clan School) in Istanbul in 1892 by the Ottoman State.224  
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This step clearly shows that the Ottoman authorities did not want to create an opportunity 
for Kurds to develop a nationalist mentality. Similarly, during and after the WW1 when 
the major allied power countries came to Kurdistan, the British for instance, who had 
power over the area, did not establish schools and other education institutes that would 
enabled Kurds to learn foreign languages and develop intellectually. The only school 
where Kurdish historians and intellectuals were educated was Rushdiya Askary.  
After Kurdish and other ethnic students had graduated they were sent to Baghdad and 
then to Istanbul to continue their education. Historians such as 
min Zaki Beg, Ihsan Noori Pasha, Ismael Haqi Shawais, Maaruf and Chyrok and others 
were among those who graduated from this school located in Slemani city. Although 
these intellectuals’ views were well reflected in their writings about the history of that 
time in addition to their services, the influences of the Ottoman schools’ administration 
were also evident in part of their writings. This is especially apparent in the writings 
about the Kurdish military revolutions, where they praised the British and the Ottomans; 
the Sheikh Mahmud revolt, for example, was confirmed by writers like 
Nawshirwan Mustafa.225  
After the form of education offered at Rushdiya Askary School soon expanded to other 
Kurdish areas, such as Akre, Amedi, Sinjar, Dohuk, Zakho, Koya, Sharbazher, Kifri and 
Qaladze. The educational institutes opened their doors to Kurdish students. Also some 
Schools also opened in the cities of Erbil, Sulaimani, Kirkuk and Rawanduz. The first 
Kurdish school, called Kurd Nmuna Maktab (Kurdish Exemplary School), was opened 
in 1910 through the effort of some Kurdish personalities by an association 
called Kurd Nashir Maarif. Later, other prominent Kurdish figures 
like Abdulrazaq Badir khan and Simkoi Shkak opened school opened more schools in 
1913 in 1913.226 Alongside with their armed revolutions, Kurdish nationalist leaders 
intended for Kurds not be left behind in the advancement of education happening around 
the world. However, when looking at the history of these Kurdish schools, we can realize 
how late they were established by the Europeans, the Ottomans or the Persians in the 
Kurdish areas or the Kurds themselves opened. This is shown as a negative point in 
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Kurdish nationalism as they were not large scale comprehensive educational institutes 
created to develop nationalist mentality in Kurdish people. All they achieved for Kurdish 
individuals was resistance in the form of armed revolutions against those considered 
enemies of the Kurds. Therefore, the Kurds became genuinely aware that their 
nationalism was in danger not due to the regional empires’ interferences, but even at a 
larger scale from outside the region. These included, firstly, the changes and revolutions 
in Europe, especially after the eighteenth century.  
A series of changes and revolutions in the European countries propelled independence 
sentiments in other nations around the world. They directly influenced the literature of 
the writers and intellectuals from many nations in the world, and the Kurds were not an 
exception to these intellectual developments. In this context, we can see that several 
intellectuals appeared to hold these European reflections and thoughts which were not 
compatible with the Kurdish culture. Thus, these Kurdish intellectuals were not well-
received by the local Kurdish people since the latter one were not much aware of the 
developments of outside Kurdistan. Among Such Kurdist intellectuals are, include 
Rafiq Hilmi, Miqdad Madhat Badir Khan, Adula Jaudat, Hussein Husney Mukiryani, 
Ahmad Khwaja and Sharif Pasha. When Sharif Pasha became the Kurdish representative 
at the Paris Peace Conference on 1919 and the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, he presented 
those demands prepared by the Kurds to the members of both conferences.  
Before the reveal of the Turkism mentality by the Young Turks, they were joined by 
Kurdish intellectuals like Pirrot Fanun and Fajri Agha, who mentored other Kurds, so 
that they would become familiar with the modernizing views of the west. Changes that 
were brought about towards the end of the nineteenth century by the western schools 
directly affected the Turkish intellectuals in Istanbul. Hence, the Kurds and the above-
mentioned group of intellectuals lived there, and became part of it. This was because 
most of the Kurds who carried this modernization view were educated and lived in 
Istanbul and even took administrative posts in the Turkish government. They 
included Piramerd, Abdulraheem Rahman Hakary, and Mustafa Shauqi.227 
Compared to the influence of the Turkish, Arabic and Persian nationalist philosophy on 
the Kurdish nation, it can be argued that during the early twentieth century that these 
‘nations’ stood in opposition to the Kurdish fight for independence because they held 
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control over some Kurdish lands. Despite this, Kurds managed to protect their language 
and culture from them, yet Kurdish intellectuals faced multi-cultures and spoke Arabic, 
Persian and Turkish in a way that often a reflection of those cultures and languages was 
clearly seen in their writings.   
4.7 Kurdish Nationalist Poetry and Revolutions before 1930 
This section focuses on Kurdish nationalism from the 1850s to 1930 in terms of 
nationalist poetry and revolutions, as follows: 
4.7.1 Kurdish Nationalist Poetry   
First of all, before in 1850s, Ahmadi Khani (1650-1707), in his Mamu Zin poetry book, 
when he focused on Kurdish identity and nationalism throughout his poem. Thus, he is 
considered as the father of Kurdish nationalism as he was the first to focus on Kurdish 
nationalism, three centuries ago.228 In one poem he said:  
Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians, 
The Kurds have become like towers. 
The Turks and Persians are surrounded by them,  
The Kurds are in all four corners.  
Both sides have made the Kurdish people 
Target for the arrows of fate, 
They are said to be keys to the borders,  
Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark  
Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and Tajik Sea [Persians] 
Flow out and agitate  
The Kurds get soaked in Blood, 
Separating them [the Turks and Persian] like an isthmus.”229 
In fact, classical Kurdish poets had benefited from Khani’s literature written poetry texts, 
including Haji Qadri Koye and Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri, whose nationalist thoughts 
were influenced by Khani’s works. However, his poetry will not be discussed further as 
it was written before the nineteenth century. In around the middle of nineteenth century, 
south Kurdistan was considered as the center of culture and Kurdish poetry; it was active 
later than the other part of northern in terms of political and organizational activities. In 
the south in particular, the Kurdish poets and intellectuals had tried to revive their 
Kurdish identity in their writings and literary exts. They played a vital role in reviving 
Kurdish heritages. The most famous poets were as follows: 
                                                          
228 Khani, Ahmadi., Mamu Zin 1650-1707 (Kurdish), Jahiz publishing, Baghdad, 1970. 
229 Ibid, p. 53. 
104 
 
i. Abdulrahman Beg, son of Mahmud Beg, known as ‘Salim’ (1805-1869 ) 
His poems were first printed in 1933 at Mariwan Printing house in Baghdad. 
According to some opinions, he wrote an emotional poem out of feeling grief for living 
far from Kurdistan; he wrote:  
“I wish I knew when I get rid of Tehran 
The total of my beloved, my Mashhad or my residence will be just Ray 
I bet with my heart, Salm! If I get rid of Tehran 
The plains of Ray will be Paradise for me, I won’t pass through Tehran” 
In another poem he said: 
“From the sea of knowledge of edgy larynx of Whale 
From the army of Turks will be the echo of threnody 
If it is the nosh water of immortality, the enemy will not be beneficial 
From the core wave of edgy of letters, lifeless will be appear” 230   
ii. Ahmad Beg Fatah Beg’s poem 
Beg was born in 1878, according to the Arabic lunar calendar, in Sulaimani. He studied 
in religious schools in Sulaimani at the time of the Kurdish poets Kurdi and Salm. He 
was referred to be the descendant of the Sahibqran family, the famous Kurdish religious 
family. He wrote in Kurdish and Persian languages. In 1934, his book of poems was 
burnt when the city of Sulaimani was on fire. After that date, he wrote so many more 
poems and his literature which were collected by and included under a special title called 
‘foreigners attack on Kurdistan.’231 
He had a strong sense of nationalism and was known to have a bravery stance against 
the influences of the foreign nationalisms on the Kurds. He says: 
“O my homeland the Romans and Persians are eager to your Kurdistan 
The pride of Kurdish nation is your prestige title 
The glory of your mornings, nights, months and days is sufficient for you 
It was as a sign of pride for your stars rank at shoulders and chest 
Your hand of Qandil Mountain is long for them 
Piramagroon Mountain has got the glory of crown”232 
iii. Haji Qadir Koye (1816-1897) 
Haji Qadir was the most famous Kurdish poet and intellectual figure in Kurdistan. His 
strong sense of nationalism was sprung from Mamu Zin’s book, written by Ahmadi 
Khani. as mentioned earlier. He lived for a long time in Istanbul. Due to the widespread 
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illiteracy among the Kurds during this time, he depended on poetry in order to expose 
his political views to the Kurds. He identified one dangerous social disease among the 
Kurds, which was disunity and rivalry among Kurdish societies.233 For him, the only 
solution for this problem was unity and harmony among the Kurds. For example, he said:  
“Until the Kurdish tribes abandon disunity [if not], It will continue to be in ruin and 
destruction”   
He was the first Kurdish poet known as the Kurdish patriotic parrot of the nineteenth 
century, who, in his poems, always criticized the local Kurdish authorities for being 
obedient o the central authorities of the Ottomans and Persians. He said:  
“The rulers and the emirs of Kurdistan, 
From Botan until Baban [name of dynasties], 
All of them were memorizing the [Islamic] Shariah, 
They were leaders of the nation, 
But when their dynasties were demolished, 
Their hypocrisies soon revealed to the empires [Ottomans and Persians]”234 
In another poem, he encourages the Kurds to unite and work together for the success of 
the Kurds against what he sees as the enemy he says: 
“Start working as well as bees, 
Plan together in silence”235  
 
iv. Yunus Mala Rauf, Known as ‘Dildar’  
Dildar was born in 1918 in Koya city. He wrote one important poem, ‘ai Raqib’, which 
was adopted as the Kurdish national anthem. This poem was first played and sung in 
1946 on the proclamation of a Kurdish republic in Mahabad. Today, the song is played 
as the official anthem of Iraqi Kurdistan.236 In another poem describing Kurdistan, 
Dildar writes: 
“Nice Kurdistan and pretty homeland 
You are my compass  
My eyes were opened with your mountains 
They were familiar with your gardens 
Yea Kurdistan, you have created me 
You have created me, you gave me life 
The joy of my life is your joyousness 
The harm of my life is your threnody [melody]”237 
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In fact, Haji Qadir Koye’s writings and poems had great influence on Dildar’s nationalist 
sentiment. His sense of nationalism sometimes reached the level of radical nationalism 
due to the suppressions against the Kurds used by the Iraqi governments during the 1920s 
and 1930s.  
4.7.2 Kurdish Revolutions between 1850-1930  
In this section, the most significant Kurdish revolutions will be mentioned in brief while 
the detailed analysis will come in the subsequent section:  
i. The Revolution of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri of (1880-1881)  
Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri was born in 1830 in Nehri village and was the son of Siad 
Taha Nehri, the head of the tribe in the village. After his father’s death, Nehri became 
the ruler of the Nehri people. He was a rich man and owned two hundred villages on a 
massive area of land. Thus, he had a strong and respectable political, economic and social 
status. His religious beliefs were affiliated with Sufism and Naqishbandi branch of Islam. 
Thus, he also had a respectable religious status among the Kurds. He firstly supported 
and eventually participated in the Otto-Russian war in 1877-1878, because he wanted to 
exploit the outcome of the war to benefit the Kurdish economy, which was going through 
a difficult period. He was skeptical about the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, as it left him 
disappointed with the Ottomans and he came to the realization that they would not listen 
to him. He opened communication with the Sherif of Makkah, Khedive of Egypt, 
Russian Counsel in Erzurum and the British delegates in the region. In his 
communications, he was repeated that “…Kurdish leaders and mirs are of  the opinions 
that either in the Ottoman or Persian Kurdistan, an action must be made in which all the 
European states are made aware that Kurdistan is a different nation, and we want to have 
our affairs in our hands”.238 That is why Sheik Ubeydullah was considered as the founder 
of the idea of the ‘Kurdish Union’.  
The Ottomans were angry with this and the European states did not support him. This 
led to increased tension between the parties and, finally, the revolution against the 
Ottoman Empire in 1880. Neither Britons and Russians backed Ubeydullah; and as a 
result, his revolution was defeated down and ended in 1881 and finally he was captured 
and exiled to Makkah where he died in 1883.239  
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Although his revolutionary headquarters were in north Kurdistan, at the start of the 
revolution Ubeydullah began his revolutionagainst the Persian Qajar, in east Kurdistan; 
however, this resulted in the failure of the revolution.240   
ii. The Revolution of Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani of (1907-1914) 
The revolution of Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani (1909-1914). This entailed, an armed 
and political revolution originating in South Kurdistan and Barzani’s main aim was 
freedom and independence for Kurdistan, including all areas controlled by the Ottomans 
and Persians. Due to the execution of Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani by the Ottomans on 
1 January 1914, this Kurdish patriotic and political movement disappeared. In fact, tribes 
surrounding Barzani had, to certain degree, a different social charisma from the Sheikhs 
and tribe leaders surrounding them. Indeed, the Sheikhs in Barzan had their own 
autonomy, which isolated Abdul Salam Barzani and meant he the only Kurdish leader 
striving for social and political reformation. To reduce the effects of such isolation, 
Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani started to communicate intensively with famous and 
educated Kurdish personalities throughout Kurdistan.241 This made the Turks 
uncomfortable about Abdul Salam Barzani’s future, even though that they were aware 
that the Sheikh did not have much power in his region.242 However, Sheikh Abdul Salam 
Barzani was clear in his ambitions until he started a revolution. He began from boosting 
political activities and social reformation by depending on the available local forces, and 
then benefiting from the other regional Kurdish forces. The Sheikh soon found himself 
in a strong position, particularly after the colonial states became too busy to deal with 
their own conflicts, on one hand, and the weaknesses of the Ottomans, on the other hand. 
4.8 Why Kurdish Nationalism Failed in the early Twentieth Century? 
After the end of the Yazdansher revolution in 1856, the Kurds went through a dark period 
for the next twenty-five years. The reason arguably refers to the fact that during the 
1840s, all the Kurdish dynasties were destroyed which led to a political and 
administrative vacuu throughout Kurdistan that led Kurds towards revolution. Following 
this period of darkness, revolutionary sentiment began to grow again with the backing 
of Kurdish sheikhs and prominent families. In each part of Kurdistan, these sheikhs and 
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families were able to bring the people under their influences, notwithstanding that for 
several times they united all the Kurds for the purpose of one nation-state for the Kurds. 
These attempts failed for both internal and external reasons. This section will analyze all 
the relevant factors under two different subsections; the nature of Kurdish nationalism 
in the north and east, and nationalism in southern Kurdistan:    
4.7.1 The development of Kurdish nationalism in northern Kurdistan 
When discussing Kurdish revolutionary sentiment in northern Kurdistan, one should 
begin by looking at first major revolution led by Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri. The 
importance of Nehri’s revolution in the history of Kurdish liberation was that it aimed 
to liberate the other parts of Kurdistan and organize the nation as one entity. Moreover, 
the revolution aimed to regain Kurdish political status in the region, which was almost 
eliminated by the Ottomans andPersians. That is why Nehri’s revolution was considered 
as the first Kurdish revolution as it strived to advance the concept of establishing a 
Kurdish state.243 
In 1880, Ubeydullah’s army invaded northwest of Kurdistan’s territories controlled by 
the Qajar dynasty in an attempt to expand his control, and demanded recognition of 
a Kurdish state and his rule over the region. His army was defeated by the Qajar army 
and he withdrew his forces to Ottoman territories. When he faced attacks from both sides 
of his territory, Ubeydullah eventually surrendered to Ottoman authorities in 1881. He 
was then exiled to Istanbul, and subsequently to Hijaz, where he died in 1883.244 
It is noteworthy that the Ottomans did not honor all the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano 
of March 1878, although it was superseded by the Treaty of Berlin after four months in 
July 1878. Instead, the Ottomans wanted to achieve another goal, and wanted to find an 
excuse for it to the Russians.245 One of the excuses was that they were busy suppressing 
Nehri’s revolution. When no major reaction was observed from the Russian side, the 
Ottomans implemented a new strategy which focused on providing incentives to Kurdish 
elites in an effort to bring them under Ottoman influence. However, the Ottomans did 
not seem to have good intentions. In other words, the Ottomans wanted to incite a hatred 
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and conflicts between the Kurds and Armenians while seeking to achieve their own goals 
in the region and to further their own interests and controls of the region. To achieve 
this, the Ottomans provided both pecuniary and non-pecuniary means to the Kurdish 
Aghas (head of tribe or local ruler) to convince them that they were good friends of the 
Kurds, and keep the Aghas absent from engaging in the Kurdish  nationalist movement, 
on one hand, and to inspire the Muslim Aghas on religious grounds to stand against the 
Christian Armenians, on the other hand.The Ottomans then established a special army 
for the Kurds in November 1890, and passed a decree authorizing the militarization of 
Kurdish people under the name of Swarai Hamidiah, the ‘Knights of Hamidiah’,246 under 
the command of Ibrahim Pasha Milli in 1908.247 
Lazarev stated that one of the most important factors regarding involving the Kurds in 
this army was to influence those Kurdish fighters who posed enormous threats to the 
Ottomans. Thus, Kurdish fighters would be brought under  strict Ottoman martial laws 
and their rigid military administration; if successful, they would be able to suppress 
Kurdish fighters and then prohibit Kurdish tribal freedom.248 The plan was to reduce 
further riots and anarchy in the Kurdish region following the major Kurdish revolution 
led by Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri (1880-1881) nine years earlier. 249 At that time, the 
region was not only unstable, but Kurdish issues were rapidly escalating as the Kurds 
could no longer be deceived by the Ottomans nor by the Iranian rulers. That is why the 
Ottomans wanted to find a way to overpower the Kurds without encouraging a repeat of 
Nehri’s revolution.  
When Nehri’s revolution failed, no similar revolution was seen again despite protests 
taking place in other regions of Kurdistan. This situation continued until the beginning 
                                                          
246 Lazarev, M. S., The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue (Russian), Kaws Qaftan (Translated from Russian into 
Kurdish), 1st Edi, Jahiz Publishing, Baghdad, 1989, pp. 72-74. 
247 Chief of the Milan confederation of tribes was the most important commander of Hamidiye regiments, 
not only because of the many regiments he headed and the high number of armed men under his command, 
but also for his close ties to the Sultan, who referred to him as ‘my son’. In the first years of Hamidiye, 
Milli Ibrahim raised six regiments from the Milan federation. Later, after having managed to gain control 
over other tribes in the region, he was eventually able to count some twenty regiments as under his direct 
and indirect control. The regiments he raised totaled some 16,000 armed men, and the Sultan gave him the 
rank of Pasha (equivalent to a brigadier-general) following a visit in 1902 by Milli Ibrahim to Abdulhamid 
II in Istanbul. Ibrahim’s sons, Abdulhamid, Mahmmud, Halil and Temur, all reached the rank of Kaymakam 
(equivalent to lieutenant colonel) and commanded a regiment. Ibrahim Pasha Milli, 1908, at 
http://www.ekurds.com/english/ibrahimpash.htm, re-visited on 29 February 2017. 
248 Lazarev, supra, note 248, p. 87. 
249 Jalili, supra, note 191, p. 42.  
 
110 
 
of the twentieth century when a series of Kurdish uprisings took place led by Sheikh 
Abdul salam Barzani in 1907 to 1908.250  
Some Prominent Kurdish elites could not serve Kurdish nationalism although they had 
influences inside the Ottoman Empire’s administration, on both internal and external. As 
to the internal level, many Kurdish elites were major role players and decision makeers 
of the Union by fifty percent, such as Dr. Abdule Jawdat, Dr. Ishak Skuty and Ismail 
Enion. As to the external level, some Kurdish leaders became the main communication 
channels between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. In addition to this, Sharif Pasha 
introduced Latin letters to the Ottoman Arabic alphabet, and later played a great role in 
representing the Kurds at the    Paris Peace Treaty of 1919 and the Treaty of Sevres, as 
discussed in chapter three.   
Another important point to mention here is the emergence of the Young Turks in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The Turkish dynasties remained in Anatolia, while 
Sultan Abdul Majid removed all the Kurdish dynasties earlier through implementing a 
centralized system for the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman system there was no racial 
difference; that is why implementing centralization was not a difficult process to do. For 
example, on the personal identification certificates, no race was indicated, only religion 
and place of birth was mentioned; this was called the Ottoman millet system. However, 
when the Young Turks in 1906 emerged in Turkey racial discrimination become a 
common practice. This was evident in the military services; Kurdish officers were given 
the letter K as an identifying initial, while for Arab officers, the letter A was given. 
The failure of Kurdish nationalism can been seen from the failure of Kurdish revolutions 
as the ruling empires and major allied powers played a role in defusing and destroying 
Kurdish revolutions, in addition to local factors and the treachery of those against Kurds. 
If more elaboration is given to the internal factors, the Kurdish nationalist movement 
that Badir Khan’s family started in Urmia had a decisive victory in their first battle 
against the Ottomans and the army of Omar Pasha in cooperation with the English. But 
after this victory, Badir Khan’s cousin, the commander of the Kurdish revolutionarmy, 
joined the Ottomans and betrayed Badir Khan. Although there were sometimes battles 
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and conflicts between Kurds and the Ottomans, the Kurdish did not win a battle because 
of individual Kurds who supported the Ottoman army. Finally, Badir Khan and those 
who fought at the Arokh Castle for eight months were captured by the Ottoman army 
because they lacked essential weapons and supplies. They were sent to Istanbul and from 
there, to Bulgaria and Tikrit Gulf and Damascus. Finally, he was given poison that killed 
him which led his revolution into end in Damascus.251   
This shows that internal factions had a great effect on defeating the Kurdish revolution. 
Due to the ambition of getting posts in the Ottoman administration, which were given to 
Kurds by Ottoman and British leaders, divisions formed that often resulted in Kurdish 
leaders killing and executing each other, this can, therefore, be viewed as a Kurdish civil 
war. 
As to the civic approach of Kurdish nationalism movement at the hands of the Badir 
Khan family, they were considered the family of hope for Kurdish nationalist victory 
and a source of achievement in the fight for Kurdish independence. These efforts belong 
to Abdulrazaq Badir Khan, Najib Pash’s one of Badir Khan Pasha’s generation. 
Abdulrazaq’s fight for independence was significant because he was an intellectual 
figure, fight to issue a Kurdish newspaper in Urmia in 1912 until the Russians removed 
him from the city. After this, Abdulrazaq Smail Khan Shkak supervised this Kurdish 
bulletin, named Rozhi Kurd, until 1914.252 This bulletin was evidence of the Kurdish 
awareness level at that stage and developed patriotism among the Kurdish people. Apart 
from the cultural and political organizations established in Khoy city on 24 November 
1913 by Abdulrazaq Badir Khan, the main goal of this school was to educate Kurdish 
individuals and teach them in their mother tongue of Kurdish in order to create an 
intellectual and literate generation of Kurdish people so that the Kurdish children learn 
Kurdish language more than Persian language in Khoy city. The Iranian government 
immediately attacked and destroyed it. That is why the school center for Kurdish Youth 
had been transmitted to the Wan and Erzurum areas. These two cities had become the 
center of information and culture for the Kurdish nation.253 Moreover, the efforts of 
Abdulrazaq Badir Khan were the development of his predecessor’s ideas of 
independence for Kurds and the land of Kurdistan. Therefore, he unified the Kurdish 
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Union with Said Taha Shamzini, who was a Kurdish revolutionary and leader announced 
his support for Kurdish independence.254 
The Britons and the Russians took the opportunity for their own interests in the region. 
If we look at the time period after the Russian Tsar was overthrown in February 1917, 
and when the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, this was a huge disadvantage 
for the Kurds because the Ottomans became got better liberty to take actions against the 
Kurds. When Abdulrazaq Badir Khan returned from Russia to northern Kurdistan, he 
was immediately captured by the Ottoman army and was sent to a prison in Mosul and 
was sentenced to death.255 Two other Kurdish leaders, Said Taha and Simkoi Shkak, in 
eastern Kurdistan continued in their revolutions, and brought awareness to Kurds; but 
on the other hand, they caused casualties and the death of Kurdish leaders and brought 
an end to Kurdish revolutions. After the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, Kurds had 
been completely ignored for the interests of the super power countries. As mentioned in 
chapter three, these countries took advantage of Kurdistan for the sake of their political, 
economic and military forces in the Middle East, generally, and particularly in the land 
of Mesopotamia.256 Kurds took opportunities to request assistances from the 
international political forces in order to obtain independence and liberation from the 
Turks, Arabs and Persians. Whereas in responses, these forces reacted according to their 
interests in the region with Turks, Arabs and Persians, but not with Kurds. 
Here is an example of Abdulrazaq Badir Khan’s statement to the Russians: 
“I never accept my people being restrained by Turks, Arabs and Qajari Persians. Our 
goals and hope is we liberate our nation and country from the restrictions of dictators 
and invaders in order to achieve this holy goal. Our nation needs literacy to a great 
extent. The key to this is to provide education and learning opportunities for Kurdish 
nation. For this purpose, help us if we cannot liberate Kurdistan by myself or my 
comrades. At the time when Kurds are literate and powerful then they could arise 
and see their freedom”257 
This shows that Kurdish nationalism was no longer unknown to the Kurdish people, the 
Kurdish elites in particular, but was not strong enough to establish a united Kurdish 
nationalist movement because the majority were not educated to develop their sense of 
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nationalism. Instead, it was kept at the emotional level. This matter is connected with, 
the end of WW1 in 1918, Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Treaty of Sevres of 
1920 came about. The only Kurdish representative at the signing of the Conference and 
the Treaty was General Sharif Pasha, who had been a representative of Kurds in Paris.258  
At this juncture, the major allied powers had played negative role, as they ignored the 
clauses of (62, 63 and 64) for Kurds. The efforts of Ataturk had affected on the Kurdish 
issue. For example, on his visit to Erzurum in Kurdistan when he visited Sheikh Agha 
and other Kurdish leaders after WW1, he conducted a meeting with the Kurdish 
chieftains of that area of Kurdistan and promised to grant the Kurds their rights. He said: 
“O Kurdish nation! We are brothers and coreligionist. Unbelievers want to make us 
under their supervision take us to the Armenians, at that time we will lose our religion 
and honor I pledge on my honor to unite and fight together against those infidel 
Armenians and drive them out of our country, then we come together like brothers 
and provide your rights as Kurdish nation.”259 
Through an analysis of Ataturk’s speech, it is clear how much Kurdish people respected 
the opinion of other nations, despite that the Kurds had a great opportunity to obtain 
independence, but still did not want to let Ataturk down. This attitude stemmed from 
religious sentiment. This was the moment for Ataturk to exploit religion in attracting the 
Kurds towards him. Thus, he worked on the plan to convince the Kurds to support the 
Turks against the Armenians because the Turks and Kurds shared the same religion. 
Indeed, he succeeded. In this context, Kamaran Badir Khan pointed to the double-edged 
politics of Kurdistan, as he recorded that: 
“…upon the request by a British committee, I and my brother visited Kurdistan in 
order to know the situation up close, at that time the allied powers promised an 
independent state for the Kurds, but the Kurds thought if they turn away from Turk, 
it would be an act of treachery, since Ataturk correspondingly promised 
independence for the Kurds.”260   
Despite this, the Ataturk movement in later stages of development showed its true face 
as leaders moved progressively towards nationalist Turanism and the secularization of 
Turkey. Yet it is obvious that this played a huge role in deceiving Kurdish people into 
supporting the Ataturk movement and the Ottoman state. This become one of the main 
reasons for the League of Nations to neglect the Treaty of Sevres and the Kurdish issue. 
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On the contrary, because of the support from the Allied countries, it resulted in 
benefitting the Armenian people as they obtained independence, especially after the 
well-publicized Armenian genocide. For Kurds, the manipulations of Ataturk are 
considered the main feature of Kurdish nationalist failure. This is because while Ataturk 
was delivering a speech in support of the Kurds in Erzurum, he also moved against Kurds 
in a large meeting of the Ottoman government in Istanbul on 28 January 1920. This 
decision is known as ‘People’s Charter’ in the historical documents of Turkey. The 
content of the testament is as follows: “Kurdistan must remain under the authority of the 
Turkish government and the Villayet s of Mosul and Kirkuk have to be annexed to 
Turkey. The Turkish government has to be in continuous effort to achieve this goal.”261 
In support of the newly formed Turkish state, one can argue that all major allied powers 
and the neighboring countries of Kurdistan did not have a clear and honest policy with 
Kurds. In addition to this, the Kurds internally were unable to develop strong positions 
and had been a victim of false promises and pledges given by the major allied powers 
and neighboring countries. Kurds were not able to decisively take advantage of the 
historical opportunities and use them to solve their internal and external problems in 
favor of their land and people.  
As time passed and the Treaty of Lausanne approached, the Ottomans gained weight in 
the balance of power especially after they achieved some important victories against 
Greece and the Allied forces. This led to their participation in the League of Nations 
conference held in Lausanne, Switzerland on 10 November 1922. Ismet Inonu was the 
chief negotiator for Turkey and the British representative was Lord Curzon. Due to the 
length of the treaty, which took nine months to ratify, the Ottomans were able to fiercely 
stand against Kurdish interests and demands at every stage of the negotiations. At last, 
on 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was completed and signed by all participating 
parties. Thus, all the clauses of the Treaty of Sevres in which many promises were made 
to the Kurds, were ignored but in the latter treaty neither Kurdish representatives nor 
interests were mentioned.262  
One may wonder what happened to the clauses issued by the League of Nations after 
WW1 under the guise of protecting the rights of the minorities? Why did none of 
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Wilson’s fourteen points materialize? This was a valid question for the Kurds at that 
time. Conversely, the major allied powers privileged their interests in the territories they 
occupied and could not honor their promises to occupied nations when there was conflict 
of interests. This was especially true for the Kurdish revolutionary movement and the 
nationalist stages. Despite their continual attempt to be in close ties with the major power 
countries of the League of Nations, it became increasingly fruitless. An example of this 
is the letter written by Hapsa Khani Naqib to the League of Nations requesting help and 
support for securing independence for the Kurdish nation. Another example is Sheikh 
Mahmood Hafid’s letters to the British during his revolution of 1918 to 1924, asking for 
assistance and support in gaining independence for the Kurdish people. However, 
depending on the different political circumstances, the Sheikh pursued a policy of 
shifting sides. He sometimes asked for assistance for independence from the British and 
other times from the Ottoman state.263 This indicates that the Kurdish leaders did their 
utmost to gain the support of the major allied powers for their civil and armed 
revolutions. Yet it can be argued that the relations between Kurds and these international 
parties did not reach an adequate level to ensure Kurdish needs and demands and they 
did not secure full and honest support for materializing Kurdish rights. They avored their 
interests over Kurdish interests; this included the British, French, Ottoman Turks and the 
Russians, who had power in the Middle East in this period of history. This is despite the 
deficiencies in the Kurdish movements and the nationalist leaders analyzed in this 
section. 
Hopes to revive Kurdish nationalism did not die; Kurdish nationalist leaders and their 
revolutionary efforts continued and included Khalid Beg Jibry, who instigated to Sheikh 
Said Piran’s revolution, and Ihsan Nuri Pasha’s Revolution. After the execution of 
Sheikh Said and his companions, a group of young politicians and intellectuals formed 
the “Independence Society” in 1926. Among them, Ihsan Nuri Pasha continued with the 
political and military struggle of Sheikh Said in north Kurdistan. This was a proof of 
Said’s statement that he gave to the Turkish authorities before his execution. This 
revolution was started in three different areas of Kurdistan. The Mount Agri area in north 
Kurdistan was under the command of Ihsan Nuri Pasha and the civil section was led by 
Ibrahim Pasha. On 27 November 1926, with the slogan ‘Independence for Kurdistan’, 
they raised the flag of Kurdistan on Mount Agri. This revolution passed through three 
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different phases in the years 1926, 1927 and 1930 due to aggressive opposition from the 
Turkish state.264  
As part of the aggressive policy practiced by Ataturk’s army against Kurds throughout 
history, they cruelly stood against any independence attempts in north Kurdistan, the 
part of Kurdistan that was annexed to the Turkish state. During this revolution, on 
Ataturk’s orders, Sami Pasha massacred the Kurdish people and the independence 
movement’s leaders in the city of Van. Similarly, the Iranian army started murdering 
Kurds and annihilated the Kurdish revolt. Therefore, throughout history, these two 
neighbors of Kurdistan acted like two blades of scissors against Kurds and the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. This revolution spread through the areas of Bayazid, Agri city 
and the surrounding villages. Hilmi recorded that Kurdish losses in this war included the 
destruction of 660 villages, and the Turkish army looted and burned 15,206 houses. 
Thus, the Kurdish populations was forced to move to Izmir and other Turkish cities and 
many lost their lives due to hunger and exhaustion. Even on their arrival in these Turkish 
cities, the Kurdish immigrants faced humiliation by the local population and the Turkish 
army.265 
4.9 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter examined the weaknesses and strengths of Kurdish 
nationalism from 1850 to the 1930s although references to dates before that period made.  
Kurdish nationalism was discussed in various forms including Kurdish literature, poetry 
and the role of newspapers and political organizations which were the voice of the 
Kurdish struggle and displayed Kurdish identity to the world. At the end, the researcher 
argues that Kurdish nationalism weakened to the level of being unreliable to establish 
an independent state upon it. The main reason can be summarized that Kurdish 
nationalist movement was originally a local movement and not a movement that was 
institutionalized, programmed and educated on a philosophical ideology. It did not 
develop smoothly, and the movement was full of ups and downs alongside the conflicts 
against their surrounding enemies. The movement has not stopped and remains active to 
the present day. At any stage in which Kurds lost at the negotiating table, they resorted 
to armed conflicts and resistance movements. Meanwhile, external force often south to 
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attract Kurdish sentiment by providing the Kurds with arms and military equipment and 
used Kurds against their rivals. However, the provision of arms was limited and was 
only done to weaken an opponent and not with the purpose of seeking decisive 
international support.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis addressed an important issue, named: the dilemma of Kurdish nationalism 
during the Ottoman Empire between the years 1850 to 1930. The researcher attempted 
to answer a significant question in four chapters. The essence of the thesis question 
was: What went wrong that hindered the establishment of an independent state of 
Kurdistan in early twentieth century? In other words, why were the Kurds not able to 
achieve their legitimate right of to establish an independent state in the Middle East? 
Whether the concept of Kurdish nationalism was weak by its nature from the day of 
its emergence or there were other factors?  
Before answering the above questions, it is important to bear in mind that previous 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish historians and writes whose works were on Kurdistan and 
Kurdish issues during the early twentieth century or even subsequent to that, they did 
not particularly talk about the dilemma of Kurdish nationalism as an independent 
subject. Instead, they narrated or addressed different aspects relevant to Kurdish 
nationalism such as Kurdish political, economic, language, religious, geographical and 
cultural issues. In other words, this thesis addressed a specific question and answered 
it upon relying on a significant number of primary and secondary sources in order to 
identify problems faced by Kurdish nationalism during the early twentieth century. 
This question was not addressed by any previous writers. The scholarly contribution 
brought by this thesis to the question of Kurdish nationalism, can be explained as 
follows:          
First of all, the concept of Kurdish nationalism started to grow after the collapse of the 
Kurdish dynasties in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Kurdish dynasties 
fell under full control of the Ottoman and Persian powers, which led to the collapse of 
these dynasties. Before this, these dynasties had independent political authority within 
their territorial boundaries in Kurdistan which were adjacent to the Ottoman and 
Persian borders. When the Kurdish dynasties collapsed, the Ottomans and Persians 
imposed their rules on the Kurdish population which brought more difficulties in terms 
of imposing taxes and mandatory military recruitment for the two empires.  
Next, Kurdish nationalism developed when the Kurdish armed revolutions emerged 
against the Ottoman and Persian empires. At the same time, Kurdish journalism began 
to reflect nationalist sentiment for the first time. This stage is considered a key period 
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of growth of Kurdish nationalism at the hands of Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri and 
stemmed from his armed revolution throughout Kurdistan. Therefore, he was called 
the father of Kurdish nationalism. This lasted until Ottoman Empire began to show 
signs of weakness in from 1908 onwards. Kurdish nationalism during Nehri’s time 
reflected the Kurdish nation’s demands and took both a civil and armed approach. As 
to the civic approach, it aimed to raise nationalist awareness and loyalty to the 
independence cause instead of loyalty to the Sheikhs and tribes. This also led the heads 
of tribes to show more support for pro-Kurdish issues rather than focus on their close 
relationship with the Ottomans and Persians.                 
The geographical nature of Kurdistan limited the freedom of Kurdish leaders. That is 
why at the beginning of any Kurdish revolution, the geopolitical factor was the main 
influencing factor in choosing allies and enemies. Hence, these Kurdish leaders were 
unable to make their decisions for independence in their hands, which is why their 
revolutions were not successful.  
In early twentieth century, Kurdish nationalism become a robust awareness among 
Kurdish elites in the early years of the weakening of the Ottoman empire in the year 
1908 onwards. However, this stage can be considered the most difficult stage of 
Kurdish nationalism. The reason is that the major allied powers had directly interfered 
with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and its territories, the newly formed 
Turkey, and the Persians, which was the main part of their strategic interests in the 
region. They then signed treaties between themselves and the Turks, Arabs and 
Persians, excluding the Kurds. They even went one step further by partitioning 
Kurdistan as part of these treaties. The Kurds in return reacted in many different ways, 
such as making agreements with the allied powers and the Turks in order to achieve 
their national goals. However, the Kurds saw more armed conflicts with these allied 
and the two regional empires that changed the demography of Kurdistan and the 
division of Kurdistan after 1916, but the Kurdish identity and Kurdish issue became 
more popular since then.  
Hence, the researcher argues that despite a clear existence of Kurdish nationalism in 
all parts of Kurdistan especially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, yet the concept of Kurdish nationalism was not able to lead the Kurds to 
establish an independent state of Kurdistan. The reason was that concept of Kurdish 
nationalism was in a real dilemma, as Jamal Nabaz named it as ‘standard Kurdish 
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language. For him, such a lack was one of the main weaknesses of Kurdish 
nationalism, because language did not play a role in uniting the Kurds, as it did in 
Germany, as argued by Fichte. Rather, other languages were imposed on the Kurds, 
including Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. This was due to the inability of a Kurd who 
speaks the Kurmanji dialect to understand a Kurd from the East, and therefore, Kurds 
were obliged to use other languages such as Turkish, Arabic and Persian to 
communicate, in order to distance the Kurds from their own culture. This became more 
obvious after the arise of the Kurdish CUP in 1908, which subsequently gained 
influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, the researcher argues that standard 
language was not a real problem, but the problem was rather lack of unity among the 
Kurds in general, as the partitioning of Kurdistan had direct impact of the unity which 
left the Kurds without organization and ideology for their sense of nationalism.  
Besides that, although there was a real sense of nationalism among Kurdish 
individuals, it can be argued that there was no united Kurdish opinion to form a strong 
basis for Kurdish nationalism. Instead, each leader demanded Kurdish rights 
according to the geography and nature of their authority. That means the Kurds were 
not aware of the Kurdish nationalism struggles in a broader sense. Every Kurdish 
organization or movement had been supported from their local parts of Kurdistan only 
and not form the entire parts of Kurdistan although they attempted to break that 
locality.  In practice, they were only the representatives of their own regions. This 
meant that the Kurdish nationalist movement did not become a deeply-entrenched part 
of Kurdish society, rather it was formed of a limited number of elites within the 
community. Although Kurdish leaders wanted to bring all the Kurds under a united 
nationalist movement, yet Kurdish individuals remained loyal to their tribes and clans 
more than the Kurdish nationalist movement and of course, which consequently let to  
partitioning Kurdistan. In this context, it can be argued that Kurdish nationalism was 
not based on political thought, but it was rather a passive cultural product and never 
became a national project based on a well-founded ideology and philosophy.   
It can also be argued that religion did not play key role in the partitioning of Kurds. 
This was not the problem of religion itself but rather the Kurdish followers of the 
different denominations that became the weak point for Kurds in solving political 
problems. Otherwise, religion for the Turkish nation was the pillar of the Ottoman 
Empire, which existed for more than four centuries. Similarly, religion and the Shi’ite 
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denomination played the same role for the Persian nation. It became the savior of the 
Persian nation as they were able to make religion the motivating factor of maintaining 
a Persian empire, from the Qajars, Afshars to Pahlavis and present-day Iran. A similar 
case for the Arabs who used Islam for the sake of their nationalism.  
Although the majority of Kurds were Sunni Muslims and were followers of Sufi sects 
or Qadiri and Naqishbandi sects at that time, yet, they were not able to use Islam as a 
propaganda tool for the sake of achieving their nationalist rights. It is possible to state 
that religious sentiment had a negative impact on the Kurdish nationalism. Like Arabs, 
Kurdish identity was and still is connected to Islam, but because of the divided nature 
of Kurdish sectarian loyalties, Islam and Sufism were never been an important pillar 
of Kurdish nationalism.  
At external level, Kurdish nationalism did not have supports from outside and external 
lobbying. It is considerably apparent during this period of time is the lack of lobbying 
activities outside Kurdistan. Only one Kurdish man, Sharif Pasha, participated in the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. His voice however, 
did not have the direct effect as he was not able to establish a strong lobby for the 
Kurds and missed the golden opportunity for Kurdish independence and therefore 
suffered the imposition of clauses 62, 63, and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres. 
As far as the Kurdish connection with Britain, France and Russia is concerned, 
Kurdish leaders lacked experience in political maneuvering. They were either too 
naive in believing the foreigners and handing their powers over to the hands of the 
foreigners. They soon stood against them and sided the regional powers such as the 
Persians and Ottomans. This means although Kurdish political strategy was clear in 
their fight for Kurdish independence, their political strategies did not foresee a long-
term goal to achieve independence on their own land. As a result, Britain, Russia, the 
Persians, Ottomans, France and Arabs had their had interests and influence inside 
Kurdistan. They did not allow Kurds to have their own independent political system. 
On the other hand, the Kurds could not distance themselves from those mentioned 
powers, and each time they sided with one of them. Taking the historical context into 
account, one can say that the major allied powers did not have an honest purpose with 
Kurds. Thus, this lack of pragmatism costed the Kurds their independence.  
122 
 
At the internal level, there was a real lack of charismatic Kurdish figures in the same 
period. There were leaders, revolutionary figures and fighters willing to sacrifice their 
lives for the sake of Kurdistan. However, none of these Kurdish leaders had political 
and historical charisma to be the representative of all Kurds, like Ataturk who saved 
Turkey from the allied powers in the early twentieth century. At that time, this was an 
essential element for the Kurds. For example, despite Sheikh Ubeydulla Nehri’s 
complete patriotism when he launched his uprising, the Kurds not only did not join 
his revolution and offer their support, they played a direct part in defeating this 
Kurdish nationalist movement. That means the social environment for Kurds was not 
appropriate for creating the chance for charismatic figures to rise. 
Furthermore, there was no one symbolic figure for all the Kurds for various reasons. 
These include Kurdish society’s illiteracy. Those who were educated were either 
removed from the circle of the authorities and leadership or had no effect in the 
changes that happened in their societies. Although most of them were from educated 
families in Kurdistan, they could only fill a limited gap for Kurdish nationalist 
movement, due to the overwhelming tribal influence on Kurdish population on one 
hand and the religious influence of the Sheikhs on the other hand.  
Apart from that, independent economy was a crucial problem in Kurdistan. Although 
Kurdish land was rich with natural resources, it was controlled and used by the Arabs, 
Turks, Persians, Britain, France and Russia to serve their interests, not the Kurds. 
Thus, the Kurds could not finance revolutions and nationalist movements.  
It can be argued that Kurdish nationalism had been an armed reaction against the 
foreign and regional powers on Kurdish soil. It was not based on a specific 
philosophical and political ideology on which Kurdish individuals could be educated, 
according to the scientific criteria established by philosophers, whose views in 
identifying nations and nationhood we have discussed in this thesis. In other words, 
Kurdish nationalism can be regarded as a defensive reflex during early twentieth 
century, protecting the culture and the dignity of Kurdish people rather than a fully 
developed political ideology. That is why it could not become a strong foundation to 
render the Kurds to establish their independence aim like the Turanism or Arab 
nationalism though the latter one was not a good model.  
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It is finally concluded that there was a strong relationship between civil and armed 
revolutions that served Kurdish nationalism. The civil revolution took place in the 
form of Kurdish journalism as a medium of communication, writers and poets which 
was backing and representing Kurdish armed revolutions at internal and external 
levels. In the meantime, they gave particular attentions to Kurdish culture, language 
and educate Kurdish individuals on that rhythm in order to break the influence of 
Arab, Turkish and Persian cultures on Kurdish society. However, the civil form 
Kurdish nationalism was only successful to protect Kurdish identity, culture and 
language. On the other hand, the armed revolutions were not able to become an 
umbrella to control and achieve the goal of independent Kurdistan due to disunities 
among the Kurds inside Kurdistan, and the already implemented strategy of the major 
allied powers in the region had impacts on Kurdish nationalism were the major 
factors to weaken Kurdish nationalism. 
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